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Chapter 1
Introduction
Across various metrics, racial inequality continues to be an important feature of American life.
Black Americans tend to have very different social and economic experiences than their white
counterparts. A recent Pew report puts these facts in stark relief (Pew Research Center, 2016). In
2014, poverty and unemployment rates among blacks were at least double that for whites. White
households took in an average of 66% more income than black households. And white households
held 13 times the wealth of blacks, with a substantial portion of this coming from large racial
differences in homeownership rates.
These Black-White racial differences persist in other domains. Black Americans experience the
justice system differently with an imprisonment rate 5 times that of Whites (Sentencing Project,
2017). Black men in particular have a high probability of incarceration, with those born in 2001
facing a 1 in 3 chance of imprisonment at some point in their lives. And politics is not immune.
Although it is the most racially diverse Congress ever, racial and ethnic minorities are still un-
derrepresented in the current 116th Congress, with this a particularly acute problem in the Sen-
ate (Bialik, 2019). Moreover, Black Americans may increasingly face difficulties simply casting
ballots. Many states are instituting voter identification laws and other changes that make voting
costlier and may disproportionately affect groups including racial and ethnic minorities (Berman,
2015).
These differences call for explanations. Does this variation stem from race-based factors like
discrimination, or does it come from factors unrelated to race? Some may, for instance, explain
racial income gaps by pointing to differences in educational attainment. It’s not about factors
related to someone’s membership in a racial or ethnic group but something else. Alternatively,
people may build on these differences by pointing out that race-based discrimination in hiring may
matter. Black and White applicants for the same job who share the same background characteristics
1
do not have an equal shot. From this perspective race shapes lived experiences; race matters in an
ostensibly colorblind society. These understandings matter because they then shape people’s policy
preferences. If various outcomes are unrelated to race, then addressing racial inequality as racial
inequality will not occur (Iyengar, 1991).
Importantly, though, a sense that race is “real,” i.e., socially meaningful, may manifest more
for marginalized racial groups. Whites’ privileged position in the United States allows them to
avoid confronting race and how it shapes their norms, perspectives, and experiences (Waters, 1990;
Haney Lo´pez, 2006; Omi and Winant, 2015). Moreover, by experiencing racial victimization
infrequently, if at all, Whites never confront the “petty indignities and intentional slights of racism,”
leading some scholars to argue that “to be white is to not think about [race]” even as it is central to
how whites carry out their lives (Haney Lo´pez, 2006, 111-112; see also Flagg, 1993). Being White
does not potentially create problems for shopping, job hunting, or even walking down the street.
Moreover, American social life is built such that whiteness seems natural, rendering non-whites
the representatives of racial difference. For Whites, often when their race, specifically ethnicity,
becomes salient, it’s by providing a symbolic sense of community (Waters, 1990). This contrasts
sharply with groups like Black Americans for whom social and political realities make race a more
readily accessible perspective (Dawson, 1994).1
Whites’ “race-blindness” matters because people’s daily experiences shape how they under-
stand the social world (Lippmann, 1922; Gamson, 1992). Whiteness operates as a set of lenses
through which whites interpret the world, which makes it difficult for many to understand the the
different lived realities of non-whites (Haney Lo´pez, 2006). Events unfold for reasons unrelated to
race. Part of what it means to be white comes from thinking that race does not define one’s daily
life. But this happens even as whites use the “racial” characteristics of other groups to make sense
of the social and political world (Walsh, 2004; Haney Lo´pez, 2006).2
1Data from the 2016 American National Election Pilot Study are illustrative. It asked respondents “How important
is being [RACE] to your identity?” Whereas 54% of black respondents said their race was “extremely important” to
them, only 20% of whites said the same. In fact, nearly 40% of whites said that their race was “a little” or “not at all”
important to their identity.
2The 2016 ANES Pilot Study also asked a variety of questions related to white privilege. Nearly 53% of whites
said that being white did not provide any “unearned privileges in today’s society,” with a similar percentage saying
2
But people also often rely on others to help them make sense of events they do not experience
firsthand (Lippmann, 1922; Gamson, 1992). These others include a person’s social network peers
or elites in politics or the media. Because Whites’ social networks are usually racially homoge-
nous (Cox, Navarro-Rivera and Jones, 2016), and Whites typically participate in predominately
white civic organizations (Walsh, 2004), elites are likely more influential here. Elite influence
is possible because the public trusts them as a source of information (Zaller, 1992). This influ-
ence is particularly likely for political elites because increasing elite polarization has resulted in a
more party-centric political environment where individuals’ party affiliations play an increasingly
important role in shaping attitudes (Hetherington, 2001; Levendusky, 2009; Mason, 2015).
I argue that politics is particularly important because it is intimately connected with race, and
has been since the country’s founding. Racial considerations contributed to the Constitution’s
shape, and subsequently structured party systems (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Schickler, 2016;
Tesler, 2016) and directly influenced policymaking (Haney Lo´pez, 2006; Katznelson, 2006). The
politicization of race brought about by these institutions facilitates the links that exist between the
mass public’s racial attitudes and their policy preferences (e.g., Gilens, 1999; Tesler, 2016) and
party attachments (e.g., Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016), links that in turn maintain race
as an important institutional feature.
Through focusing on politics I provide an account of political race-making. By this I mean
the ways in which politics shapes understandings of race, both in terms of racialized categories
and the centrality of these concerns in interpreting lived experiences (see also Prewitt, 2013; Omi
and Winant, 2015). Specifically, I aim to understand whether and how politics can shape Whites’
awareness that racial inequality and racial identity/difference are social facts (Omi and Winant,
2015, 260). This awareness of race abuts a pervasive colorblind, even resentful, perspective con-
tending that because the Civil Rights movement was successful, any explanation of racial differ-
ence emphasizing race and discrimination over non-racial factors like market forces or character
is incorrect and even possibly racist (Bonilla-Silva, 2014; see also Kinder and Sanders, 1996;
that white people have few advantages that minorities do not have.
3
Haney Lo´pez, 2006; King and Smith, 2014; Omi and Winant, 2015).3 Politics’ increased social
salience, and the tight connections between politics and race, suggest elites have the capacity to
produce some form of race-consciousness or to reinforce the colorblind and resentful lenses that
many, particularly Whites, tend to adopt. As Civil Rights leaders once did, political actors could
challenge this new conventional wisdom about race, changing attitudes and beliefs in the process
(cf. Bonilla-Silva, 2014, Ch. 11).
I employ a multi-method approach to understand whether and how politics can shape how
Whites understand race. In the first chapter I investigate whether mass attitudes may have elite
origins by investigating how racially liberal and conservative elites talk about race. I analyze
transcripts from two partisan news shows: The Rachel Maddow Show and The O’Reilly Factor.
Pairing a case study with text-as-data methods, I provide insight into themes constituting racially
liberal and conservative elite discourse. Racial liberals like Maddow emphasize that race matters–
racial bias and discrimination still shape nonwhites’ life chances. In contrast, racial conservatives
like O’Reilly contend that race does not shape life chances and serves only as an attention-seeking
device. Identifying these divides helps shed light on the origins and dynamics of mass racial
attitudes.
The second empirical chapter offers a first test for elite influence on perceptions about race
by considering agenda setting on race. Traditional agenda setting accounts show that the more
the media cover an issue the more important it seems to the public. But these analyses focus
on media coverage featuring a unidirectional frame, a limitation for topics like race where elites
can present markedly different perspectives. I demonstrate that these different perspectives af-
fect elites’ agenda setting capacity in observational and experimental analyses. I use the content
analysis described in chapter 1 to create a measure for how much attention Maddow and O’Reilly
give to race and relate this with the public’s most important problem evaluations. I find that while
Maddow’s coverage produces expected agenda setting effects, O’Reilly’s does not. I support these
3I emphasize psychological processes here rather than materialist conceptions of racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Omi
and Winant, 2015). I do not deny that structures and material well-being matter. Rather, I argue that cognitive
and affective processes are central for understanding how people make sense of the social world created by these
institutional arrangements (see generally Neville et al., 2000).
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conclusions through two experiments where I demonstrate that story frames, not just audience pre-
dispositions or show content differences, influence agenda setting effects. Talking about race can
motivate public concern with it, but only when presented in particular perspectives.
I extend the investigation into attitudinal effects in the third empirical chapter. Here I examine
the connection between politics and racial group evaluations. Specifically, I focus on the relation-
ship between whites’ party loyalties and their racial attitudes. The conventional wisdom in political
science is that racial attitudes are an important foundation for partisanship (Green, Palmquist and
Schickler, 2002; Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016). Yet, I argue that polarized and competi-
tive political contexts can make partisanship a more central attitude, increasing its causal influence
relative to other predispositions, including racial attitudes. I apply cross-lagged regression models
to panel data from the 1990s and 2000s and demonstrate that whites do indeed align their racial
attitudes with their party loyalties, and partisanship’s increased centrality in recent years makes
these ties more influential. White Republicans and Democrats hold increasingly polarized views
of Black Americans. Although I offer no direct test for events or other specific political stimuli,
these analyses demonstrate that politics can make race by shaping how Whites understand racial
categories.
The final empirical chapter begins to assess why partisans update their attitudes in polarized po-
litical contexts by examining whether individual differences condition the dynamic relationship be-
tween Whites’ partisanship and their racial attitudes. Specifically, I focus on political engagement–
captured by education, political interest, and political awareness–as a moderating force. I find that
in party-centric political contexts White partisans of all stripes adopt new racial attitudes, but the
politically engaged change the most, and especially Democrats. Relatedly, and in contrast to work
arguing it promotes tolerance, education produces similar dynamics. College-educated White par-
tisans display more attitude polarization in these periods than those without college degrees. Party
encourages racial attitude change, and the politically engaged are the vanguard.
These patterns have important implications for the future of American politics. Partisan po-
larization appears unlikely to disappear in the near future and issues related to race are likely to
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persist in importance. Partisanship is likely to continue to shape Whites’ beliefs about race and
racial groups for the foreseeable future. By way of conclusion, I note descriptive patterns suggest-
ing continued party influence. I also highlight areas for future work.
6
Chapter 2
The Content of their Coverage: How Partisan Media Discuss Race
Scholars often identify the Civil Rights Movement as helping inaugurate an era of legal racial
equality (e.g., Klinkner and Smith, 2002). But despite formal advances protecting the franchise and
guarding against overtly discriminatory behavior, stark inequalities persist. Blacks and Latinos are
twice as likely as whites to be poor, whites are more likely to be employed, and white households
hold 10-13 times the wealth of Latino and black households (Pew Research Center, 2016).
To address such disparities scholars and political observers often propose that political elites
need to lead the United States in a conversation on race. Political and social developments follow-
ing the Civil Rights Movement motivated elites to turn away from race-conscious policy discus-
sions in favor of race-neutral governing (King and Smith, 2014). That whites’ racial attitudes pro-
foundly shape their political opinions, including support for race-targeted policies, appears only
to reinforce these decisions (Hutchings and Valentino, 2004). Echoing Myrdal (1962), the pro-
conversation position appears to hold that elites can encourage whites to overcome this aversion to
race-conscious policies by giving voice to the realities minority communities face.
This view has theoretical support. Although scholars persuasively argue whites’ racial views
are early-learned and persistent (Sears and Brown, 2013), evidence suggests these beliefs may
respond to the social and political context (Schuman et al., 1997). Critically, elite behavior helps
define these contexts. Some mass attitude scholars, for instance, have claimed that elite cues helped
replace Jim Crow racism with culturally or symbolically racist beliefs (Kinder and Sanders, 1996).
Further, social psychologists find that people provide views about racial groups that fit with per-
spectives they hear (e.g., Blanchard et al., 1994; Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004; Apfelbaum et al.,
2010). Taken together, mass racial attitudes may look the way they do because individuals’ ten-
dency to divide the world into kinds (Hirschfeld, 1996) intersects with information from elites on
how these kinds should be understood. This thinking extends conventional models of elite-driven
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public opinion formation (e.g., Zaller, 1992) to argue that elites may influence core predisposi-
tions, the very things these models propose as guiding the reception and incorporation of other
considerations.
But despite these insights, scholars have devoted surprisingly little systematic attention to elite
rhetoric on race (cf. Gillion, 2016).1 This is a substantial oversight when striving to understand
the nature and origins of mass racial attitudes. First, if elites do matter then scholars must assume
the elite information environment on race has a specific flavor. Scholars holding that mass racial
attitudes have persisted in a consistent guise for decades (e.g., Tesler, 2016) must assume either
a stable stream of information from elites or that these attitudes develop and persist without elite
influence. Second, it forces scholars to assume a unified signal that may not exist. An expansion
of media options creates a fragmented news ecosystem potentially producing distinct information
environments (Prior, 2007). This is particularly important in light of partisan media outlets that
provide specific perspectives on the day’s news and the relationship between people’s political
views and preferred news sources (Pew Research Center, 2014).
Third, not investigating how elites talk about race blinds scholars to possible explanations for
mass attitude patterns. Elites could influence predispositions by shaping which ones people use to
understand race and potentially race-related events. Tesler (2016) demonstrates that racially liberal
and conservative attitudes increasingly explain whites’ political views. This chronic accessibility
suggests these attitudes have strengthened, a potential byproduct of elites consistently adopting
views reinforcing racially liberal or conservative attitudes (Howe and Krosnick, 2017). Moreover,
social psychologists have provided rich evidence that how racial progress and diversity are pre-
sented can lead whites to change their racial attitudes (Knowles et al., 2009; Craig and Richeson,
2014; Wilkins and Kaiser, 2014), providing another avenue for elite influence. But no evidence
to date can speak to how frequently elites adopt such perspectives, which limits understanding
whether and to what degree racial attitudes may change in ways extant work suggests.
1Prior investigations speaking to elite racial cues either focus on limited domains like campaign appeals (e.g.,
Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Mendelberg, 2001) and party platforms (e.g., Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Schickler,
2016), or on specific issues like welfare (e.g., Gilens, 1999), crime (Gilliam, Iyengar and Simon, 1996), and immigra-
tion (e.g., Pe´rez, 2016).
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Finally, studying elite rhetoric can speak to disagreements among public opinion scholars re-
garding the nature of certain racial attitudes. Some claim that symbolic racism or racial resentment
(Kinder and Sanders, 1996) conflates principled conservatism with racial animus (Sniderman and
Piazza, 1993; Huddy and Feldman, 2009). Although presented in part as measurement critiques,
this position has an important theoretical implication: racial animus and principles are separa-
ble concerns when it comes to racial politics; value orientations convey no information about race
when related to political judgments. But elite rhetoric can racialize non-racial views (Gilens, 1999;
Winter, 2008; Tesler, 2016), creating the fusion of principles and group evaluations constituting
racial resentment (Kam and Burge, 2018). Studying elite rhetoric on race can offer insights into
the nature and political relevance of distinct mass attitudes.
To engage with the broad literature on mass racial attitudes I analyze elite rhetoric as it relates to
racial conservatism and liberalism. Racial conservatism manifests as a commitment to race-neutral
governing and a belief that individual characteristics, not structural barriers, explain group-based
disparities. Racial liberalism emphasizes structural barriers to advancement and racial diversity’s
benefits. I develop these themes further in the following section.
I analyze partisan television to identify discrete racially liberal and conservative themes elites
use. MSNBC and Fox News are an ideal place to identify how racially liberal and conservative
elites talk about race because these outlets devote themselves to providing consistently liberal and
conservative perspectives of the day’s news (Levendusky, 2013). Viewers receive clear and consis-
tent information that, intentioned or not, can establish whether and how race should matter socially
and politically. Further, while prior work suggests these outlets should only cover issues promot-
ing ideological or partisan ends (Levendusky, 2013), when required to cover nationally important
events they should frame these issues to provide congenial perspectives. Fox will ignore race or
adopt a racially conservative perspective that aligns with its audience’s expectations. MSNBC,
in contrast, should give race more attention and highlight discrimination when doing so. These
coverage differences inherent in partisan television allow me to identify some of the racially con-
servative and liberal considerations elites provide, views that may contribute to racially liberal and
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conservative mass attitudes.2
I use transcripts from flagship primetime programming on Fox and MSNBC, The O’Reilly
Factor and The Rachel Maddow Show, to identify themes racially conservative and liberal elites
provide. Far from ignoring race, each show consistently covers it. Further, O’Reilly’s attention
to race surpasses Maddow’s, a surprising outcome given what existing work suggests these outlets
should cover (Levendusky, 2013). But more important, the differences in how each show covers
race shed light racially liberal and conservative elite views and suggest connections with mass
beliefs. Maddow endorses race’s relevance by emphasizing its social reality and its centrality to
understanding issues communities of color face. O’Reilly, in contrast, holds that race is irrelevant
and those claiming it matters simply want attention. Importantly, these analyses are not about
demonstrating that Maddow and O’Reilly talk differently about race; rather, I use these differences
to shed light on the types of racially liberal and conservative rhetoric the mass public may hear to
understand if elite views may have attitudinal implications. Although I offer no direct tests for this
last point, I conclude by drawing on extant work to highlight mass attitude patterns consistent with
the possibility that elite rhetoric may shape predispositions.
2.1 Stylized Accounts of Racially Liberal and Conservative Rhetoric
Research on mass racial attitudes suggests these views can be characterized broadly as racial
conservatism and racial liberalism. Given my interest in understanding whether elites may shape
these views, I conceptualize elite rhetoric along similar lines. These positions incorporate beliefs
about race’s social and political relevance–explanations for how it does or does not matter. I use
these themes to establish a framework for interpreting my later results, but I do not see them as
definitive. I instead proceed inductively to identify specific content and perspective differences
that racially conservative and liberal elites provide.
Racial conservatism includes colorblind or race-neutral views alongside a racially resentful
perspective. It builds from conservative intellectuals articulating positions for decades distancing
2These outlets can also address the myriad contexts where elites may talk about race noted in Footnote 1.
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themselves from considering race in the policymaking process (Lowndes, 2008; King and Smith,
2014). It incorporates liberal ideals like equal opportunity, choice, and individualism, and min-
imizes discrimination, as explanations for potentially race-related matters (Knowles et al., 2009;
Bonilla-Silva, 2014). Racial conservatism also includes a view that given the Civil Rights Move-
ment’s successes, society reflects meritocratic ideals. Consequently, preferential treatment of any
kind is unwarranted, especially if special attention is group-based. It instead holds that the best,
most qualified people end up with the good things in life. Thus, if processes violate meritocratic
norms, as in instances of affirmative action, racial conservatism sees this as constituting reverse
discrimination. By deeming skin color irrelevant, racial conservatives are unlikely to ascribe im-
portance to race when addressing social problems.
Racial conservatism also incorporates explanations for minorities’ social and economic status.
For instance, it holds that blacks do poorly because they created a culture that promotes unhealthy
values and bad habits (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Tarman and Sears, 2005; Kam and Burge, 2018).
It denies that discrimination and prejudice threaten nonwhites’ life chances and instead sees hard
work as sufficient to overcome any disadvantages. By relying on individual rather than structural
status explanations, racial conservatism includes resenting any perceived demands from minority
groups for special attention and improvements to their station (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Tarman
and Sears, 2005).
Racial liberalism, in contrast, more directly engages with group-based inequalities and the dif-
ferent lived experiences of people of color. It challenges the idea that race no longer shapes indi-
viduals’ life chances, evidenced by liberal activists championing policies to help nonwhites (King
and Smith, 2014). Whereas racial conservatism opposes black Americans and other nonwhites
receiving special attention, the racially liberal view embraces this position. It acknowledges prej-
udice and discrimination, both past and present instantiations, and views individual effort alone
as insufficient for group advancement (Kam and Burge, 2018). By taking a structural perspective,
racial liberalism echoes in part former Supreme Court justice Harry Blackmun’s position in Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke that “In order to get beyond racism, we must first
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take account of race.” Group-based inequalities persist and thus require attention and, potentially
group-based, solutions.
Racial liberalism further emphasizes the unique experiences of people of color by affirming
all groups’ unique backgrounds and experiences as well as the contributions they make to society
(Citrin and Sears, 2014). Emphasizing equal group worth encourages seeing racial affairs as racial
rather than as race-blind because ignoring race may homogenize potentially disparate group ex-
periences. By drawing positive attention to otherwise marginalized communities, racial liberalism
endorses race’s political and social relevance.
To identify specific frames of racial liberalism and conservatism I focus on partisan elites be-
cause each party should employ different kinds of rhetoric. Since the conventional wisdom sug-
gests talking about race calls attention to problems identified as racial (Gillion, 2016), Democrats
should devote more attention than Republicans (Levendusky, 2013) and this rhetoric can shed light
on racially liberal themes. In contrast, Republicans should talk less about race (Levendusky, 2013,
but see Gillion, 2016) and their rhetoric will offer insight into racially conservative views. Again,
I do not seek to show that partisan elites speak differently about race; I focus on them because I
expect that they should. My aim instead is to use these differences to identify this rhetoric’s spe-
cific content. By identifying the content, this investigation can help shed light on mass attitudes
when paired with insights from elite-driven public opinion models (Zaller, 1992) and investiga-
tions into sources of racial attitude change (e.g., Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004; Knowles et al.,
2009; Apfelbaum et al., 2010; Craig and Richeson, 2014; Wilkins and Kaiser, 2014).
2.2 Measuring Racially Conservative and Liberal Rhetoric
I build on existing conceptualizations to define racial rhetoric as references to a racial group,
racialized policy or experience, prominent minority individuals, or some other racial association
(Mendelberg, 2001; Gillion, 2016). This attempts to capture explicit and implicit racial references
regardless of content and degree of emphasis within a conversation.3
3Emphasizing rhetoric is unfortunately limited, however, because I cannot account for images linking implicit
rhetoric and racial groups (Mendelberg, 2001).
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I focus on race in relation to racial minority groups. Whereas studies of race often center on the
black-white divide, a diversifying country necessitates expanding conceptualizations to account for
growing immigrant communities from Asia and Latin America. A broader view of race matters
for understanding whether partisan elites affect mass attitudes even as black Americans remain at
the bottom of the racial hierarchy (Bobo, 2011). This view is especially important because whites
often view these groups in a similar light (Kinder and Kam, 2009); information on one group may
shape views on all.4
To identify racially conservative and liberal elite rhetoric I use transcripts from flagship week-
day evening shows on Fox News and MSNBC: The O’Reilly Factor and The Rachel Maddow
Show.5 Because Maddow premiered after O’Reilly, I focus on the period between September 8,
2008, and December 31, 2016, when the shows aired simultaneously.6 Each show consistently
commanded a large number of viewers on the respective network. Before its cancellation in 2017,
The Factor was typically the highest-rated cable news show. Although I do not argue that these
shows are necessarily representative of elite discourse more broadly, I argue their coverage dif-
ferences can provide insight into some racially conservative and liberal themes elites offer (for
a similar approach, see Levendusky, 2013). Although limited temporally, the 2008-2016 period
allows for comparing shows in the same news environment to understand whether and how these
elites cover race.
Partisan television is advantageous because of the likely consistency of cues on race and its au-
dience size. First, Fox and MSNBC have taken deliberate steps to provide conservative and liberal
interpretations of the news (Levendusky, 2013). These outlets can thus shed light on the nature
of racially conservative and liberal elite discourse. Second, partisan television appears to have a
broader reach than other partisan media. More people consume it than partisan newsmagazines
4Focusing on nonwhites may still be limited because it does not consider whiteness. But accounts of whiteness’s
origins suggest these concerns are not dire. As Haney Lo´pez (Haney Lo´pez, 2006) notes, whiteness developed by
establishing who is not white rather than affirmatively defining who counts as white (21). Consequently, focusing on
rhetoric referencing nonwhites can speak to how people understand race in its myriad guises, including whiteness.
5While other shows could be included or used instead, O’Reilly and Maddow offer the longest time coverage and
most watched programming for each outlet, making them opportune subjects.
6These transcripts come from the DowJones FACTIVA database.
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like The Nation or The National Review or blogs like Daily Kos or Breitbart (Pew Research Cen-
ter, 2014), and spillover effects may expose non-viewers to its programming (Levendusky, 2013;
Druckman, Levendusky and McLain, 2018). Partisan television’s relatively broad reach, and po-
tential to disproportionately affect viewers’ attitudes (Levendusky, 2013), help make it an excellent
place to identify racially conservative and liberal themes.
I use a multi-method approach to connect partisan racial discourse with racial liberalism and
conservatism. I begin with a case study of the shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson,
Missouri. By using a nationally important event I address expectations that partisan media only
cover news that benefits their side (Levendusky, 2013). But because outlets cannot ignore an event
like Ferguson, I can contrast how O’Reilly and Maddow cover the same story and offer initial
evidence regarding the nature of racially liberal and conservative frames.
I then systematically address each show’s attention to race through two text-as-data methods. I
first use an algorithm to categorize transcripts as mentioning race or not. This procedure recovers
the set of documents about race that I use to compare each show’s level of attention to race and
that serve as the data with which I address the racially conservative and liberal perspectives each
outlet provides. I follow prior work and segment transcripts by speaker-turn and then divide these
comments into sections resembling paragraphs (Gillion, 2016). This attempts to capture speakers’
approximately complete thoughts, providing a richer characterization of racial discourse. I then
apply the classifier to this set of speaker-turn documents.
This method seeks to replicate human coding procedures but over a larger set of documents. I
first hand-coded a 200 document sample for each month between September 2008 and December
2016 and used these to train the algorithm to classify the remaining documents. My conceptual-
ization of race as it relates to the experiences of racial and ethnic minorities, informed by extant
work (e.g., Mendelberg, 2001; Gillion, 2016), motivated my coding decisions. I coded documents
as about race if they 1) mentioned a racial group (e.g., Latinos), 2) discussed a racialized or race-
targeted policy (e.g., welfare, stop-and-frisk), 3) referenced a prominent minority figure, either
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political or not (e.g., Al Sharpton, Oprah),7 4) discussed immigration, 5) invoked the Civil Rights
Movement and related legislation, or 6) referred to race-based experiences (e.g., discrimination,
segregation). After running the algorithm, I reviewed the text excerpts it classified as mentioning
race to correct for false positives.8
The second approach addresses racial conservatism and liberalism by capturing thematic and
content differences by show. This method sorts texts according to the substance, or “topics,” they
address. Specifically, I apply a structural topic model to the documents the first algorithm classified
as discussing race (Roberts et al., 2014; Lucas et al., 2015). This technique recovers common terms
between documents that reflect different content featured in racial discourse, differences that offer
information on racially liberal and conservative views. Importantly, and in contrast to related
methods, this approach allows for using covariates to uncover relationships between documents. I
include an indicator for whether the document came from Maddow or O’Reilly and a flexible time
trend. Again, I seek to characterize racially conservative and liberal perspectives and content by
uncovering how The Factor differs from Maddow, rather than the discrete topics employed.9
2.3 Divided Racially Liberal and Conservative Views on Policing in Ferguson
I begin my investigation with the August 9, 2014, killing of Michael Brown, a black teenager,
by Darren Wilson, a white police officer, in Ferguson, Missouri. With the event receiving national
attention, Maddow and O’Reilly must pay attention to it instead of ignoring something potentially
incongruent with party priorities (Levendusky, 2013)).
Maddow introduced the story by comparing the pending FBI investigation to the Rodney King
beating in 1991. In doing so she drew attention to federal efforts at addressing police brutality in
the years since King, asking, “More than 20 years later, how much have things really changed since
7I exclude Barack Obama from mentions of prominent racial figures to guard against conflating discussion of race
with references to the sitting president. Any results including Obama thus pair him with race defined some other way.
This makes the picture I present restrictive because I do not directly capture how commentators discuss the sitting
president, references my coding scheme may otherwise miss.
8This procedure is still limited because it cannot capture conversations across pundits and discussions on the same
show if statements do not incorporate words identified as discriminating racial from non-racial text. I thus offer a
restrictive characterization of partisan racial discourse.
9The appendix includes additional details on the text processing and model estimation.
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the 1990s? And what has the federal government done to try to address this problem in a systemic
way?” By linking Ferguson with a well-known incident of police brutality Maddow suggests to
her viewers that they should see Ferguson as another instance of institutional discrimination and
bias. Maddow and her guests also emphasized systemic issues in law enforcement. One guest, for
example, noted that the ensuing federal investigation was important because:
[I]t sends a message to the whole country as well as all the police departments that
there has to be a change. If not, then it just gets pushed under the rug and the next thing
you know, there’s another incident. And they’re isolated as opposed to having a general
stance, pattern and practice that could be changed by police policies nationwide.
Maddow similarly highlighted St. Louis police seeking to “specifically arrest black people.
That [police officers] should specifically target black people for arrest in specific shopping areas in
southern St. Louis County.” She also discussed data from Missouri on racial disparities in traffic
stops, emphasizing the disproportionate attention police gave to blacks in cities like Ferguson.
Maddow perhaps most clearly described racial inequities by noting representation gaps between
Ferguson’s police force and the local community.
The community where 18-year-old Michael Brown was shot and killed by a police
officer this weekend has a population that is 2/3 black. Of its 53 police officers, three
of them are black. Two black women and one black man, out of 53 officers.
These comments and data references reveal a pattern of attention emphasizing the systemic
nature of police behavior, contextualizing the Ferguson shooting and ensuing protests. Further,
by using racial profiling and its potentially deadly consequences to demonstrate that racial dis-
crimination still shapes nonwhites’ lived experiences, Maddow’s coverage could promote, or rein-
force, racially liberal views among her audience (Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004; Apfelbaum et al.,
2010).
O’Reilly’s coverage stands in stark contrast. Instead of comparing Ferguson to other in-
stances of police brutality like Maddow did, O’Reilly introduced the shooting by focusing on
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the protests, specifically looting and violence targeting police officers. Doing so placed attention
on the protests’ consequences instead of their impetus. O’Reilly, for instance, editorialized one
protestor’s comment “He ain’t got no gun in hands. Why you kill him,” with “That man, appar-
ently, justifying the looting,” placing the focus not on the circumstances of Michael Brown’s death
but rather on the ensuing events. Similarly, he questioned whether the protestors were actually
from Ferguson, and thus in his view holding some legitimate grievance, or if they were outsiders
taking advantage of the situation. According to O’Reilly, Al Sharpton, for example, had come to
Missouri “demanding this and that, agitating the situation,” even “stoking the racial fire” as another
commentator put it. By presenting a picture of possible material or symbolic gain instead of le-
gitimate outrage, O’Reilly’s comments suggest a deep distrust, even resentment, of the protestors’
motives, rhetoric potentially contributing to racially conservative mass attitudes (Knowles et al.,
2009). While O’Reilly did note that Brown’s death was a “terrible situation,” his coverage was
well-removed from Maddow’s racially liberal themes connecting the shooting to similar events or
directly addressing potential causes.
Commentators on The Factor also worried about making Ferguson into a “spectacle” like other
“racially-charged cases,” namely the Trayvon Martin shooting. On a subsequent episode, com-
mentator Howard Kurtz repeated O’Reilly’s remarks questioning Al Sharpton’s potential attention-
seeking desire. Guest host Laura Ingraham agreed, noting Ferguson seemed like “one big satellite
dish. I mean it’s bring the satellite dishes in and you think the situation is going to get calmer?”
Ferguson wasn’t about highlighting racial bias, but about using race to get media attention. In fact,
in another episode O’Reilly calls police shootings an “infinitesimal situation” relative to the total
number of yearly arrests, and therefore not an important problem.
It doesn’t happen and those people who run in to Ferguson or any other city and say
the police are hunting down young black men are lying and they’re grossly insulting
law enforcement across the country because this stat shows it all, this tells it all.
For O’Reilly, police disproportionately killing black Americans is sensible “in proportion to
the crimes committed [by the group].” Instead, the real problem was “black-on-black crime.” The
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picture of the event Factor viewers saw emphasized its rarity, with violence in the black community
and grandstanding for national media attention bigger stories. The Factor paid little attention to
community concerns with racial profiling and the shooting’s connection to these fears. Instead, sig-
nals emphasize group pathologies, delegitimize calls to see race’s connection to social and political
affairs, and ignore potential discrimination, information potentially bolstering racially conservative
attitudes (Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004; Knowles et al., 2009; Apfelbaum et al., 2010).
The community where 18-year-old Michael Brown was shot and killed by a police
officer this weekend has a population that is 2/3 black. Of its 53 police officers, three
of them are black. Two black women and one black man, out of 53 officers.
Ferguson provides initial evidence into what differentiates racially liberal and conservative elite
rhetoric and that this speech may also contribute to racially liberal or conservative mass attitudes.
Racially liberal commentators like Maddow highlight the unequal experiences communities of
color have with law enforcement, potentially promoting these same attitudes among her audience.
O’Reilly’s argument that emphasizing race is self-serving, with disparate police experiences com-
ing from not cooperating, speaks to the nature of racially conservative elite rhetoric and offers an
explanation for racially conservative mass beliefs. Race either shapes people’s lived experiences
or is used to get undeserved attention.
These insights could, however, be anomalous and case specific. That Maddow and O’Reilly
talk about race here does not indicate how much attention they devote to race overall. Further,
the insights into racial liberalism and conservatism the case offers could be unique as well. Event
characteristics may motivate the perspectives I highlight. To address these limitations I turn to the
text-as-data approaches.10
2.4 Racially Liberal and Conservative Partisan Elites Consistently Talk About Race
I focus first on the frequency of racial discussion. Differentiating racially liberal and conser-
vative elite rhetoric matters little if they do not talk about it. To do so, I rely on a classification
10The supplementary information includes a case study of Henry Louis Gates’s arrest offering similar insights.
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algorithm to replicate human coding procedures over a larger document set. This recovers the set
of show transcript excerpts related to race.
Figure 2.1 plots the distribution of episodes from each show according to the attention given to
race, defined as the proportion of texts (i.e., speaker-turn paragraphs) from an episode the algorithm
classified as about race.11 The top panel presents the distribution for Maddow while the bottom
panel provides the distribution for The Factor.
Figure 2.1 shows that while decidedly not dominant, partisan media outlets do discuss race.
Further, while the typical episode may contain no discussion, Factor viewers on average hear
slightly more discussion about race than does Maddow’s audience. Mean attention for a Factor
episode is 2.9%, and for Maddow it is 2.6% (medians are 1.5% and 1% respectively). Racial
discussion on Maddow is also marginally more variable (SDMaddow = 3.9, SDO′Reilly = 3.8). Finally,
Figure 1 shows that slightly more Factor episodes devote higher levels of attention to race, a pattern
supported statistically (two-sample KS test D = 0.16, p < 0.01). Although these differences do
not seem substantively large, they contrast with evidence that conservative- aligned outlets ignore
issues that are not winning topics for their coalition (Levendusky, 2013). Not only does O’Reilly
discuss race, according to this measure he gives it more attention than Maddow.12 But this may
come in part from what is covered when these shows discuss race, with substance dividing in ways
that advantage each party. Such divides can help identify racially liberal and conservative themes
and speak to the potential for elites to influence mass racial attitudes.
11This is a noisy attention measure given the methodological issues highlighted in Footnote 8.
12Gillion (Gillion, 2016) finds little partisan difference between members of Congress in how much they talk about
race, results suggesting my finding is not a function of looking at partisan media or the specific attention operational-
ization.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of episode attention to race by show.
2.5 Racially Liberal and Conservative Themes in Partisan Media
I rely on the structural topic modeling results to contrast how Maddow and O’Reilly cover
race. Again, this method sorts the transcript excerpts classified as mentioning race in some way
into similar thematic areas, or topics. After considering several models I focus on one identifying
35 topics. I do not claim that this perfectly captures content variation; rather, a combination of
statistical information and substantive interpretability suggest it can help shed light on racially
liberal and conservative views by identifying differences between Maddow and O’Reilly (Roberts
et al., 2014; Lucas et al., 2015).
Figure 2.2 directly addresses my expectation that contrasting Maddow and O’Reilly can speak
to racially liberal and conservative coverage differences. It plots the difference in the proportion
of texts classified in a topic based on them coming from Maddow or O’Reilly. Positive numbers
indicate that Maddow favors the topic. Negative values indicate O’Reilly features it more. If
Maddow and O’Reilly devote equal attention, the points center on 0.
Figure 2.2 shows how racially conservative and liberal coverage varies.13 These differences
13Topic labels come from reading the 60 documents identified as most strongly loading on each topic with 30 each
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lTopic Attention Difference Between O'Reilly and Maddow
More O'Reilly Attention                                          More Maddow Attention
lRacial Violence (4)
lBlack Lives Matter (6)
lIllegal Immigration (2)
lPopulation characteristics (5)
lRacially motivated behavior (1)
lProminent black individuals I (19)
lProminent black individuals II (14)
lRace as a problem (9)
lInvoking Race or Not (7)
lCity/community problems (13)
lDeaths of black Americans (3)
lPolitical Correctness (28)
lObama (21)
lRacial Oppression (31)
lRace Relations (29)
lRacial Tension (8)
lRacism (16)
lDefining something as about race (12)
lPolitical Elites (27)
lRace as descriptive label (32)
lMinority children (30)
lEric Holder and DOJ (26)
lPolicymaking (23)
lMisc. (15)
lTea Party racism (18)
lTrump (34)
lEvaluations of black behavior (22)
lTreatment of Black Americans (20)
lGOP Politicians (33)
lCourts (25)
lMinority voting behavior (17)
lImmigration Reform (10)
lState politics (35)
lSystemic Oppression (24)
lVoting/Civil Rights (11)
−0.08 −0.04 0 0.04 0.08
Figure 2.2: Estimated difference in topic attention by Maddow and O’Reilly with precision esti-
mates. Numbers in parentheses denote overall prevalence rank among all topics.
may relate to mass racial attitudes and also suggest that partisanship, by shaping information-
seeking, may affect what people hear about race. O’Reilly covers whether race is a problem more
than Maddow. He also emphasizes illegal immigration, what behaviors may be racially motivated,
city/community problems, population characteristics, and prominent black Americans like Jesse
from Maddow and O’Reilly. The “misc.” topic includes primarily guest introductions but also a mix of short-term
events like the 2009 ACORN controversy.
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Jackson, Louis Farrakhan, and Rev. Jeremiah Wright. In contrast, Maddow features immigration
reform, civil and voting rights issues, Tea Party racism, and discrimination. Despite rather similar
levels of attention to race, how O’Reilly and Maddow cover it differs and in ways that shed light
on the racially conservative and liberal divide.
The variation in Figure 2.2 indicates that racially conservative and liberal elite rhetoric ad-
dresses what race is and how it may matter. O’Reilly’s fairly consistent attention to illegal immi-
gration may spur whites to hold increasingly negative racial attitudes (Craig and Richeson, 2014).
Similarly, how he discusses if race is a problem could reinforce racially conservative beliefs that
minority group culture prevents nonwhites from getting ahead, rather than pointing to race itself as
an obstacle (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Bonilla-Silva, 2014), a possibility I address further below.
Similarly, topics like whether to invoke race to explain social phenomena and political correctness
suggest racially conservative concerns about race’s social and political relevance and if people use
race to get attention. Maddow, in contrast, attends more to issues where nonwhites face contin-
ued discrimination like civil and voting rights, to racial biases among Republican politicians and
supporters, and to areas presenting minority groups in at least a neutral light with immigration
reform. This suggests that race matters given its presence in policymaking and nonwhites’ dif-
ferent lived experiences, characterizing racially liberal themes and suggesting that attitudes may
diverge according to whether one watches Maddow or O’Reilly (see Richeson and Nussbaum,
2004; Apfelbaum et al., 2010).
Figure 2.3 provides further insight into how racially conservative and liberal elite views vary by
visualizing the correlation between topics as a network based on the likelihood topics co-occur in
a text (Lucas et al., 2015). I scale the nodes and ties according to topic prevalence and correlation
strength respectively, and create separate networks for O’Reilly and Maddow.
Not only does topic emphasis vary, Figure 2.3 suggests that the relationship between topics
also differs. For instance, when O’Reilly and his guests discuss whether race is a problem, they
are also likely to talk about whether race should be invoked or whether race motivated the events
at hand. Labeling something as about race, further, is closely connected to discussion of racial
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Figure 2.3: Correlation between topics by show. Edges weighted by correlation magnitude and
nodes sized to indicate topic frequency. Only positive correlations greater than 0.10 are drawn.
tension. These patterns suggest themes related to the merits of using race to understand current
affairs help characterize racial conservatism. This also appears to be a frequent conversation point
on O’Reilly given the relative node size.
Although the right panel reveals similar relationships among these topics for Maddow, these
connections are weaker and other clusters are more prominent. Here, the connection between
minority children and illegal immigration suggests that how Maddow discusses illegal immigration
may differ from O’Reilly. Maddow and her guests also often discuss GOP politicians alongside
Barack Obama or evaluations of black behavior, and the relationships are stronger here than for
O’Reilly. These patterns may reflect Maddow drawing attention to Republican elites using negative
racial rhetoric to describe Obama and black Americans (Haney Lo´pez, 2014), a point I return to
below.
While the patterns in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 offer some insight into how racially conservative and
liberal coverage varies, the Michael Brown case study indicated that they can differ in important
ways when covering the same topic. To address this, and better identify racially conservative and
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O'Reilly
And that's why an observation you made in your talking
points is really, really important. You said you're
going to keep an eye on this for your viewers. You
need to do that, because these people who always bring
race into things without any evidence and throw racism
around need to be shamed to the extent that they're
capable of being shamed. And they need to be called
out as unserious people and just as we put a bright
spotlight in our history, which was a good thing on
real racists who said nasty things, and said, "Look
at these people," we need to put a bright light on the
people who recklessly throw around charges of racism,
because they're also doing harm to this country.
However, we have a very different problem today. The
problem today is a social problem. It's not so much a
racial problem. You can take any group and you put them
in an environment where there is no father figure to
teach them, you know, personal responsibility and how
to relate to authority. You put them in an environment
where people advocate resolving issues with violence.
And an environment where drugs and alcohol are easily
accessible and an environment where education is not
put on the top shelf, it's the thing that you want to
accomplish. And then you send them out into society.
But let me say this, the problems that African−
Americans face are no different than the problems
that America faces. It's just that they are deeper.
It's just that they're more significant, whether it's
unemployment; whether it's a desire for our children
to achieve educational outcomes; whether it's a desire
to live in safe and wholesome communities. Those
aspirations are the same. Our problems are similar.
They just have to be deeper.
Maddow
The people who are be planning this new telling of
history say that that‘s not going to be white washed.
They‘re going to tell all sides of the story. They‘re
going to tell the story of the people who fought for
civil rights, but also the much more uncomfortable
story of the people who fought against it, including
the state itself.
We end up with a wealth problem like this because of
choices made by our own government. Initially, many
black people in America cannot own property because
they were property. Even after becoming citizens, many
were shut out of the post−World War II policies that
created an American middle class.
So, I think just based on that and then when you
look at the systemic problems we have in this country
and systemic racism and oppression. When you look at
North Carolina itself being number 50, in the country
in terms of the vulnerability for black people, we
understand there is a problem here beyond the fact that
we‘re being killed. There is a problem in terms of the
educational system, the pipeline problem we have here,
prison industrial complex issues we have here, there‘s
a whole host of problems that need to be resolved.
Race as a Problem
Figure 2.4: Example topic documents: Race as a Problem
liberal themes, I focus on three topics as example cases: race as a problem, population characteris-
tics, and Tea Party racism. In Figures 2.4-2.6 I present three example documents from each show
classified into each topic.
Figure 2.4 shows how the race as a problem topic merits this label and also speaks to racially
conservative and liberal themes. These documents offer information regarding how each show
references problems related to communities of color, but The Factor does so by defining them as
problems all Americans face while Maddow points to legacies of discrimination maintaining race’s
relevance. On The Factor, real problems are not racial but social; violence, drugs, and personal
responsibility are obstacles for minority communities, not race itself. Moreover, claims of racism
are often specious and “unserious.” Race itself has no political or social relevance. This contrasts
sharply with Maddow, where discussion directly addresses systemic racism, policy legacies hold-
ing blacks back from economic success, and the civil rights struggle. Black Americans face issues
in the educational system and criminal justice system, and have not had similar opportunities to
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O'Reilly
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the
unemployment rate for black Americans is 11.4 percent.
It's just over five percent for whites, 4.5 percent
for Asians. So, do we have Asian privilege in America?
Because the truth is, that Asian American households
earn far more money than anyone else. The median income
for Asians, close to $69,000 a year; it's 57,000 for
whites' $33,000 for black −− so the question becomes
why? And the answer is found in stable homes and in
emphasis on education; 88 percent of Asian Americans
graduate from high school compared to 86 for whites and
just 69 percent for blacks. That means 31 percent of
African− Americans have little chance to succeed in the
free marketplace because they are uneducated. They are
high school dropouts.
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics from
2012 to 2013, latest available, African−Americans are
responsible for 22.4 percent of all violent crimes
in the U.S.A., despite being just 13 percent of the
population. Whites responsible for 43 percent of
violent crimes with Caucasians making up 62 percent of
the population. But here's the kicker. When you look at
police shooting victims, whites comprise 50 percent of
those shots, Blacks just 26 percent.
Out of wedlock births, 17 percent for Asians,
29 percent for whites, a whopping 72 percent for
blacks. It's no question poverty is driven by lack of
education, poor supervision of children and fractured
families.
Maddow
Thirty−one is the percentage that the Pew Research
Center estimates of the population, the voting
population, that will be non−white. That‘s huge,
because in 2012, the non−white population was 29
percent. It had been growing at 2 percent every four
years, it‘s grown an extra percentage point. The vast
majority of the 10.7, the second number 11, of the 10.7
million new eligible voters, 7.5 million of them are
black, Hispanic, or Asian−American.
Crack was primarily afflicting urban neighborhoods
and cocaine was viewed as the party drug of well−off
whites. African−Americans made up 80 percent of those
put in jail for crack offenses despite being 30 percent
of crack users.
And the specifics are even worse. Child poverty rose
from under 21 percent to 22 percent. Poverty among
Hispanic Americans went from more than 25 percent to
more than 26 percent. Poverty among African−Americans
went from just under 26 percent to over 27 percent.
Population Characteristics
Figure 2.5: Example topic documents: Population Characteristics
build wealth. These examples reveal that in this context, The Factor’s racially conservative view
denies race’s relevance and resents claims that racism matters. Maddow’s racially liberal perspec-
tive calls attention to discrimination’s legacies and obstacles nonwhites still face due to their race.
Figure 2.5 offers similar insights. The population characteristics topic includes racial group
characteristics including rates of poverty, incarceration, and drug use, as well as minority groups’
electoral significance. These examples again address racially conservative and liberal differences
and how these analyses can inform work on mass attitudes. As the first and third O’Reilly texts
show, The Factor attributes poverty to group cultural failings, a central part of racially conserva-
tive attitudes (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Kam and Burge, 2018). O’Reilly often cites education
and family socialization as necessary for success. Relatedly, the second text suggests Factor view-
ers hear that black Americans disproportionately commit crimes, a point reflecting the Michael
Brown case study and potentially reinforcing impressions of black criminality (Gilliam, Iyengar
and Simon, 1996).
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In contrast, Maddow’s racially liberal perspective emphasizes discrimination. While discussing
child poverty rates, Maddow also mentions that aggregate numbers hide the worse experiences of
Hispanic and African American communities. The second example highlights disparities in drug
sentencing based on powdered or crack cocaine use and the overrepresentation of black Americans
among those imprisoned for using the latter. These patterns suggest that those hearing racially
liberal views hear more about racial group population features as they relate to other groups like
whites, with a particular focus on nonwhites’ unique experiences and continued disadvantaged.
How O’Reilly and Maddow discuss racism within the Tea Party speaks to how racial conser-
vatives and liberals understand racism more generally. O’Reilly typically sees claims about Tea
Party racism as baseless. As the first two texts in Figure 2.6 show, he and his guests argue that
the left tries to “brand Tea Party people as racist” because they dislike what it stands for, ignoring
what constitutes “real racism” in America.14 Since the Tea Party is not racist, such claims create
a “boy who cried wolf” situation. The third text suggests these arguments are in part responses
to media figures like actress and comedian Janeane Garofalo, potentially as a way to establish a
belief that elites were arrayed against the Tea Party. Racial conservatism sees charges of racism
as illegitimate and instead part of an effort to discredit a movement built on authentic, principled
grievances. With race irrelevant, people saying otherwise deserve condemnation.
Maddow, in contrast, promotes claims of Tea Party racism. The first two documents focus
on the movement’s attempts to deal with racism. Even though some Tea Party elements sought
to address race, many others made racist remarks or did not condemn those who did. Citing the
NAACP’s efforts to address Tea Party racism, as the second text shows, may enhance Maddow’s
critiques by incorporating similar comments from a well-known civil rights organization. Further,
as the third text indicates, Maddow also covered Republican politicians making racist remarks.
Here, Carl Paladino, a one-time Tea Party-backed GOP candidate for a New York congressional
14When The Factor affirmatively addresses racism it usually invokes Jim Crow-style discrimination and biological
racism. But this is rare. References to “real racism” provide no definitions, suggesting the speaker and audience
possess a common knowledge about what actually constitutes racism. Alternatively, The Factor may define “real
racism” via negation by indicating what racism is not.
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O'Reilly
JANEAN GARAFALO: This is about hating a black man in
the White House. This is racism straight up. That is a
nothing but a bunch of tea banging rednecks.
CROWLEY: Ellis, here's the danger of what the NAACP did
this week. There is real racism in America. But what
the NAACP went out there and did by attacking the Tea
Party with nonexistent charges of nonexistent racism,
rather, they are going down this road a boy who cried
wolf, so that when real racism does come up, people are
less inclined to take it seriously.
O'REILLY: Obviously, the left despises that kind of
rhetoric. And now, they are charges that Sarah Palin
incites violence, sows discord. It's clear that some
on the American left fear the Tea Party movement and
that, there is a media strategy to brand Tea Party
people as racist. Right in the Miami Herald over the
weekend, Miami Leonard Pitts says, this about the Tea
Party quote, "Their stated fears, socialism, communism,
liberalism, are just proxies for the one fear, most of
them no longer dare speak. It insults intelligence to
deny that race is in the mix." unquote. So, you can see
what's emerging.
Maddow
MADDOW: You know, humans with their racist,
pornographic e−mail genes. Mr. Paladino‘s plans for the
plight of our inner city youth, as he says that he is
committed to them −− his plans are to teach them basic
things, including personal hygiene. Mr. Paladino has
proposed converting prison dorms into Welfare centers.
Quote, "Instead of handing out Welfare checks, we‘ll
teach people how to earn their check. We‘ll teach
them personal hygiene, the personal things they don‘t
get when they come from dysfunctional homes." Quote,
"You have to teach them basic things, taking care of
themselves, physical fitness. In their dysfunctional
environment, they never learned these things."
Last week the NAACP passed a resolution asking the tea
party movement to repudiate overtly racist groups that
have associated themselves with the tea party movement
as well as the occasionally racist signs and stuff that
have happened at tea party events.
MADDOW: Thanks a lot. Richard Engel, NBC chief foreign
correspondent, of course. All right. One wing of the
Tea Party Movement is organizing a conference on race
to avert claims that there is any racism at all in the
Tea Party Movement. On the other hand, the leader of
another wing of Tea Party Movement has written a mock
letter to Abraham Lincoln on behalf of slaves, asking
Lincoln to repeal emancipation. It is hilarious like
only a white Tea Party guy impersonating black slaves
can be. A Tea Party divided amongst itself is not
standing. The ongoing struggle to take that movement
seriously continues in just a moment.
Tea Party Racism
Figure 2.6: Example topic documents: Tea Party Racism
seat, characterized inner city youth as welfare-reliant and irresponsible. From these discussions,
Maddow’s viewers may increasingly pair racism with the Republican Party, or at least elements
within it. MSNBC viewers may see racism as intertwined with Republican Party politics while
Fox’s audience sees it as the excuses of people lacking credible ways to critique someone’s poli-
tics.15
Taken together these examples offer evidence for some ingredients potentially constituting
mass racial attitudes. Racially conservative and liberal elite rhetoric varies both in what receives
attention and how content is presented. O’Reilly’s racial conservatism identifies problems related
to race as ones of family breakdown instead of racism and discrimination. Racial liberalism as
epitomized by Maddow emphasizes race’s social reality and disparities communities of color face.
I conclude by offering six stylized frames in Table 2.1, three from each show, that encapsulate
divides in racially conservative and liberal elite views and suggest what mass attitudes may look
15Maddow’s approach reflects partisan news’s proclivity to use individual events and stories to reveal flaws in the
opposing party (Levendusky, 2013). Here, the Tea Party demonstrates that the Republican Party is out of step on race
in part by condoning racist remarks.
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Table 2.1: Stylized Frames of Racial Discourse
Theme Maddow O’Reilly
Strategic uses of racism Republican elites use race to scare whites Charges of racism are self-interested
Talking about Race Talking about race matters A double standard exists for talking about race,
especially when people should not see race
Race-related issues Communities of color have unique (and disparate)
experiences
Minorities get special favors and attention, ignoring
the real problems in their communities
like for people hearing these perspectives.
Strategic uses of racism constitute one dimension. A racially liberal perspective includes seeing
racism as in part a tool Republican elites use to scare white voters into supporting Republican
candidates. GOP politicians pursue “George Wallace-type stuff” by employing racist conspiracy
theories and imagery of “nonwhite people being scary” as dog whistles. Racial conservatism sees
racism not as a campaign tactic, but as allegations by the media or minorities advancing their own
interests. The “temptation of racial politics” is about a “color beef” promoted by “racial hucksters”
employing racism charges to delegitimize reasonable opposition or simply get attention. Like
McCarthyite allegations of Communism, racism claims are “boy who cried wolf stuff” that harm
people.
A second area concerns the legitimacy of talking about race. Discussing race is affirming for
racial liberals like Maddow. Black lives matter as black lives, and not at the expense of other
groups. Someone’s race is central to understanding who they are and their often disparate experi-
ences. The Factor’s racial conservatism suggests it is better to ignore race. Evaluating outcomes
through racial lenses is wrong because race is rarely related to social and political affairs. Peo-
ple should ignore race because “skin color is the least important human characteristic.” In fact,
a double standard exists because people use race to criticize whites and deflect from nonwhites’
failings.
The final difference addresses race-related issues. Here, Maddow’s racial liberalism empha-
sizes “systemic problems” and “historic wrongs.” Acknowledging that discrimination is not as
overt as it once was, this position emphasizes racial disparities in myriad social and economic out-
comes, and how these relate to legacies of white supremacy and anti-black violence. For racial
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conservatives like O’Reilly, minority communities receive special attention from the government
and media when facing the slightest issue. Black communities do not face systemic oppression
from the government and other institutions; black family fragility is the important policy problem.
In this view, social problems explain racial group disparities, not race itself. Furthermore, such
disparities may actually suggest underlying group differences in industriousness and lawfulness.
2.6 Conclusion
By contrasting how Rachel Maddow and Bill O’Reilly cover race I provide insight into how
racially liberal and conservative elites’ speech differs. Racial liberals celebrate racial diversity and
argue nonwhites still face prejudice and discrimination. Racial conservatives attempt to delegit-
imize claims of racism and propose that discussing race is self-serving.
Identifying these differences matters because elites can influence mass predispositions, and
race may be no exception. People adopt elite views to make sense of events they do not experience
themselves (Lippmann, 1922), with this tendency potentially helping to explain why “Democrats
and Republicans had increasingly separate realities about race in the Age of Obama” (Tesler, 2016,
195; emphasis in original). Tesler (2016) shows that while partisanship did not divide public
reactions to events like the OJ Simpson or Rodney King verdicts, partisans’ responses to events
like the Ferguson, Missouri, protests and George Zimmerman’s acquittal of murdering Trayvon
Martin diverged markedly. My results suggest that rather than simply a byproduct of the growing
correlation between partisanship and racial attitudes (Tesler, 2016), these patterns may also reflect
elites shaping which predispositions people use to interpret social phenomena. By consistently
applying the racially liberal or conservative perspectives I identify, elites may lead people to more
regularly use these perspectives to interpret potentially race-related events (Howe and Krosnick,
2017), or to even change these attitudes (Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004; Apfelbaum et al., 2010;
Craig and Richeson, 2014; Wilkins and Kaiser, 2014).
Divide elite rhetoric may have additional consequences, particularly in the present political
context. Elites may actually motivate people to update these presumably fundamental predisposi-
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tions (Sears and Brown, 2013), not simply weight them differently. I investigate this in Chapter
3 by focusing on the growing partisan divide in whites’ racial attitudes. I demonstrate that it
increasingly comes from attitude change rather than party switching. This is a consequential out-
come given racial attitudes’ presumed long-term stability (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). Although
no analyses directly relate the rhetoric I present here with these attitude trends, the changes are
consistent with mass partisans responding to the elite information environment by updating their
attitudes (see also Chapter 4).
These patterns also speak to the nature of distinct racial attitudes. Some argue racial resent-
ment conflates racial animus and race-neutral principles (Sniderman and Piazza, 1993; Huddy and
Feldman, 2009), implying these are separable concerns when it comes to understanding racial pol-
icy opinions. But recent work supports the view that race and principles jointly matter (Kam
and Burge, 2018). My evidence may help explain these connections. Repeated exposure to
racially conservative rhetoric like O’Reilly’s that denies discrimination and explains racial affairs
through individualism and other principles can connect race and values in viewers’ long-term mem-
ory (Lodge and Taber, 2013), thereby racializing ostensibly race-neutral considerations (see also
Gilens, 1999; Winter, 2008; Tesler, 2016). This associative learning process also suggests people
could express racial views through principles alone, letting them ignore, or be unaware of, how
race shapes their thinking (Knowles et al., 2009; Bonilla-Silva, 2014). Identifying racially con-
servative and liberal themes in elite rhetoric can thus shed some light on the nature and origins of
mass predispositions.
The patterns I find also do not appear unique to the specific context or commentators (see
Haney Lo´pez, 2014; Dixon, 2017). Pundits applied similar frames when covering the August 2017
white nationalist rally and counterprotest in Charlottesville, Virginia. Although O’Reilly had since
left Fox News, host Jesse Watters offered a view denying racism’s relevance: “What we saw in
Charlottesville were fringe fanatics who do not represent this country. America is not a racist
nation. It’s time we stop acting like it is.” Rachel Maddow emphasized racism’s importance,
arguing, “[T]his persistent fascistic violent racist element in American culture and politics is a real
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thing that we have lived through before as a country. And it waxes and wanes but it has never really
gone away.”
These divergent elite views may have facilitated sharp partisan divides in attitudes about Char-
lottesville. Democrats and Republicans split 62%-35% on whether the “political positions of white
nationalists who attended the rally in Charlottesville” were mostly wrong (Edwards-Levy, 2017).
Likewise, while more Democrats than Republicans said the violence in Charlottesville was part of
a broader problem in American society (79%-61%), a full 25% of Republicans saw the violence
as an isolated incident. That these divides reflect how elites covered Charlottesville, as well as
the differences in racially liberal and conservative rhetoric I identify, implies some degree of elite
influence (Zaller, 1992).
Future work could evaluate how apolitical and non-partisan sources present race. Sports com-
mentators and athletes provide an interesting extension. Recently, NFL players including Colin
Kaepernick and Eric Reid drew national attention by kneeling during the national anthem to protest
police violence and other racial inequities. The NBA has perhaps been even more outspoken, with
players and coaches including Lebron James, Stephen Curry, Steve Kerr, and Gregg Popovich
speaking out against racism and discrimination. Future work could explore how these figures dis-
cuss race to see if rhetoric resembles the racially liberal and conservative views outlined above.
Studying how elites discuss race matters in light of work on prejudice reduction. While Myrdal
(1962) may have believed that ignorance, willful and actual, about black Americans’ social and
economic circumstances helped shape whites’ views on race, and thus publicity through media
attention and other efforts would have salutary effects, reality seems more complicated. Motivation
appears to play an important role in what makes a prejudice reduction technique effective (Paluck
and Green, 2009). I show some of the information elites may provide, and subsequent work can
establish what makes it persuasive. Uncovering what encourages people to update their beliefs
about racial and ethnic minorities can help identify when people adopt elite views.
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Chapter 3
The Limits of Agenda Setting? Framing Race’s Importance
“What if we were to write race together on every Starbucks cup, and that facilitated a
conversation between you and our customers?. . . If a customer asks you what this is,
try to engage in a discussion.” – Howard Schultz, Starbucks CEO, March 20151
After protests broke out following a grand jury declining to indict Ferguson, Missouri, police
officer Darren Wilson, for killing Michael Brown, Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz wanted to do
something (Carr, 2015). This something became Starbucks’s Race Together campaign, an effort
highlighted in the epigraph that sought to “stimulate conversation, compassion and positive action
regarding race in America” (Starbucks, 2015). Schultz is not alone in seeing racial dialogue as
a way to bridge divides in the U.S. As president, Bill Clinton sought to start a national dialogue
on race as a way to “learn together, talk together” (Clinton, 1997), something former First Lady
Michelle Obama echoed when saying that “honest conversations” are “the only way we will heal
the wounds of the past and move forward to a better future” (McCalmont, 2014). Indeed, the
conventional wisdom appears to be that discussing race raises its salience as a way to address
issues related to inequities that fall along racial lines (Gillion, 2016).
Fortunately for its advocates, work on media effects supports the pro-dialogue position. Decades
of research handsomely supports the view that talking about issues increases public attention to,
and concern with, them (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Beckett, 1994;
Miller and Krosnick, 2000; Soroka, 2002, 2006; Miller, 2007). These insights suggest that talking
about race, particularly for elites, should make it and related issues salient concerns, establishing
ways to address past wounds and present injustices (see also Gillion, 2016).
But I argue here that merely emphasizing talking about race is not enough to encourage public
attention. Proponents of racial dialogue seem to have in mind a specific type of conversation,
1Remarks from letter to employees, quoted in (Carr, 2015).
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one that acknowledges race’s social reality (Gillion, 2016). But an alternative racial dialogue may
occur, one deemphasizing race’s role in social and political affairs (King and Smith, 2014). This
conversation instead emphasizes other factors as explaining disparities across races. The nature of
the racial dialogue likely has implications for mass beliefs about race’s importance in the United
States.
Further, talking about race may not be sufficient to stimulate public concern because individ-
uals’ attitudes may constrain elite influence. This seems particularly likely for a subject like race
where the conventional wisdom holds that individuals’ racial attitudes–beliefs about about groups
understood to be racial–form early in life and persist through adulthood (Sears and Brown, 2013).
Likewise, issue positions connected with social groups exhibit greater temporal stability than those
lacking group implications (Converse, 1964), and may be more resistant to elite influence (Nelson,
Sanbonmatsu and McClerking, 2007; Nicholson, 2011). With race a central component of the cur-
rent party system (Kinder and Chudy, 2016; Tesler, 2016), and group evaluations providing “the
very basis of reasons” for many individuals’ political thinking (Achen and Bartels, 2016, 213),
elites may face significant constraints stimulating concern for it in the mass public. Talking about
race may only lead a subset of the mass public to believe it important while potentially generating
a backlash among others (Gillion, 2016). Despite elite attention, the public’s concern with race as
a whole changes little because people react differently when hearing the same conversation.
To demonstrate that public concern with race is not a necessary outcome of elite attention
to it, I focus on racial discourse in partisan media. Partisan media offer a most likely place to
identify a conversation on race occurring but where the substance is varied. Indeed, as I showed in
Chapter 1, partisan television outlets talk about race but cover different subjects and offer different
perspectives on how race should be understood. This variation may affect whether the public
expresses concern with race as an issue, an outcome suggested by perceptions of whether racism
“is a big problem in our society today” polarizing by party in recent years (Neal, 2017).
Through two studies I consider elites’ agenda setting capacity on race. The first provides
a brush-clearing exercise, tracking attention to race on two partisan pundits’ shows and public
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concern with race as an important problem between 2008 and 2016. The attention measure comes
from a content analysis of The Rachel Maddow Show and The O’Reilly Factor, exemplars of
partisan media punditry. For public concern I use Gallup’s most important problem data series. I
then relate these two series and find that while Maddow’s attention to race motivates public concern
whereas O’Reilly’s does not. In study 2 I use a survey experiment to demonstrate that the frame
applied to an issue can motivate this concern, not simply differences in what the media choose to
cover with respect to the issue (Miller, 2007). Elite attention to race is necessary, but not sufficient,
to generate concern with race as a social problem.
3.1 Elite Racial Rhetoric and Public Perceptions
Classic agenda setting accounts propose that the more the media cover an issue, the more the
public sees this issue as a pressing national problem (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar and
Kinder, 1987; Beckett, 1994; Miller and Krosnick, 2000; Soroka, 2002, 2006; Miller, 2007). More
stories about the environment, unemployment, or crime make these problems seem more important
to the mass public. But left largely unaddressed is how these dynamics function when what outlets
cover within an issue varies and, more importantly, how these issues are covered.
Variation across media outlets in whether and how they cover an issue matters because this
affects what consumers come to believe about the issue. Traditional agenda setting work typically
considers a univalent issue (e.g., the economy is bad, inflation is increasing). It does not offer evi-
dence for how attention to an issue matters when coupled with additional information that the issue
is important (e.g., characteristic liberal coverage of race) or unimportant (e.g., typical conservative
coverage of race).2 This additional information frames race for viewers by defining what the issue
is (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987) and what explanation(s) merit consideration (see also Chong
and Druckman, 2007). To the degree media outlets cover race differently, viewers may reach dif-
2Scholars have incorporated variation in topic frames to explain media (Boydstun, 2013) or social group (Gillion,
2016) attention to issues. Others have considered how coverage characteristics like positive or negative issue content
affect importance judgments (Soroka, 2006; Miller, 2007). These results imply that issue characteristics affect now
only what gets covered but also how this coverage relates to opinions. I extend this work to address evaluations of
whether an issue should be seen as a problem.
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ferent conclusions about the sources of, and solutions to, social and political problems (Iyengar,
1991). If coverage patterns persist over time within and across outlets, then viewers’ perspectives
of current affairs will vary according to the news they consume.
News organizations’ decisions about what to cover and how to cover it likely follow in part
from judgments regarding what is and is not newsworthy. Institutional norms, for instance, can
guide whether and how an organization covers an issue (Gilens, 1999; Boydstun, 2013). Further,
the outlet’s belief about who the issue affects, its perceived relevance to consumers, and attention
from other elites all guide coverage decisions. These decisions can lead to outlets paying attention
to some issues more than others or, when covering the same issue, applying different frames,
patterns than can persist over time (Boydstun, 2013).
Partisan media offer a most likely place to find this variation in the content and kind of issue
coverage. Fox News and MSNBC are exemplars of conservative and liberal punditry. This moti-
vation to provide an ideological interpretation of the day’s events can lead them to cover race and
related issues differently (Haney Lo´pez, 2014; King and Smith, 2014; Dixon, 2017). First, atten-
tion to issues related to race may vary within and across outlets in accordance with the priorities of
the party with which the outlet aligns (Levendusky, 2013). MSNBC may avoid covering crime or
welfare because these issues disadvantage Democrats. Fox may avoid race altogether because its
commentators see it as a losing issue for them and the Republican Party. They gain nothing from
paying attention to issues affecting groups that overwhelmingly identify as Democrats (Kinder and
Chudy, 2016). If anything, attention to racial inequality as the racial dialogue position desires
would anger an increasingly racially conservative white base (Tesler, 2016). Differential attention
to an issue prevents audiences from receiving the information necessary for them to identify race
as an important problem.
But content is only half the story. What is potentially more consequential is variation in how
race is discussed (Haney Lo´pez, 2014; King and Smith, 2014; Dixon, 2017). Framing decisions
allow partisan media to cover issues on the national agenda in ways that maintain partisan ad-
vantages in these domains (Levendusky, 2013). As I showed in chapter 1, when covering race,
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commentators on The O’Reilly Factor deny its relevance to ongoing social and political processes.
This racially conservative perspective includes describing protests surrounding black deaths at the
hands of police as concerning black criminality and a desire for national attention rather than sug-
gesting race has any social relevance. In contrast, racial liberals like Rachel Maddow linked these
deaths to historical patterns of discrimination and ongoing struggles against racism and inequity.
When they cover the same events, partisan media personalities can offer perspectives consistent
with their partisan and ideological proclivities.
3.2 Partisan Media as Agenda Setters
I focus on partisan media to study how differences in elite racial rhetoric shape the public’s
proclivity to see race as an important national problem. Unlike broadcast news, media outlets like
FOX News and MSNBC have greater freedom to editorialize, particularly through their primetime
programming. They therefore provide clear partisan messaging on matters including race (Lev-
endusky, 2013; Grossmann and Hopkins, 2016; Dixon, 2017), and reach a larger audience than
similar sources (Pew Research Center, 2014).
Partisan media also provide an ideal place to explore elite influence because they likely have
an outsized impact on viewers’ attitudes. Partisanship’s growing influence on individual decision-
making (Mason, 2015; Iyengar and Westwood, 2014; Azari and Hetherington, 2016) has created
party-specific media diets (Iyengar and Hahn, 2009; Henderson and Theodoridis, 2017) by affect-
ing which elites people believe to be credible and trustworthy messengers (Pew Research Center,
2014).MSNBC’s viewers tend to be Democrats and liberals while FOX News’s audience is over-
whelmingly Republican and conservative (Levendusky, 2013; Grossmann and Hopkins, 2016).
This makes partisan news outlets particularly influential because the mass public perceives them
to be promulgators of the party line (Levendusky, 2013; Suhay, 2015) and viewers are unlikely
to encounter information that substantially challenges existing attitudes (Zaller, 1992; Lodge and
Taber, 2013). If people decide to watch MSNBC then they will be exposed to a very different
understanding about what race is and how it matters than if they opted to tune in to Fox News.
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Despite its likely larger reach than other types of partisan media, partisan television is poten-
tially limited because these outlets’ viewers are a unique group. Overall, a relatively small portion
of Americans consume partisan news, with some evidence suggesting 10-15% watch this program-
ming consistently (Prior, 2013).3 Even so, this group is more engaged and attentive than others
(Levendusky, 2013). Partisan media consumers are those most likely to pay attention to what party
elites say and are therefore more likely to update their attitudes to fit with the partisan cues they
come across (Zaller, 1992; Layman and Carsey, 2002; Stroud, 2011; Lenz, 2012). As Levendusky
(2013) emphasizes, partisan media merits attention because its influence falls on the portion of
Americans most politically aware and active, those whose voices most likely influence the politi-
cal process. This is particularly important for an area like race where addressing related problems
requires changing the status quo. Differences among engaged individuals in their impressions that
race merits attention will shape what politicians understand to be pressing problems.
Despite its potentially limited direct influence, additional evidence suggests partisan media’s
reach may extend beyond the immediate audience. By being among the group of individuals ac-
tively interested in gathering information about politics, partisan news consumers are also likely
opinion leaders within their social networks, facilitating information diffusion to others who do
not consume this news (Huckfeldt, 2001; Stroud, 2011). Consequently, by providing this partisan-
tinged information to their peers, viewers can motivate those who do not, or only rarely, consume
partisan news to update their attitudes as if these individuals had also watched partisan program-
ming (Druckman, Levendusky and McLain, 2018). Furthermore, partisan media may agenda set
for other media outlets (Levendusky, 2013). Broadcast outlets and print media may pick up stories
partisan outlets cover, expanding these organizations’ reach. As I showed in the preceding chapter,
partisan news media offer a way to capture clear partisan elite racial cues, and then relate these to
3Data from Pew’s 2012 Biennial Media Survey offer insights into each show’s audience. They indicate that 76%
and 74% of respective show viewers are non-Hispanic whites. Over 75% of each show’s regular viewers trust a
few media sources more than the news media generally, and sizable portions say they prefer news sources that share
their “political point of view” (20% for Maddow, 43% for The Factor). Twenty-seven percent of all respondents said
they sometimes or regularly watched the O’Reilly Factor. Twenty-three percent said the same for The Rachel Maddow
Show. The numbers reported focus on the 8% and 5% respectively who report regularly watching each show. Although
this is likely an overestimate (on measurement issues, see Prior, 2013), the characteristics of self-reported viewers are
instructive.
37
mass attitudes.
I test three hypotheses related to the media’s agenda setting capacity when it comes to race. The
first, the traditional account, states that media attention, regardless of frame or content, increases
public concern with the issue (cf. McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Beckett,
1994; Miller and Krosnick, 2000; Soroka, 2002, 2006; Miller, 2007). The second, the multi-valent
account, proposes that how the issue is covered matters. In this context, I expect public concern
with race to increase as attention to race emphasizing discrimination, racism, and race’s social
reality increases. In contrast, I expect no relationship between attention devoted to race that denies
its ability to explain social phenomena and public concern with race. Finally, the null account
proposes that race is simply a different type of issue. Because individuals’ racial attitudes are
strong and persistent (Sears and Brown, 2013), and personal and group experiences work alongside
media influence to shape attitudes (Gamson, 1992; Walsh, 2004), the media have little influence
over when people see race as an important problem (cf. Soroka, 2002). People use their racial
attitudes to understand social and political phenomena and then decide whether race is important.
No mediating role for elites needed.
3.3 Data and Methods
I rely on observational and experimental analyses to test my hypotheses. The observational
analyses focus on levels of attention to race on O’Reilly and Maddow and the public’s concern
with race as an issue. The attention measure is the same as the prior chapter’s. To recap, this
captures how much The O’Reilly Factor and Rachel Maddow Show discuss race on each episode.
This measure is defined by the proportion of a show’s transcript for a given day that an automated
algorithm classified as including some reference to race.
Public concern comes from Gallup’s most important problem series. Every month Gallup
invites survey respondents to report what issues they feel are pressing national problems in an
open-ended format. Respondents can provide up to three issues which Gallup then codes. I use
these data to measure concern with race in two ways. First, I create a race only indicator for
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whether or not any response was coded as mentioning “race relations or racism” in any of the three
coded responses. Second, I combine these responses with any mention of racialized policies like
crime, welfare, or immigration and illegal aliens to create a race plus measure. Because racial
discourse takes on many guises, this second operationalization captures the possibility that this
rhetoric increases concern about closely related issues.4
I use these observational data two ways. First, I offer a descriptive comparison between the
media attention and public concern series. I then test agenda setting test by relating public opinion
responses to how much attention O’Reilly and Maddow devote to race in the weeks preceding a
respondent’s interview date.
The second test for my hypotheses relies on an experimental design. In study 2 I randomly as-
sign individuals to read one of three news articles describing civil asset forfeiture. Each respondent
reads that the policy involves law enforcement’s ability to seize money and property in a person’s
possession if they suspect that it relates to a crime. But in two conditions respondents read that this
policy is connected to race. One of these presents civil asset forfeiture as racially discriminatory
while the other contends the policy has nothing to do with race. These frames reflect perspec-
tives offered on Maddow and O’Reilly respectively that I identified in the last chapter. Comparing
responses to items assessing problem importance across treatments then offers a way to address
directly whether issue framing affects agenda setting by holding content constant.
3.4 Study 1: Partisan Racial Discourse Correlates with Judgments of Race’s Importance
I begin by demonstrating descriptively that partisan outlet attention to race varies over time
and in ways that suggest it could matter for the public’s perception that race is an important na-
tional problem. To do so I rely on data from a content analysis conducted as part of other work.
4In an average month, over 2% of Gallup’s respondents offer a race only response (SD: 3.2%; range: 0.1–18%),
while over 9% provide a race plus response (SD: 5.9%; range: 3–30%). These numbers drop when looking at just
non-Hispanic whites. Over 1% of Anglo respondents report a race only response in a typical month (SD: 2.3%; range:
0–15%), while over 7% provide a race plus response (SD: 4.89%; range: 2–27%). To compare, a similar proportion of
whites voice concern with the environment every month. The economy and unemployment, in contrast, receive much
more attention with on average 27% and 17% of whites naming each as the most important problem every month. All
descriptives employ survey weights.
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Figure 3.1: Partisan Media Attention to Race
Specifically, in Figure 3.1 I plot the proportion of attention to race each show devotes on every day
between September 2008 and December 2016. Moreover, I relate this attention to a selection of
events which may have stimulated discussion about race. These include the arrest of Harvard Pro-
fessor Henry Louise Gates, President Obama’s remarks following George Zimmerman’s acquittal
of murdering Trayvon Martin, and the shooting death of Michael Brown.
The patterns in Figure 3.1 suggest that pundit attention to race reflects, in part, important events.
Both Maddow and The Factor covered race more after Henry Louis Gates’s arrest and the shooting
death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. Attention similarly increases following police
officers killing Philando Castile and Terence Crutcher. But attention varies across shows and over
time, too. During summer 2013 when George Zimmerman was acquitted of murdering Trayvon
Martin and President Obama remarked that if he had a son he would look like Trayvon, Maddow
devoted more attention to race than O’Reilly. Similarly, 2011 was a relatively quiet year for both
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Figure 3.2: Public Concern with Race as an Important Problem
shows when it came to discussing race. Overall, the two series correlate at 0.31, suggesting that
while related, potentially consequential variation exists in how much attention each show devotes
to race.
The public’s concern with race as an issue appears to also respond to some of these events.
Figure 3.2 provides information on the public’s concern with race as an issue. The top panel plots
the percentage of all Gallup respondents whose most important problem responses fall in the race
only or race plus categories. I again include the preceding events to visually relate prominent and
potentially race-related social and political events to public attitudes.
The trends suggest that these events may motivate concern. The Michael Brown shooting and
eventual grand jury verdict appear to precede perceptions of race’s national importance. Others
like Freddie Gray’s death and the ensuing protests in Baltimore, as well as the Philando Castile
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shooting outside Saint Paul, Minnesota, seem to fall on general trends in increasing concern with
race. What’s more, the race only and race plus series in large part move together. While the former
is certainly a component of the second measure and thus this parallelism makes sense, the degree
to which they move together suggests that concern with race relations and racism is related to the
salience of racialized issues.5
Similar patterns manifest when breaking down importance evaluations by partisanship among
Whites, although the patterns are more muted for Republicans.6 Whites in both parties appear to
respond to the grand jury verdict in the Michael Brown case and events surrounding Freddie Gray’s
death. Democrats, however, react more to the Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown shootings, as
well as President Obama’s remarks following George Zimmerman’s acquittal of murdering Martin.
In general, as might be expected given the close alignment between individual racial attitudes and
party (Tesler, 2016), White Democrats voice much more concern with race as captured by the race
only measure, particularly during Barack Obama’s second term in office. But Republicans express
much more concern, and consistently so, when expanding the array of outcomes beyond racism and
race relations to include things like welfare, crime, and immigration. It is also important to note
that this expanded outcome measure appears driven by different components for White Democrats
and White Republicans. For White Democrats, perceptions of racism’s importance play a key
role. For White Republicans, the additional racialized issues feature prominently. While only
descriptive, this divergence suggests that because what elites talk about when they talk about race
varies by party, mass attitude patterns look increasingly different.
To test my hypotheses I now relate these two series by regressing the race only and race plus
outcomes on a set of individual and contextual covariates. My key explanatory variable, news
coverage, enters as a contextual variable. I assign to each respondent the average amount of at-
tention each show devotes to race in the two weeks preceding her interview date. The theoretical
5Indeed, removing the race relations and racism responses from the race plus series and relating this racialized
issues subset with the race only series yields a correlation of 0.53. Concern with race appears a general pattern among
the American public as a whole. These relationships dampen among Whites, but don’t differ much from there by party.
The correlation between each series for white Democrats is 0.35 and for White Republicans is 0.39. Although related,
the series are more different for Whites than non-Whites (rnonwhite = 0.52, rwhite = 0.42).
6I focus on Whites because they make up more than 3/4 of the partisan news audience.
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motivation behind the two-week window comes from the information diffusion necessary for mod-
ifying attitudes beyond immediate show viewers (Levendusky, 2013; Druckman, Levendusky and
McLain, 2018).7 Moreover, including coverage variables for both shows in the same model ac-
counts for potential interdependencies in coverage. As the discussion in the last chapter suggests,
Maddow may respond to O’Reilly’s coverage of race, or vice versa.
I also include individual-level covariates that may shape most important problem evaluations.
These include partisanship, operationalized as indicator variables folding leaning partisans into
the relevant partisan category, age set on a 0-1 scale, sex, an indicator for whether the respondent
graduated from college, and an indicator for whether the respondent lives in the South defined as
the states of the former Confederacy (Acharya, Blackwell and Sen, 2018). I also include survey
fixed effects to account for any systematic differences over time in the survey context that may
change respondents’ concern with race overall. My inferences therefore relate variation in attention
to race by show to problem importance responses within a survey fielding.8 Finally, I focus on non-
Hispanic Whites. They make up roughly 3/4 of each show’s regular audience and provide a most
likely place to find media effects because race is less salient for this group than for non-Whites.9
I model the binary race only or race plus categories using a probit link.10 Consequently, I
present the results as figures and reserve the complete model results for the appendix. Each panel
in Figure 3.3 converts the model results into predicted probabilities, holding all variables at their
sample means or modes for Whites.11 The solid line in the left panel shows that when Maddow
7The substantive results hold for windows as short as 10 days and extend to even a 21 day period. One potential
explanation for the decline in significance as proximity to interview date increases follows from a decline in variation
in show attention to race.
8This modeling approach reflects similar designs used to assess agenda setting effects (Gillion, 2016).
9Running the same analyses on only non-whites shows slightly different results from those I describe subsequently.
On both outcomes O’Reilly’s coverage still has a null effect. Maddow’s coverage differs. On the race only outcome,
non-Whites do not vary in their concern in ways that relate to media attention to race. On the race plus outcome
a negative effect actually manifests (p < 0.01). This suggests that the racialized outcomes included in this measure
may function differently for non-whites. Finally, running the same models on the full sample but interacting all of
the explanatory variables with an indicator for whether the respondent is White reveals a positive and significant
coefficient on the interaction between it and Maddow’s coverage (race only p < 0.05; race plus p < 0.01), supporting
my contention that Whites are more responsive to these racial cues. I report these results in the appendix.
10Analyses using a linear probability model or rare events logit offer similar insights.
11This is a White man without a college education who lives outside the south and is 56 years old. I present results
for this person identifying as a Democrat here, and as a Republican in the appendix. The substantive patterns remain,
but for intercept shifts.
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Figure 3.3: Probability of endorsing race as the most important problem by show attention to race.
Predicted probabilities generated from probit models for a white Democrat with covariates held
at sample means or modes. The hashmarks provide the distribution of levels of racial discussion,
shaded by show.
discusses race more on her show, whites become more likely to report that race is an important
national problem. A min-max change in coverage increases this probability by 0.038, from 0.007
to 0.045, over a 530% increase (p < 0.05). However, as the hashmarks show, this is a rare event
given the distribution of the data. Looking instead at a change from one standard deviation below
the mean for Maddow show coverage to one standard deviation above it produces a change of over
0.01, nearly a 150% increase from 0.008 to 0.019.12
This is not the case for O’Reilly. As the dashed line indicates, the more O’Reilly discusses race,
12Alternatively, calculating the marginal change in conditional expectation using the observed value approach pro-
posed by Hanmer and Kalkan (2012) provides an estimate of 0.095 with a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval of
[0.026, 0.167] for Maddow’s coverage and -0.050 [-0.129, 0.029] for O’Reilly’s coverage. This is over 23 times the
difference between a White Democrat and a White Republican (-0.004, [-0.005, -0.003]). For the race plus outcome
these are: Maddow 0.185 [-0.012, 0.384], O’Reilly -0.121 [-0.391, 0.143], and Republican-Democrat 0.015 [0.013,
0.018].
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the less likely whites are to see race as a problem. However, this effect is imprecisely estimated
(p= 0.17, two-tailed). Even so, the potential negative relationship between greater attention paid to
race and most important problem evaluations is interesting and I address it further in the subsequent
studies.
These results also hold when looking at the race plus measure. The right panel of Figure 3.3
provides the same change in probability for this new outcome. The coverage effect is smaller, but
still meaningful for Maddow. A min-max change in attention to race increases the probability an
individual offers a response coded as one of the race-related outcomes by nearly 0.033, a 68%
increase from 0.048 to 0.081 (p < 0.05). Reducing the change in attention to average attention,
plus or minus one standard deviation, produces a 0.013 point shift from 0.050 to 0.063, a 27%
increase. As before, the relationship between problem evaluations and O’Reilly discussing race is
negative but much less precisely estimated (p > 0.1).
When Maddow discusses race more white respondents are more likely to report that race is an
important national problem on two separate measures of concern. The multi-valent account there-
fore receives support while the traditional and null accounts do not.13 Admittedly the effects are
small in absolute magnitude. As I detail in footnote 4, relatively few Whites report race as an im-
portant problem in any given month. The most in the time period is 15% in July 2016, potentially
reflecting the shooting deaths of police officers in Dallas and Baton Rouge and discussion about
whether the Black Lives Matter movement motivated these attacks. Even so, the relative influence
is substantial. Maddow discussing race can more than double the probability Whites report that
race is an important national problem, although this influence is smaller on the broader race plus
outcome. Whites’ attitudes appear to respond to partisan racial rhetoric in ways that reflect its con-
tent. That these effects vary by partisan outlet may help explain why large partisan attitudinal gaps
exist in evaluating race relations and race-based events (see Tesler, 2016; Neal, 2017). Maddow’s
audience expresses more concern while, if anything, O’Reilly’s does less.
13I also conducted placebo tests with different issues to inspect whether the identified relationship was spurious.
Neither show’s amount of racial discourse affects Whites’ views on the importance of the environment, unemployment,
or abortion. These issues should be well-removed from any effects from racial discussion. The estimated null effects
suggest this is the case.
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The preceding analyses demonstrate that the relationship between partisan media coverage of
race and the public’s concern with the issue is not directly related to issue attention; rather, outlet
appears to matter. But these results may exist for two reasons. First, what the media cover in
relation to an issue may shape whether people find it to be an important national problem (Miller,
2007). Alternatively, how the media present the content related to an issue matters (see generally
Iyengar, 1991). It could be how each outlet covers race that shapes these differences, not so much
differences in which topics they cover.
3.5 Study 2: Framing Affects Agenda Setting in an Experiment
I turn to an experimental design to address the observational equivalence issue in Study 1. I
fielded this as part of a multi-investigator study on a sample of 1,2000 U.S. adults through the
YouGov survey platform in July 2018. For consistency with the Study 1 analyses, I focus on the
825 non-Hispanic White respondents included in the surveys.
Participants read a pair of news articles ostensibly from the USA Today (for a similar design,
see Miller, 2007).14 Participants first read a story on mortgage interest rates and then read another
story about law enforcement civil asset forfeiture practices.15 The intervention relates to how this
second story was framed.16 Participants were assigned, on a random basis, to a control article
talking about the practice of civil asset forfeiture, a race-important article calling attention to
racial biases in the application of civil asset forfeiture and encouraging its repeal because it is
discriminatory, and a race-denial condition mentioning the same racial biases but downplaying
their importance.17
I measure problem importance evaluations in two ways, with the order of item type counter-
14Each article was an edited version of an actual USA Today story.
15Civil asset forfeiture is an advantageous issue to study the impact framing has on perceptions of problem impor-
tance. The issue has received media coverage but has not commanded the attention that other aspects of the criminal
justice system with potential racially disparate implementation have. Further, the nature of civil asset forfeiture cov-
erage readily intersects with the types of coverage variation present in the media attention measure used in Study 1.
This coverage variation provides the foundation for the framing variation I use in the design.
16The frames reflect racially liberal and conservative frames I identify in the preceding chapter. Articles are included
in the appendix.
17After each article participants answered two questions evaluating the article on different dimensions to maintain
a cover story for the section, and then they completed items capturing most important problem judgments.
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balanced across participants. The first item is the standard Gallup question used in Study 1. I offer
respondents the chance to provide up to three open-ended responses. As with the observational
analysis I then create race only and race plus measures. The first codes responses that specifically
mention race, racism, and race relations while the second incorporates the same set of racialized
issues as before except for immigration given the treatment’s focus.
The second item set, a series of close-ended issue importance items, addresses concerns with
the Gallup most important problem item. Some contend it conflates perceptions of issue impor-
tance, or salience, and issue problematization, or a desire to change the status quo (Wlezien, 2005).
Important problems may not be politically relevant and politically relevant issues may not be prob-
lems. I therefore include a set of 5 items asking respondents “Of the problems in the country
today, how big of a problem is...[Racism/Race relations]?” with responses recorded on a 4-point
Likert-type scale ranging from “a very big problem” to “not a problem at all.” These issues in-
clude racism/race relations, housing affordability, the economy, the environment, and health care.
Comparing across treatments, I expect respondents in the race-important condition will rate race
as a more important problem than those in the race-denial condition. The remaining issues pro-
vide insight into whether and how the treatments shift concern about other issues. It could be
the case that those in the race-denial condition rate these issues as more important than those in
the race-important condition in a type of hydraulic effect. Alternatively, exposure to information
about discrimination and appeals for modifying public policy may generate additional concern
about other policies. Those in the race-important condition may place greater importance on these
policies than those in the race-denial group.
I begin with the open-ended item. The left and right panels in Figure 3.4 present the proportion
of responses coded as race only or race plus, respectively, as bold horizontal lines, doing so for
each treatment group and the control. The vertical lines indicate 83% confidence intervals. The
results reinforce the results from Study 1 and point to the influence issue frames have on problem
importance judgments. The race-important group was more likely to offer a race only response
compared to both the control and race-denial groups. Nearly 17% of those assigned to the race-
47
Race Only Race Plus
Race
Denial
Control Race
Important
Race
Denial
Control Race
Important
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Pr
o
po
rti
on
 o
f M
en
tio
ns
Figure 3.4: Issue mention proportions by condition. Horizontal lines present group means. Vertical
lines denote 83% confidence intervals where non-overlap indicates significant differences between
coefficient magnitudes at the 95% level (Bolsen and Thornton, 2014). Points display the raw
responses and are jittered slightly to reduce overplotting.
important condition provided such a response compared to about 12% each for the control and
race-denial conditions (p < .15 and p < .09, respectively).18 While small in absolute magnitude,
the difference in effects relates to over a 40% increase in the number of responses classified in
this category. This is a particularly impressive outcome given the requirement that respondents
relate a text-based treatment about a policy to a belief that race relations or racism are an important
national problem in an open-ended format.
The right panel in Figure 3.4 sheds further light on the results. After expanding the set of
classifiable responses to include racialized policies or other race-related mentions the race-denial
condition becomes unique. While 20 and 21% of White respondents in the control and race-
important conditions provide a race plus response, only 17% of those in the race-denial condition
do so. While differences across conditions are not reliable, they are consistent with the observa-
tional analyses.19
18Supplementary analyses using randomization inference yield similar p-values (Keele, McConnaughy and White,
2012).
19The p-value on the difference between the race-important and race-denial conditions is 0.24. Similarp-values
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The difference between the race only and race plus operationalizations is suggestive of the na-
ture of the treatment effect. Given ongoing debates about race and related issues in summer 2018,
an additional piece of information about discrimination in the criminal justice system does little
so shift views about the importance of race-related policies.20 The treatment then may specifically
call attention to how race structures social outcomes, leading to the increased proportion of race
only responses in the race-important condition. This outcome appears important for understanding
the mix of considerations people bring to bear when identifying important social problem, even if
it is only suggestive. While some 37% of the race plus responses in the control condition are from
additional race-related issues, this decreases to 31% in the race-denial condition and 20% in the
race-important condition. Exposure to information about whether or not race is related to social
affairs appears to affect how Whites understand its role.
Figure 3.5 extends these analyses to the closed-ended items. The top left panel shows that
those in the race-important condition rate race as more important than the other two conditions,
but the difference is reliable only relative to the control (p < .05). Compared to the control, those
in the race-important condition average a 0.72 on this 0-1 measure, a nearly 0.07 point difference
(Cohen’s d = 0.21). With respect to the race-denial group, the average importance rating is 0.026
points larger, but unreliably so (p = .33). These differences relate to increases of 10 and 4%,
respectively. Additionally, 45% of the race-important group reported that race is a “very big
problem,” compared to 39% in the control and race-denial groups.21
It is worth highlighting the similarity in effects between the race-denial and race-important
conditions. On the open-ended item, these two treatments resulted in polarizing attitude effects
with the former decreasing concern and the latter increasing it. Here, they both increase concern
with race as define as racism and race/relations. This suggests that part of the function for the
obtain in analyses using randomization inference.
20As an example, the race-important condition contained only 1 additional response classified as mentioning crime
or policing than either other condition.
21These distributional differences appear to affect the hypothesis testing. P-values from randomization inference
tests offer evidence that not only are average ratings lower in the control group (p < .02), but they also provide
more reliable, albeit still suggestive, evidence that the race-denial condition’s importance rating is lower than the
race-important group (p < .09).
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Figure 3.5: Issue importance ratings by condition. Outcomes scaled 0-1. Horizontal lines present
group means. Vertical lines denote 83% confidence intervals where non-overlap indicates signif-
icant differences between coefficient magnitudes at the 95% level (Bolsen and Thornton, 2014).
Points display the raw responses and are jittered slightly to reduce overplotting.
race-denial condition may be a deliberate downweighting of considerations about race relative to
other potentially important problems. The consequence for the closed-ended item is then viewing
race as important but only because people are paying too much attention to it.
The remaining panels all also reveal some influence from the race-important condition. Rela-
tive to the control group, those in the race-important rate housing (difference = 0.046, p = .051),
health care (0.017, p = .42), the economy (0.040, p = .18), and the environment (0.027, p = .30)
as more important.22 Similar differences manifest comparing the race-important and race-denial
conditions.23 These results offer little evidence that exposure to rhetoric about the importance of
22Randomization inference analyses offer similar insights into where differences are reliable (housing, p = .052;
health care, p = .43; economy, p = .32; environment, p = .20).
23These are: housing (difference = 0.032, p = .18), health care (0.013, p = .53), the economy (0.034, p = .27), and
the environment (0.010, p = .71). But as with ratings of race’s importance, distributional differences appear to affect
to what extent these margins reliably differ from 0. Evidence from randomization inference analyses suggest these
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one issue necessarily reduces concern with other issues when people are asked to individually rate
them. Instead, the pattern of results potentially suggests that applying a frame indicative of liberal
positions may foster concern with other issues given the integration of these issues in contemporary
mass belief systems (Converse, 1964). A shift in perceived important for one issue may increase
importance judgments for others through a process akin to spreading activation (Collins and Lof-
tus, 1975). Indeed, averaging together the issue importance ratings for the non-race issue suggests
this may be the case. The average on this combined measure in the race-important condition is
0.72, 0.033 points greater than the control (p = .08) and 0.025 points larger than the race-denial
condition (p = .19).24
The results in Figure 3.5 also reveal that the race-denial condition does little to influence im-
portance judgments on issues further removed from race. Not only are ratings consistently lower
than the race-important condition, importance judgments in this group are on average only mod-
estly larger than the control. The largest differences emerge on housing (difference = 0.015, p =
.54) and the economy (0.017, p = .50), while on health care (0.004, p = .86) and the environment
(0.007, p = .83), importance judgments differ little. In contrast to the race-important condition, the
race-denial condition then does not appear to have any potential global influence on evaluations
of issue importance for the issues considered here. The difference in average ratings relative to the
control is only 0.008 (p = .65).
The results from Study 2 corroborate and extend the insights from Study 1. Not only may
content affect agenda setting, but framing does so as well. Relative to a control condition where
information about race was absent, participants in a condition where a policy was framed as racially
discriminatory were more likely to note that race was an important problem. This holds both
on open-ended and closed-ended items. Further, those reading that the policy was not racially
discriminatory and that the policy’s opponents were using race as a distraction were less likely to
offer race as a response on an open-ended item compared to a control, but more likely to do so on
differences are more reliable (housing, p = .027; health care, p = .26; economy, p = .49; environment, p = .10).
24Cohen’s ds of 0.15, and 0.11, respectively. Randomization inference tests yield a similar p-value for the difference
relative to the control (.079) but also suggest the difference relative to the race-denial condition is potentially more
reliable (.042).
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a closed-ended item. The results also offer interesting suggestive evidence regarding potentially
broader impacts for framing on issue importance. While those in the race-important condition on
average rated the non-race issues as more important than the control, no such increase appears in
the race-denial condition. Future work could investigate the potential for such spillover effects and
their consequences (cf. Hopkins and Mummolo, 2017).
3.6 Conclusion
A conventional wisdom holds that talking about race serves as a way to correct past injustices
and present wrongs by calling attention attention to disparities related to race. But the evidence I
present suggests that simply talking about race is not enough. In line with expectations from classic
agenda setting accounts, concern with race does increase as attention to race increases (McCombs
and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Beckett, 1994; Miller and Krosnick, 2000; Soroka,
2002, 2006; Miller, 2007), but only when that conversation centers race as an important explanation
for social inequities. Although the evidence I present is mixed on this outcome, attention to race
that deemphasizes its influence may actually reduce public concern with it. Simply talking about
race is not enough; perspective also matters.
My results indicate that agenda setting accounts should consider framing variation as an impor-
tant conditioning force. Even so, one might argue that Study 1’s results simply reflect individuals’
predispositions shaping their judgments of race’s national importance. Those likely to watch, or
hear about, potentially race-related news from Rachel Maddow may already be open to seeing race
as an important problem. Relatedly, O’Reilly’s audience and their peers are perhaps more likely to
ignore race anyway. That mass partisans are increasingly divided in their racial attitudes suggests
this is potentially the case (Tesler, 2016). Consequently, it’s unsurprising that Maddow’s coverage
matters in the observational analysis while O’Reilly’s does not. Those receiving this information
are predisposed to respond to cues on race in the same way, regardless of the frame.
Another concern may be that Maddow and O’Reilly are uniquely able to influence beliefs on
race because people see them as trusted information sources. The partisan preferences that mo-
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tivate people to seek out attitudinally consistent information similarly set partisan elites apart as
people who can effectively frame issues (Druckman, 2001). Although motivated by partisanship,
that these predispositions correlate with racial attitudes suggests individuals expect elites to offer
some specific perspectives on race. Maddow can frame race as about discrimination, thereby shap-
ing attitudes, in part because this is a consistent position. Without trustworthy sources, individuals’
racial attitudes suppress these framing attempts, limiting elite influence.
Although not directly addressing this by varying source cues, the results from Study 2 suggest
that highly trusted sources may be sufficient, but not necessary, for framing to influence agenda
setting. The articles were ostensibly from the USA Today. That a story from a neutral arbiter
framed in different ways can shift attitudes suggests source cues, while important, may not be
required to alter how people perceive issues related to core predispositions. Although I motivated
my analyses by foregrounding the trust partisans place in party elites, the experimental results
suggest that elite influence may not simply follow from their credibility; rather, what they say may
matter more.
As a final point, elite racial discourse may have longer-term implications for mass attitudes
beyond agenda setting. Agenda setting concerns perceptions of national issues, but individuals can
internalize elite discourse on race such that they see race as not only nationally important but also
personally important. The mass public adopts the frames (de)emphasizing race’s importance and
uses these to understand other phenomena (Lippmann, 1922). Elites can thus encourage the public
to use a particular perspective to understand the world (Boninger, Krosnick and Berent, 1995).
A dialog on race can create issue publics around race where they otherwise did not exist. But
because these entities may grow in response to elite discourse, these issue publics may organize
around preserving, or challenging, the racial status quo. For those seeking to address persist racial
inequality, talking about race matters, but the content of these conversations matters even more.
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Chapter 4
Racial Attitudes Through A Partisan Lens
Race is fundamental to American society and American politics. Racial considerations con-
tributed to the Constitution’s shape, subsequently structuring party systems (Carmines and Stim-
son, 1989; Schickler, 2016; Tesler, 2016) and influencing policymaking (Katznelson, 2006). The
politicization of race brought about by these institutions facilitates the links between the mass
public’s racial attitudes and their policy preferences (Gilens, 1999; Tesler, 2016) and party attach-
ments (Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016) links that in turn maintain race as an important
institutional feature. Intentioned or not, race helps shape who gets what, when, and how.
Undergirding all of this is an assumption that racial animus feeds political conflict. In this
paper, I turn this conventional wisdom on its head, arguing that political conflict can shape racial
attitudes–the views and beliefs people hold about groups understood to be racial.1 Political scien-
tists have failed to examine this possibility perhaps because racial attitudes are seen as persistent
and influential predispositions that form during childhood, long before most Americans become
political animals (Sears and Brown, 2013).2 According to this line of reasoning, individuals use
these early-formed attitudes to make sense of politics; racial attitudes lead to partisanship (Sears
and Funk, 1999; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002; Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016).3
Yet, I contend that changes in the political environment suggest that consistently privileging
racial attitudes as the causal force in their relationship with partisanship is unwise. Consider the
question in terms of attitude centrality. Political contexts make some predispositions more central
in belief systems than others (Highton and Kam, 2011) with greater centrality increasing a predis-
position’s causal influence on other attitudes (Converse, 1964). When scholars first proposed and
1My argument extends findings that partisanship can shape positions on race-related issues (Carsey and Layman,
2006; Highton and Kam, 2011) to consider attitudes about racial groups.
2Recent reviews of prejudice and politics view early-socialized racial animus as an explanation (Hutchings and
Valentino, 2004; Kinder, 2013).
3Tesler (Tesler, 2016) does suggest evaluations of Barack Obama changed racial attitudes, but does not provide a
full account (215, n. 33).
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found evidence that racial attitudes shape party loyalties during the 1960s-1980s, many Americans
were adjusting their partisanship to account for changes in the party system caused by an issue that
was more important to them than their partisan ties (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Sears and Funk,
1999; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). But the current party system gives people little in-
centive to change their party loyalties and more cause to adopt party-consistent attitudes (Highton
and Kam, 2011). It makes little sense to consistently use racial attitudes to predict a relatively more
stable predisposition as scholars do when describing the growing correlation between partisanship
and racial attitudes as a story about sorting rather than attitude change (Tesler, 2016).
That partisanship might affect racial attitudes is theoretically plausible for two reasons. First,
partisanship is perhaps the most important attitude in Americans’ political belief systems, and it
is only more so today. By defining conflict more in terms of partisanship than other concerns, the
current polarized and competitive political environment has made partisanship a much stronger
political force now than it was in the first decades of survey research (Azari and Hetherington,
2016; Mason, 2018). In this more party-centric environment, scholars have found that partisanship
has emerged as causally prior to many things once thought to be causally prior to partisanship, in-
cluding issue positions (Lenz, 2012) core political values (Goren, 2005) and economic evaluations
(Bartels, 2002). Add to this individuals’ motivation to adopt party-consistent views in a polar-
ized environment (Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014) and the possibility of changes in causal
dynamics is not only possible, but plausible.
Second, because the parties of the early 21st Century have not changed where they stand on
race, party switching on racial attitudes is less likely. People are unlikely to receive information
on race that changes which party they see as more supportive of racial minorities and fewer people
have misaligned partisanship and racial attitudes, each making sorting less likely. Instead, when
people receive information on race they are likely to change their attitudes. More central party
attachments can shape the kinds of information partisans receive on race and how they interpret
it. Party elites, for instance, discuss race in markedly different ways when it becomes salient
(Haney Lo´pez, 2014; King and Smith, 2014) offering one potential source of party-driven attitude
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change (Zaller, 1992).
I demonstrate that partisanship is indeed a causal force in its relationship with racial attitudes,
and this follows from changes in the political context that make party the central organizing force
of political conflict. Using panel data, I compare two periods characterized by different degrees of
party conflict, the early 1990s and late 2000s. I find that whites’ racial attitudes encourage party
switching in both periods, but this better characterizes the less party-centric 1990s than the more
party-centric 2000s. In contrast, Barack Obama’s administration coincided with many more whites
aligning their racial attitudes with their partisanship than switching parties, a pattern persisting
even in 2016. The results paint a normatively mixed picture by showing that politics, through
partisanship, can perpetuate negative racial attitudes or encourage whites to adopt more favorable
views.
4.1 Partisanship, Race, and Racial Attitude Updating
The connection between race and partisanship in the modern era has grown stronger over at
least the last half century (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Schickler,
2016). Before 1964, intra-party conflicts largely kept civil rights off the national political agenda,
with Southern Democrats in particular the keystone to maintaining institutionalized racism. This
changed when Democrats championed the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts and Republicans
courted disaffected whites with their Southern Strategy. In subsequent years, Democrats reinforced
their commitment to pro-black policies, while Republicans distanced themselves from racial liber-
alism (Carmines and Stimson, 1989, Ch. 2). In part because the growing partisan divide on race
gives elites incentives to use racialized campaign messages (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Mendel-
berg, 2001) the mass public has received clear signals about whom the parties support on race since
at least the mid-1960s.
Changes in the mass public’s party loyalties followed this information about where the par-
ties stand, and explanations for these changes contribute to the prevailing characterization of the
relationship as one where racial attitudes shape individuals’ partisanship. For Sears and Funk
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(Sears and Funk, 1999), racial attitudes played a “unique role” in shaping “partisan political pref-
erences during the civil rights era and its aftermath” (17).4 Similarly, Green and colleagues (Green,
Palmquist and Schickler, 2002) contend that the enfranchisement of African Americans changed
each party’s “social imagery,” motivating whites to switch parties. Tesler (Tesler, 2016) echoes this
claim when arguing that Barack Obama’s presidency motivated racial liberals and conservatives to
become Democrats and Republicans.
The conventional wisdom on whites’ racial attitudes also argues race leads to party. The ex-
isting literature contends racial attitudes form early in life and persist through most of adulthood
as a way to understand the world (Henry and Sears, 2009; Sears and Brown, 2013; Goldman and
Hopkins, Forthcoming). Evidence indicates children understand racial categories before kinder-
garten and then come to see them as fixed attributes as they grow up (Hirschfeld, 1996). People’s
early social environments, including family and school experiences, contribute morals and values
that provide these categories with meaning (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Goldman and Hopkins,
Forthcoming).
The evidence for early-acquired racial attitudes encourages scholars to treat them as causally
prior to political outcomes including partisanship (Sears and Funk, 1999; Hutchings and Valentino,
2004; Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016) implicitly reinforcing the conventional view that
these attitudes are unlikely outcomes of political processes. The position holds that when people
encounter information on race they will align some political position with their racial attitudes
rather than change the latter. However, I propose that the contexts people find themselves in can
motivate racial attitude change. People can reevaluate racial groups by incorporating additional
information, like that provided by political elites when they draw attention to the positive and
negative characteristics that define racial categories (Haney Lo´pez, 2014; King and Smith, 2014).
Changes in which racial attitudes count as socially acceptable offer some initial guidance. For
decades, white Americans believed that whites and blacks were innately different. This biological
racism persisted among elites at least until World War II when it lost favor among social scientists
4See also (Valentino and Sears, 2005).
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(Kinder and Sanders, 1996, Ch. 5). Change in elites’ beliefs precipitated a change in the mass
public such that biological racism is decidedly uncommon these days (but see Tesler, 2016). As
Kinder and Sanders (1996) detail, how elites talk about race affects how individuals express their
attitudes. I extend this thinking to argue that elites, and the information environment more gener-
ally, can not only affect how people express distinct racial attitudes, but also which attitudes they
hold.
4.2 Why Partisanship Should Matter for Racial Attitudes
To see how partisanship could shape racial attitudes, consider the relationship between the two
in terms of attitude centrality. Changes in the political context make party now arguably more
central than ever before. Increasing elite polarization and more competitive elections over the last
several decades have reduced the number of cross-pressured voters open to changing their parti-
san allegiances and increased the congruence between partisanship and other predispositions and
identities (Mason, 2018). Partisan attachments are so ingrained they even shape responses to re-
action time tasks (Theodoridis, 2017). It’s perhaps unsurprising then that analyses of historical
data suggest that party today is more influential than any time since the introduction of the secret
ballot (Azari and Hetherington, 2016). Even more suggestive of its growing influence, partisanship
appears to increasingly shape preferences in settings outside of politics (Iyengar and Westwood,
2014). A political context defined more by party loyalties than issue positions or other concerns
encourages the mass public to use partisanship more often to understand social and political phe-
nomena, strengthening these loyalties and potentially making them more influential relative to
other predispositions (Converse, 1964; Krosnick, 1988).
Partisanship’s influence can be seen through several potential mechanisms. It shapes who peo-
ple pay attention to for information and how they process the information they receive. Preferring
relatively costless information searches, partisans tend to rely on co-partisan information sources
because they value credible and trustworthy messengers (Zaller, 1992). Alongside potential differ-
ences in information exposure, partisanship’s function as a “perceptual screen” encourages biased
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information processing (Campbell et al., 1960; Bartels, 2002; Gaines et al., 2007), and motivates
people to hold consistent attitudes (Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014). People interpret social
and political affairs in ways that fit with their partisanship, modifying their attitudes accordingly.
When contexts elevate partisanship over other lines of conflict, these partisan biases in information
seeking and processing become more likely, increasing partisanship’s potential influence on other
attitudes (Krosnick, 1988; Mason, 2018; Henderson and Theodoridis, 2017).
Party-biased reactions to the information environment should most affect whites. Racially
segregated geographic and social spaces limit whites’ interactions with non-coethnics (Logan and
Stults, 2011; Cox, Navarro-Rivera and Jones, 2016). Whites’ information about nonwhites may
primarily, or solely, come from political elites and other sources (Entman and Rojecki, 2000).
Social psychology offers insights into how whites’ attitudes may respond to information on
race. Signs of racial progress can motivate some whites to bolster the existing racial hierarchy and
hold more negative racial attitudes (Norton and Sommers, 2011; Wilkins and Kaiser, 2014). Cues
about whether race merits attention can have similar attitudinal consequences. Those emphasizing
a colorblind perspective, one proposing that people should ignore race in decisionmaking, can lead
some whites to avoid acknowledging their own racial biases (Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004) and
become less likely to see racism as an explanation for social outcomes (Apfelbaum et al., 2010).
Whites thus increasingly deemphasize race’s social reality and deny racial inequality, hallmarks of
negative racial attitudes (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Tarman and Sears, 2005). But these effects re-
verse if people hear rhetoric about racial diversity’s benefits or continued discrimination (Richeson
and Nussbaum, 2004; Apfelbaum et al., 2010).
The information environment could therefore influence attitudes directly or indirectly. First,
it may directly shape attitudes by providing information related to race. Second, it may shape
the perspectives people use to interpret potentially race-related affairs, shaping how information
from other sources is processed and thus changing views indirectly (Krosnick, 1988). Partisan-
ship matters to the degree it affects each potential channel of influence. That evidence indicates
Republican elites typically provide information potentially bolstering negative attitudes and Demo-
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cratic elites frequently offer perspectives promoting positive views (Haney Lo´pez, 2014; King and
Smith, 2014), suggests information environments on race that potentially differ by party, making
party-driven attitude change possible in party-centric contexts (Zaller, 1992).
To summarize, I examine two explanations for the relationship between partisanship and racial
attitudes. The first–the racial attitude influence hypothesis–follows the conventional wisdom that
whites’ racial attitudes produce changes in partisanship. Whites’ racial attitudes in part foster con-
cerns about who the parties support, leading them to change parties or how strongly they identify
with their current one. The second–the partisanship influence hypothesis–argues that party shapes
racial attitudes. Partisanship changes attitudes by affecting where people get information and how
they process what they acquire. These two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and can jointly
describe the link between partisanship and racial attitudes in a given political context. What varies
across contexts is the potential source(s) of change.
To show how context can shape dynamics, I test these hypotheses in two periods, one in which
party was less central and one in which it was more: the Clinton era of the early 1990s and the
Obama era of the late 2000s. In the first, party does less to define political conflict so whites
should be more likely to adopt new party loyalties. I therefore expect to find more support for
the racial attitude influence hypothesis5 Whites cross-pressured by their partisan ties and racial
attitudes resolve this conflict by sorting into the “correct” political party. In the second era, party
does more to organize political conflict and there are fewer whites with misaligned partisanship and
racial attitudes to switch parties. I thus expect to find more support for the partisanship influence
hypothesis here.
Importantly, my argument for this latter period is not about reactions to President Obama and
his administration or responses to a diversifying country; it is about the party-centric context in
which these occur. For instance, imagine Obama running and governing in the 1980s when par-
tisanship is in greater flux. His presence would likely not coincide with much, if any, attitude
change. Instead, by reinforcing the connection between the Democratic Party and black America
5Green and colleagues (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002) note partisan attachments in the 1990s were less
stable even than prior decades.
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it encourages party switching. Indeed, analyses exploring Jesse Jackson’s 1984 campaign for the
Democratic Party’s presidential nomination reflect this possibility. His candidacy coincided with
a white electorate shifting its allegiances to the Republican Party, changes motivated in part by
racial attitudes (Sears, Citrin and Kosterman, 1987). The latter era matters because it is defined
by strong partisan conflict. This allows for partisanship to change racial attitudes by shaping what
information people receive on race and how they interpret it.6
4.3 Data and Methods
I test the relationship between whites’ partisanship and racial attitudes using panel data from
the American National Elections Studies, the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP),
and the Democracy Fund.7 In Appendix section 6.3 I show descriptively that the relationship
between the two may be changing using the 1986-2016 ANES cross-sections.
I measure racial attitudes multiple ways. Racial resentment serves as my primary measure
(Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Tarman and Sears, 2005) and I complement this with group affect.
Racial resentment captures structural versus individual explanations for black Americans’ social
and economic status (Tarman and Sears, 2005; Kam and Burge, 2018). It provides a reliable,
validated construct consistently used in studies examining the relationship between whites’ racial
attitudes and partisanship (Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016). By also including affect I
speak to prejudice’s multi-dimensional nature (Kinder, 2013) and address any concerns with the
racial resentment construct (Sniderman and Carmines, 1997; Huddy and Feldman, 2009). Finally,
I offer evidence in Appendix section 6.3 that stereotype measures show similar dynamics.
I operationalize racial resentment with four items in the Kinder and Sanders (Kinder and
6Some argue that Obama may also matter by shaping the relationship between racial attitudes and party (Tesler,
2016). Specifically, people’s evaluations of Obama mediate these interconnections. But other mediators may matter
or other factors may produce these results. I do not claim evaluations don’t matter, but that they may do so because of,
or alongside, other factors. In Appendix section 6.3 I develop this point further, including related analyses.
7I use the 1992-1994 wave of the 1992-1994-1996 ANES panel, the 2008, 2012, and 2016 CCAP election panels,
and the 2012-2016 Democracy Fund VOTER Survey. The 1992-1994 ANES panel conducted face-to-face interviews,
while the CCAP and VOTER surveys were completed online. Although survey modes differ, this should not affect
my analyses because I look at individual-level change. CCAP and VOTER survey participants came from YouGov’s
non-random respondent pool with completed surveys then weighted back to population benchmarks. Analyses using
more panels spanning different parts of the party-centric era are reported in Appendix section 6.3.
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Sanders, 1996) battery.8 I sum the items and scale them 0-1, with higher values indicating greater
racial resentment. For group affect I create a differential affect measure by subtracting how nega-
tively whites feel about whites from how negatively they feel about blacks. I set this to run 0-1, with
higher values indicating respondents feel more negatively about blacks than whites.9 This proce-
dure accounts for interpersonal differences in how people respond to such items (Brady, 1985). I
operationalize partisanship using the branched ANES party identification question, present in all
data collections. I also set it to run 0-1, ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican.10
I complement this operationalization in additional analyses reported in Appendix section 6.3 that
use differenced feeling thermometers to measure partisanship with results showing similar attitude
change patterns.
Consistent with the existing literature I focus on non-Hispanic whites (Valentino and Sears,
2005; Tesler, 2016). Furthermore, when using the 1992-1994 ANES data I restrict the analyses
to those consistently interviewed by a white or non-white interviewer across waves (e.g., white
in 1992 and white in 1994). This holds constant potential variation in responses to the racial
resentment items the interview context creates (Kinder and Sanders, 1996).
I use cross-lagged regression models to evaluate dynamics (Finkel, 1995). These assess the
effect of lagged racial attitudes (racial attitudest−1) on current partisanship (PIDt) and the effect
of lagged partisanship (PIDt−1) on current racial attitudes (racial attitudest), after accounting for
a lagged dependent variable. Equations 1 and 2 show this mathematically.
8Answers are recorded on 5-point strongly agree–strongly disagree scales. The 2016 CCAP differs from the others
because it included only three of the four items. Using only the three items common across surveys does not change
the substantive results. Full question wording and descriptive statistics appear in Appendix section 6.3.
9This measure is available in the 1992-1994 ANES, 2012-2016 VOTER survey, and 2016 CCAP. The first two data
collections feature 101-point feeling thermometers while the third has 5-point favorability scales.
10Using a very reliable measure for partisanship may privilege it in analyses using less reliable racial attitude mea-
sures. But racial resentment has similar characteristics, with error-corrected stabilities similar to partisanship (Kinder
and Sanders, 1996; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). Yet, using a single partisanship item may disadvantage
it. To address this I report further analyses in the appendix. In Appendix section 6.3 I report results from structural
equation models. In Appendix section 6.3 I measure partisanship with party feeling thermometers. The substantive
results persist.
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racial attitudesi, t = β0 +β1PIDi, t−1 +β2racial attitudesi, t−1 + εi (4.1)
PIDi, t = α0 +α1PIDi, t−1 +α2racial attitudesi, t−1 +υi (4.2)
This method allows for assessing whether change in a variable over time can be attributed to the
other variable in the relationship.11 Here, β1 and α2 reflect the degree to which lagged partisanship
and racial attitudes predict current values of the other construct after accounting for individuals’
initial scores and associated weights (β2 and α1, which provide estimates for each predisposition’s
temporal stability). If β1 > 0, then the partisanship influence hypothesis receives support: whites’
partisanship motivates racial attitude change. Similarly, if α2 > 0, then the racial attitude influence
hypothesis receives support: whites’ racial attitudes inspire changes in partisanship. Finally, while
my argument concerns each predisposition’s potential causal impact, with these two comparisons
my focus throughout, the models can also offer suggestive evidence regarding which predisposition
drives dynamics. If β1 > α2, then this suggests partisanship and attitude change matter more. But
if β1 < α2, then this suggests racial attitudes and sorting matter more. I estimate the models using
seemingly unrelated regressions to facilitate these final comparisons, and report consistent results
from additional estimation and analysis strategies in the appendix.12
As prima facie evidence that whites’ partisanship could produce racial attitude change, con-
sider the two-wave correlations for partisanship and racial resentment in each dataset. In all cases
partisanship’s correlation is heartier, and this increases over time. The correlation for racial resent-
ment is 0.67 in the 1992-1994 ANES, 0.80 in the 2008 CCAP, 0.83 and 0.85 in the March and
August waves of the 2012 CCAP, 0.80 in the 2012-2016 VOTER Survey, and 0.87 in the 2016
11Scholars have used this same approach to examine partisanship’s relationship with core political values (Goren,
2005) and issue orientations (Carsey and Layman, 2006; Highton and Kam, 2011).
12Appendix section 6.3 addresses distributional differences between partisanship and racial attitudes by standardiz-
ing the variables in equations 1 and 2 to place them on the same metric. Appendix section 6.3 offers consistent results
from cross-lagged structural equation models that address measurement error concerns while also offering a standard-
ized metric for comparisons. Results in Appendix section 6.3 suggest the patterns I find are not limited to modeling
assumptions and manifest when simply considering the distribution of cases demonstrating stability and change in
each predisposition over time.
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CCAP. For partisanship, these are 0.81, 0.93, 0.94, 0.94, 0.90, and 0.95. Partisanship’s greater
stability, despite measuring it with a single item, suggests it is a likelier cause (Converse, 1964;
Krosnick, 1988). Again, I refine this to argue its influence is most likely when partisanship de-
fines political conflict over other concerns. Eras where party does less to organize political conflict
should be less likely to see attitude change.
4.4 Racial Attitudes Dominate in a Political Context Defined Less by Party
What does the relationship between whites’ partisanship and racial attitudes look like when
party is less central to political conflict? The 1992-1994 ANES panel offers some evidence. Re-
call, I expect to be more likely to find support for the racial attitude influence hypothesis (α2 > 0)
than the partisanship influence hypothesis (β1 > 0). Further, racial attitudes should be more sub-
stantively influential than partisanship. Partisanship does less to organize political conflict and its
influence on political thinking should therefore be weaker or nonexistent.
Table 4.1 contains the results from applying cross-lagged models to these data, separated by
racial attitude operationalization. The first column tests the partisanship influence hypothesis and
the second column considers the racial attitude influence hypothesis. First, the results in column
1 suggest partisanship’s importance in this relationship, even during an era that could be seen as
conventional politics. Strong partisans, 26% of the sample, separate by an average of 0.041 points
on the racial resentment scale in these two years, equivalent to about two-thirds of a category on
an item. But these results are imprecisely estimated (p = 0.054). Racial resentment’s estimated
stability is also noteworthy. The results suggest less stability than might be expected for a predis-
position that is always placed near the beginning of the causal chain (βˆ2 = 0.600). Partisanship’s
positive, albeit modest and imprecisely estimated, influence offers initial suggestive evidence for
the partisanship influence hypothesis.
The results in column 2 support the racial attitude influence hypothesis. As expected, racial
resentment has a significant influence on later party loyalties (p < 0.05). The difference in parti-
sanship for the 7% of the sample scoring at racial resentment’s poles increases by 0.127 points,
64
Table 4.1: Relationship between Whites’ Partisanship and Racial Attitudes (1992-1994)
Racial Resentment Affect Difference
Racial Attitudest Partisanshipt βˆ1− αˆ2 Racial Attitudest Partisanshipt βˆ1− αˆ2
Partisanshipt−1 0.041 0.853∗ −0.086 −0.001 0.868∗ −0.059
(0.021) (0.025) (0.046) (0.013) (0.025) (0.082)
Racial Attitudest−1 0.600∗ 0.127∗ 0.586∗ 0.058
(0.031) (0.041) (0.065) (0.082)
Constant 0.243∗ 0.011 0.229∗ 0.051∗
(0.022) (0.025) (0.033) (0.047)
Observations 592 592 577 577
R2 0.424 0.656 0.294 0.648
Residual Std. Error 0.158 0.205 0.088 0.208
Note: ∗p<0.05. Seemingly unrelated regression results with robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use
population weights. Columns 3 and 6 provide the estimated difference in cross-lagged effects between each predisposition.
about three-fourths of a category on the 7-point measure. Combined, the construct stabilities and
cross-lagged effects presented in columns 1 and 2 explain about 33% of the relationship between
each predisposition in 1994. The remaining variation comes from other unidentified factors and
causal processes (see Finkel, 1995).13
The seemingly unrelated regression estimation strategy also offers one way to test whether
racial attitudes or partisanship are more substantively important. Comparing the effects of min-max
changes for each predisposition offers insight into its theoretical possible effect, despite different
operationalizations (Achen, 1982). Column 3 in Table 4.1 provides the difference in coefficient es-
timates for partisanshipt−1 in column 1 (β1 in equation 1) and racial resentmentt−1 in column 2 (α2
in equation 2), and this difference’s precision. As expected given the less party-centric context, par-
tisanship is less influential than racial resentment (βˆ1− αˆ2 =−0.086, p = 0.03, one-tailed). Racial
attitudes thus appear to contribute more substantively to the relationship’s dynamics. Even so,
these comparisons of theoretical influence are affected by each predisposition’s variance because
the changes relate to vastly different percentages of the sample. Although racial resentment’s the-
oretical impact far surpasses that for partisanship, this potential influence is overstated because
13The 33% comes from the proportion of the correlation between partisanship and racial resentment in 1994 un-
accounted for by the correlation between the models’ residuals. To address potentially unaccounted for factors, I
report analyses in Appendix section 6.3 including economic orientations, culture war attitudes, and anti-immigration
attitudes. The substantive conclusions change little.
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relatively few people occupy the scale endpoints. Another test for substantive influence consists
of standardizing all variables to place them on the same metric, thereby directly relating variation
in the predictor to variation in the outcome (Achen, 1982). Analyses reported in Appendix sec-
tion 6.3 using standardized variables point to racial attitudes as more substantively influential in
this regard.
The remaining columns in Table 4.1 extend these analyses to group affect.14 The results in
columns 4 and 5 suggest that there is no apparent relationship between differential group affect
and partisanship in the 1990s. In neither case does the lagged measure produce significant changes
in the other variable. If anything the results suggest sorting on racial attitudes.15
These analyses provide information on two counts. First, they show that at least one dimension
of racial attitudes continued to shape party loyalties into the 1990s. Second, they offer sugges-
tive evidence that partisanship may shape racial attitudes, although this only fits with the racial
resentment operationalization.
4.5 A More Polarized Context Makes Party More Influential
I use the 2008 and 2012 CCAP surveys and the 2012-2016 VOTER Survey to assess dynamics
in the more party-centric era. I expect to find consistent support for the partisanship influence hy-
pothesis (β1 > 0). Secondarily, and in contrast to the preceding analyses, I also expect partisanship
to be more substantively influential than racial attitudes given the change in context.
I begin with the 2008 CCAP, using the March and October waves. I report the results in Ta-
ble 4.2’s columns 1-3. The first column supports the partisanship influence hypothesis. White
strong partisans, over 40% of the sample, separate by an average of 0.102 points in racial re-
sentment (p < 0.05), about one and a half categories on a scale item. The racial attitude influence
hypothesis also receives support. The difference in partisanship between the least and most racially
resentful (about 16% of whites) increases by an average of 0.048 points, over one-fourth a category
14Descriptives: mean92= 0.55, sd92= 0.10; mean94= 0.55, sd94= 0.10.
15The affect measure and partisanship are in fact uncorrelated in these data. Nor does this relationship vary when
looking at the individual racial group thermometer ratings.
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Table 4.2: Relationship between Whites’ Partisanship and Racial Resentment in the 2008 and 2012
Elections
CCAP 2008 CCAP 2012: March CCAP 2012: August
Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt βˆ1− αˆ2 Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt βˆ1− αˆ2 Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt βˆ1− αˆ2
Partisanshipt−1 0.102∗ 0.917∗ 0.054∗ 0.075∗ 0.927∗ 0.009 0.130∗ 0.935∗ 0.097∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.029) (0.021) (0.039) (0.030) (0.018) (0.041)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.739∗ 0.048∗ 0.812∗ 0.066∗ 0.792∗ 0.032
(0.009) (0.008) (0.028) (0.027) (0.047) (0.025)
Constant 0.120∗ 0.012∗ 0.096∗ −0.003 0.081∗ 0.012
(0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.014) (0.025) (0.019)
Observations 8,866 8,866 726 726 751 751
R2 0.660 0.865 0.680 0.885 0.663 0.864
Residual Std. Error 0.152 0.138 0.150 0.117 0.149 0.123
Note: ∗p<0.05. Seemingly unrelated regression results with robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights. Columns 3, 6, and 9 provide
the estimated difference in cross-lagged effects between each predisposition.
on the 7-point item.
Partisanship also appears more substantively influential.16 Column 3 presents the difference
in coefficient estimates with partisanship about twice as influential as racial attitudes (βˆ1− αˆ2 =
0.054, p < 0.05). Moreover, the effect of moving across partisanship’s range implicates a much
larger proportion of people than that related to racial attitudes’ estimated theoretical influence.
The results not only support my claim that contexts can make partisanship a causal force on racial
attitudes, the evidence also suggests attitude change does more to explain the growing correlation
between partisanship and racial attitudes.17
Table 4.2’s remaining columns consider dynamics in 2012. They also provide an additional test
for whether contextual changes increase party’s relative importance. Each week during the cam-
paign a representative sample of the nearly 45,000 respondents completing the December 2011
CCAP baseline survey were reinterviewed. I focus on the two waves reassessing racial resent-
ment, one in March and the other in August. Because intensifying electoral competition activates
partisanship over other considerations (Erikson and Wlezien, 2012). I expect it to be more sub-
stantively influential than racial attitudes in August than March.
The results again support the partisanship influence hypothesis. Column 4 shows that between
December and March, the roughly 35% of the white sample identifying as strong partisans sep-
16Additional analyses in Appendix section 6.3 also indicate that partisanship’s increased magnitude relative to the
1990s is significant.
17The model accounts for about 85% of the relationship between the two predispositions in October.
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arates by an average of 0.074 points on racial resentment (p < 0.05). Partisanship matters even
more for the August group. As the results in column 7 indicate, strong partisans divide by 0.130
points on racial resentment, over two categories on a scale item (p < 0.05).18
The results inconsistently support the racial attitude influence hypothesis. Column 5 indicates
that the 14% of whites in the March reinterview group placing at racially resentment’s extremes
separate by an average of 0.066 points on the partisanship item (p < 0.05), two-fifths of a category
on the 7-point measure. This effect halves for the August reinterview group. The gap in partisan
attachments grows by only 0.032 points, an insignificant difference (p > 0.10).
Further, partisanship again appears to be more substantively influential. Its influence on racial
attitudes is greater in both waves. But with the difference in estimates only significant for the
August reinterview group, the change in relative influence aligns with accounts that elections raise
partisanship’s salience; context matters for the relationship’s dynamics. In addition, in both waves
partisanship’s influence concerns a group 2.5 times that implicated by a maximal change in racial
resentment. Racial resentment’s substantive effect is thus if anything overstated and the difference
in magnitudes a restrictive characterization. Analyses in Appendix section 6.3 using standardized
measures complement this. As with the 2008 analyses, partisanship not only shapes racial attitudes
in periods where party does more to organize political conflict, but attitude change, not sorting,
appears to drive dynamics more.
But these results only address election year patterns. Although helpful for unpacking attitude
change dynamics, particularly for those made salient (Valentino and Sears, 1998) a campaign con-
text does not shed light on whether the partisanship influence hypothesis holds over longer periods
of time in a party-centric political context. The results in Table 4.3 from the 2012-2016 VOTER
Survey help address this. And analyses reported in Appendix section 6.3 using data from the
2006-2010 General Social Survey and 2010-2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study re-
veal that the dynamics I identify are not merely a function of surveys conducted during presidential
18A one-tailed test derived from the directional nature of my expectations given prior work indicates that the dif-
ference in partisanship’s estimated effect across waves is suggestive but imprecisely estimated (βˆ1,March = βˆ1,August :
p < 0.10, one-tailed). Nor does racial resentment’s influence reliably differ between these two periods (αˆ2,March =
αˆ2,August : p = 0.53, two-tailed).
68
Table 4.3: Relationship between Whites’ Partisanship and Racial Attitudes (2012-2016 VOTER
Survey)
Racial Resentment Affect Difference
Racial Attitudest Partisanshipt βˆ1− αˆ2 Racial Attitudest Partisanshipt βˆ1− αˆ2
Partisanshipt−1 0.147∗ 0.792∗ 0.006 0.068∗ 0.831∗ −0.042
(0.017) (0.020) (0.033) (0.009) (0.018) (0.049)
Racial Attitudest−1 0.837∗ 0.142∗ 0.563∗ 0.110∗
(0.024) (0.027) (0.036) (0.049)
Constant 0.001 0.036∗ 0.186∗ 0.044
(0.014) (0.018) (0.021) (0.030)
Observations 6,014 6,014 5,722 5,722
R2 0.614 0.682 0.317 0.687
Residual Std. Error 0.190 0.202 0.113 0.201
Note: ∗p<0.05. Seemingly unrelated regression results with robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use
population weights. Columns 3 and 6 provide the estimated difference in cross-lagged effects between each predisposition.
elections. Midterm election year surveys fielded in a more party-centric era reveal similar patterns.
The evidence again supports the partisanship influence hypothesis. Strong partisans (40% of
whites) separate by an average of 0.147 points in racial resentment (p < 0.05). This is equivalent
to three and a half categories on a single scale item.
Racial attitudes also contribute to the relationship’s dynamics. Those scoring at racial re-
sentment’s poles divide by an average of 0.142 points on partisanship, or one response category
(p < 0.05).
Considering substantive importance, the test comparing the difference in estimated effects of-
fers inconclusive evidence for whether attitude change or sorting drive dynamics. Column 3 reveals
an estimated difference of near 0. But again, this is a comparison of theoretical differences across
each measure’s range. Racial resentment’s effect is likely overstated because relatively few whites
(13%) populate the scale endpoints, a possibility reinforced by results from standardizing each
measure that suggest partisanship matters more. While the evidence indicates that partisanship’s
influence extends beyond campaign contexts in a more party-centric political era, it is mixed as to
whether partisanship is more substantively important between 2012 and 2016.19
The VOTER Survey also allows me to assess partisanship’s influence using the group affect
19The model accounts for about two-thirds of the correlation between whites’ partisan ties and racial attitudes in
2016.
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dimension of racial animus.20 The results in column 4 indicate that partisanship’s influence per-
sists. Partisanship shapes how much more negatively whites feel about blacks relative to whites
(βˆ1 = 0.067, p < 0.05). Affect also motivates sorting, with those who rate blacks more negatively
than whites identifying as more Republican (αˆ2 = 0.130, p < 0.05). These results do not support,
however, the result that partisanship matters more when comparing theoretically possible changes
(βˆ1− αˆ2 =−0.042, p > 0.1). But again, the estimated effect for racial attitudes on partisanship is
overstated because respondents are not distributed similarly across the measure. Results reported
in Appendix section 6.3 standardizing the variables to adjust for this suggest partisanship has more
substantive influence. As with racial resentment, attitude change is thus at least as likely as sorting
to explain the growing correlation between racial attitudes and party loyalties, and potentially more
so given the estimated attitude change effect implicates many more respondents.
These results provide substantial evidence for my argument that partisanship can shape racial
attitudes. A political context raising party’s salience makes it an influential causal force. Such
contextual changes also appear to shape the relative influence that partisanship has in its relation-
ship with racial attitudes, a point also suggested by leveraging the design of the 2012 CCAP panel.
More party-centric contexts make attitude change rather than sorting the primary explanation for
the growing correlation between partisanship and racial attitudes. The intensely partisan era in
which President Obama governs sees whites adopting racial views consistent with their party loy-
alties and this holds for multiple dimensions of racial animus.21
4.6 2016: Sustained Party Influence
I argue that the preceding evidence for consistent party-driven attitude change comes from
partisanship’s increased centrality, brought about by a more party-centric political context. Even
so, the results could be unique to President Obama. I now turn to test whether these effects persist
in a party-centric context where Obama is not a focal political actor.
20Descriptives: mean12= 0.56, sd12= 0.11; mean16= 0.53, sd16= 0.13.
21In all cases partisanship matters more in analyses standardizing all variables, and shapes racial attitudes after
incorporating additional core attitudes. Analyses reported in Appendices D and F respectively.
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Table 4.4: Relationship between Whites’ Partisanship and Racial Attitudes (2016 CCAP)
Racial Resentment Affect Difference
Racial Attitudest Partisanshipt βˆ1− αˆ2 Racial Attitudest Partisanshipt βˆ1− αˆ2
Partisanshipt−1 0.089∗ 0.918∗ 0.055∗ 0.074∗ 0.924∗ 0.009
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019)
Racial Attitudest−1 0.792∗ 0.034∗ 0.556∗ 0.065∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.022) (0.017)
Constant 0.069∗ 0.026∗ 0.193∗ 0.007∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009)
Observations 8,116 8,116 8,120 8,120
R2 0.725 0.851 0.378 0.851
Residual Std. Error 0.151 0.128 0.135 0.128
Note: ∗p<0.05. Seemingly unrelated regression results with robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use
population weights. Columns 3 and 6 provide the estimated difference in cross-lagged effects between each predisposition.
I do so using the 2016 presidential election. The election featured, in Donald Trump, a politi-
cian more open than most to denigrating racial and ethnic minorities. Trump’s actions, and the me-
dia coverage they received, provide considerations on race separate from Obama that whites could
respond to by changing their attitudes or partisanship. But Trump’s ascendance also revealed a
fracturing Republican Party. And Democrats displayed similar divides, with Bernie Sanders chal-
lenging Hillary Clinton by appealing to economic dissatisfaction. Race could matter, with whites’
partisan lenses guiding responses, or race may matter less than other topics and not provide signals
sufficient to motivate attitude change.
For this test I rely on data from the 2016 CCAP’s June pre-election and November-December
post-election interviews. The results, included in Table 4.4, again support both hypotheses. The
first column indicates that strong partisans, nearly 42% of whites, separate by an average of 0.089
points in racial resentment, a difference of one scale item category on this 3 item version (p< 0.05).
That is not to say that whites did not also adopt new partisan allegiances. Column 2 suggests
that racial attitudes encouraged changes in partisanship. The 20% of the white sample located at
racial resentment’s poles moves apart by 0.034 points on partisanship, or about one-fifth an item
category (p < 0.05).
The results also suggest that partisanship has greater substantive influence. Column 3 shows
that the difference between partisanship and racial resentment is positive and significant (βˆ1− αˆ2 =
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0.055, p< 0.05). This occurs despite racial resentment’s effect being somewhat overstated because
it still implicates fewer people than the same shift for partisanship.22
The partisanship and racial attitude influence hypotheses also receive support when consider-
ing group affect. Here, respondents rated blacks and whites on 5-point favorability scales rather
than feeling thermometers like the prior affect analyses.23 Table 4.4’s remaining results show that
partisanship changes affect (βˆ1 = 0.074, p < 0.05), and that affect motivates changing party loy-
alties (αˆ2 = 0.065, p < 0.05). These estimates offer no clear insight into substantive influence
(βˆ1− αˆ2 = 0.009, p > 0.10). But as with the VOTER Survey results, racial attitudes’ influence is
likely overstated because few whites score at the measure’s extremes.
Party-driven racial attitude change occurs even when Barack Obama is not a focal political
actor. Polarized contexts open the door for partisanship to change racial attitudes. Further, the evi-
dence again suggests that the growing correlation between partisanship and racial attitudes comes
more from attitude change than sorting.
4.7 Partisan Lenses for All? Awareness Moderates Dynamics
The preceding results demonstrate that partisanship can shape whites’ racial attitudes. Even
so, I estimate an average effect throughout. Scholarship investigating the dynamics between issue
orientations and partisanship suggest individual-level characteristics may condition such dynamics
(Carsey and Layman, 2006). To speak to these complexities, and to offer evidence for my argument
that partisans are likely responding to features in the information environment, I briefly consider
whether political awareness conditions the dynamics. Awareness captures individual differences
in the likelihood people encounter information and can incorporate what they hear into existing
attitudes (Zaller, 1992). If partisans are responding to the information environment as I claim,
then the most politically aware should exhibit the most change. In periods of low party conflict,
the most aware should provide the clearest evidence of sorting on racial attitudes. In more party-
22Party still matters after including additional core predispositions. Similarly, standardizing all variables supports
the evidence for its greater influence. Analyses reported Appendices F and D, respectively.
23Descriptives: meanJune= 0.55, sdJune= 0.17; meanNov−Dec= 0.53, sdNov−Dec= 0.18.
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Table 4.5: Political Awareness’s Moderating Effect on the Relationship between Racial Resent-
ment and Partisanship
1992-1994 ANES 2012-2016 VOTER Survey
Low Awareness High Awareness Low Awareness High Awareness
Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 0.021 0.774∗ 0.057∗ 0.879∗ 0.123∗ 0.785∗ 0.167∗ 0.807∗
(0.038) (0.050) (0.024) (0.031) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.579∗ 0.032 0.595∗ 0.165∗ 0.757∗ 0.122∗ 0.861∗ 0.128∗
(0.061) (0.080) (0.034) (0.044) (0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015)
Constant 0.288∗ 0.084 0.227∗ −0.014 0.087∗ 0.064∗ −0.046∗ 0.022∗
(0.044) (0.058) (0.023) (0.029) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 196 196 396 396 2,732 2,732 2,782 2,782
R2 0.320 0.553 0.471 0.706 0.475 0.617 0.745 0.767
Residual Std. Error 0.171 0.226 0.151 0.193 0.200 0.224 0.147 0.151
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.
centric periods, the most politically aware should show the greatest amount of attitude change.
I focus on the 1992-1994 ANES and the 2012-2016 VOTER Survey. I use the same speci-
fication as before, but run these models separately for high and low awareness individuals who
I define, respectively, as scoring at and above, or below, political awareness’s median in each
data set.24 Table 4.5 presents the results. The first two columns offer no evidence for a dynamic
relationship between racial resentment and partisanship for low awareness whites in the 1990s.
They neither update their racial attitudes nor sort on these beliefs. The next column pair, how-
ever, reveals different patterns, and evidence in line with my expectations. The politically aware
appear to update their racial attitudes (βˆ1 = 0.057, p < 0.05) and also adopt new party loyalties
(αˆ2 = 0.165, p < 0.05), with racial attitudes offering more substantive influence.25 When party
does less to organize political conflict, those likely to receive information and have the ability to
respond to it appear more willing to switch parties than update their views of black Americans.
That the politically aware change more supports my claim that individuals are likely responding to
the information environment.
The results from the VOTER Survey reveal that, as expected, changes in the political con-
24I operationalize awareness by summing together correct responses to political fact items and scale this 0-1, with
higher values denoting greater levels of political awareness (Zaller, 1992). MedianANES 1992 = 0.50. MedianVOT ER 2012
= 0.90.
25Even so, the difference in effects between the low and high awareness groups is imprecisely estimated in both
instances (βˆ1: p = 0.40 and αˆ2: p = 0.12, two-tailed). But using a truncated sophistication measure appears to drive
this. A model moderating by the full awareness measure rather than the low-high dichotomy reveals a significant
difference across awareness’s range on sorting but not attitude change.
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text alter these dynamics. Between 2012 and 2016, the least politically aware both change their
racial attitudes (βˆ1 = 0.123, p < 0.05) and adopt new party loyalties (αˆ2 = 0.122, p < 0.05). This
suggests that changes in political context can foster party-driven attitude change even for the least
politically attuned. But the results also indicate that the more politically aware are more responsive,
suggesting the patterns I identify come from whites responding to the information environment.
High awareness whites’ partisanship changes their racial attitudes (βˆ1 = 0.167, p < 0.05), a sub-
stantively large difference that is also greater than that for low awareness whites.26 Further, while
the results suggest sorting on racial attitudes (αˆ2 = 0.128, p < 0.05), this is substantively less im-
portant than partisanship. Only 7% of the most aware white sample place at racial resentment’s
poles whereas strong partisans make up 46% of the sample. While the evidence suggests the most
aware are more likely to change their racial attitudes, both groups appear similarly likely to adopt
new party loyalties.27
These results support my argument that the information environment facilitates dynamics. With
the politically aware the most engaged and attentive, they should be the most responsive to infor-
mation they get on race, and the present patterns support this view.
4.8 Supplementary Analyses
Additional analyses reported in the appendix bolster my conclusions. As noted throughout,
analyses using standardized variables offer further evidence speaking to whether attitude change or
sorting best characterize the relationship’s dynamics in more or less party centric eras. Partisanship
still changes racial attitudes after including other presumptively core predispositions. I also find
consistent effects in other panels. Results from the 2006-2010 General Social Survey and 2010-
2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study show that presidential election-year surveys do not
uniquely make partisanship a cause, and the 2008-2012 CCAP panel offers additional supporting
evidence. I find similar patters using cross-lagged structural equation models to address measure
26Partisanship’s larger effect is significant (p < 0.05). This difference persists when moderating by the full aware-
ness measure rather than focusing on the low-high binary.
27In Appendix section 6.3 I show that the group affect measure offers broadly consistent results.
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reliabilities and tame measurement error. I also replicate the ANES and VOTER Survey analyses
using differenced feeling thermometers to measure partisanship, an operationalization offering
complementary results. Finally, descriptive trends and a different analytical approach complement
these insights.
4.9 Conclusion
I demonstrate that the relationship between partisanship and racial animus is not unidirectional
as prior scholarship at least implicitly believes (Hutchings and Valentino, 2004; Kinder, 2013).
Rather, partisanship’s centrality in whites’ belief systems grounds my claim that it can serve as a
causal force, with changes in the political context moving party to the center of political conflict
making this a likely outcome. I show that partisanship influences two dimensions of prejudice
(Kinder, 2013) and offer evidence that it shapes stereotyping in Appendix section 6.3. Finally,
while partisans of all stripes update their racial attitudes in party-centric political contexts, the
politically aware change the most. This aligns with my claim that partisans are responding to the
information environment.
My results recast our understanding of the relationship between two predispositions presumed
to be fundamental to individuals. Racial attitudes arguably form early in life and persist in much
the same form through adulthood (Henry and Sears, 2009; Goldman and Hopkins, Forthcoming).
Similarly, although partisan allegiances form somewhat later, evidence suggests they typically shift
most following substantial changes in the party system (Campbell et al., 1960; Green, Palmquist
and Schickler, 2002). Racial attitudes’ early development and persistence encourages placing them
causally prior to other outcomes, including partisanship, but this conceptualization blinds schol-
ars to potential changes in causal dynamics created in part by changes in the political context.
That partisanship and racial attitudes appear to have similar cognitive characteristics (Sears, 1993)
perhaps makes it less surprising that whites’ partisan ties can motivate them to update their be-
liefs about black Americans in response to new information given received wisdom that similar
processes motivate party switching (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002).
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My results also shed light on the growing racialization of partisan ties. Scholars usually present
this pattern in two ways: the growing division in party loyalties between whites and nonwhites and
the sorting of racially resentful and sympathetic whites into the “correct” party (Tesler, 2016).
My results reveal a third path for increased racialization: partisanship itself. When partisan loy-
alties drive political conflict more than other concerns whites appear open to updating their racial
attitudes in ways consistent with their partisan loyalties.
That whites will change their racial attitudes potentially introduces perverse incentives for po-
litical campaign strategy. For decades politicians have faced the “electoral temptations of race”
for generating support through racial campaign appeals (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Mendelberg,
2001). Republican candidates may increasingly find success using this messaging because their
core supporters’ increasingly negative racial attitudes give these tactics greater purchase. More-
over, my results suggest such appeals could lead to additional party-driven attitude change, there-
fore introducing a vicious cycle. It seems unlikely that these attitude change dynamics are a short-
term phenomenon.
Recent work suggests that negative racial appeals could have even more deleterious outcomes
because the set of racial appeals available to politicians may be increasing. Whereas prior work
demonstrated that social norms shape how politicians talk about race(Mendelberg, 2001) new ev-
idence suggests these prohibitions may be changing (Valentino, Neuner and Vandenbroek, 2018).
Whites do not appear to shun explicit racial cues like they used to. If party elites who employ neg-
ative racial appeals are not punished, then these appeals may become increasingly common. Such
an outcome could produce pernicious consequences because the current party-centric era makes
party elites particularly influential sources of social norms. Elites using negative racial appeals,
particularly explicitly hostile ones, can validate this same behavior in the mass public (Crandall,
Miller and White II, 2018). A breakdown in norms can lead the racial tensions built into the party
system to surface, and with normatively troubling consequences.
Conversely, my results also indicate that politics, through partisanship, may reduce prejudice.
That white Democrats’ attitudes are becoming more positive suggests that political processes need
76
not exclusively amplify racial animus. Motivation appears to be a key component of effective
prejudice reduction techniques(Paluck and Green, 2009) and my results point to partisanship po-
tentially providing some of the encouragement whites need to reevaluate racial categories. Further,
that the politically aware are most open to attitude change suggests some combination of infor-
mation exposure and willingness and/or ability to update existing attitudes. Future work could
consider the discrete factor(s) at work for Democrats to identify prejudice reduction paths.
With this in mind it is also worth noting the similarity in estimated attitude change effects in
the party-centric era analyses. They offer a couple possible implications for attitude change future
work could consider. Whites may require consistent information exposure to sustain changes in
core attitudes. Similarly, attitudes may shift in response to one piece of information, and change
again given new considerations. Finally, it could be that one party’s attitudes change in one period
more than the other’s. Democrats and Republicans all respond to the information environment, but
to different degrees given the types of information available. Appendix section 6.3, for instance,
shows descriptively that Republicans’ attitudes started trending more negatively before Democrats’
views moved more positively. These three possibilities are not mutually exclusive and could all
shed light on the similarity in effects across the different analyses in the more party-centric context.
These lessons reorient the perspective that race is fundamental to politics by demonstrating that
politics are also fundamental to race. Politics shape how whites view black Americans. Despite
the Founders’ desires, proper institutional arrangements appear insufficient for stifling group-based
antagonisms (Hamilton, Madison and Jay, 1788/2006). In fact, the processes these structures
establish can stoke, or quell, racial animus.
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Chapter 5
Partisan Lenses For All or For Some?
Partisanship drives current political conflict. With issues, values, and other social cleavages
increasingly aligned with party, partisan concerns appear to rule all (Layman and Carsey, 2002;
Levendusky, 2009; Mason, 2018). These changes in the political context increasingly encourage
people to view the world through their partisan attachments (Bartels, 2000; Hetherington, 2001).
Partisanship is now a more central predisposition, increasing its causal force on attitudes that them-
selves have been seen as causally prior to partisan preferences in less party polarized contexts
(Bartels, 2002; Goren, 2005; Lenz, 2012).
As I demonstrate in the previous chapter, this change in the political context has resulted in
partisanship even shaping Whites’ racial attitudes–the views and beliefs people hold about groups
understood to be racial in the United States. In this argument, changes in the political context
making partisanship a more central predisposition have made it more central than even racial an-
imus. According to this reasoning, party-driven attitude change comes in part from partisanship
shaping where people seek out information on social and political affairs (Zaller, 1992) and how
they process what they encounter (Gaines et al., 2007; Lodge and Taber, 2013; Bolsen, Druckman
and Cook, 2014). With partisan elites providing consistent, and divergent, information on race
(Haney Lo´pez, 2014; King and Smith, 2014), partisans have ingredients available to update their
views of racial groups.
This argument relies in part on Whites recognizing, and responding to, patterns in the informa-
tion environment. Changes in context may increase partisanship’s influence, but it can only be in-
fluential if Whites encounter, and understand, information on race. Indeed, individual-differences
in political engagement and its relationship to information seeking and related processes appear to
matter for understanding the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes. For instance,
Tesler (Tesler, 2016) demonstrates that as recently as 2008 the correlation between partisanship
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and racial attitudes was much stronger for college-educated Whites than those without college de-
grees. But a process of “low-information racialization” changed this substantially during Barack
Obama’s first term. The argument goes that less educated individuals became more aware of party
differences on race, with the connection between their party loyalties and racial attitudes strength-
ening in the process (Tesler, 2016).
The argument that less politically engaged individuals responded most in this period seems
reasonable insofar as this position emphasizes the role played by prominent features of the elite
information environment. A Black Democrat as president unambiguously shows less politically
engaged individuals that the Democratic Party supports minority communities, even if he talks less
about race than those holding the office before him (Gillion, 2016). This presumably eliminates
differential responsiveness across levels of engagement because such information requires little
effort to seek out or interpret. But other patterns in the information environment suggest that the
process is potentially more complicated. Accounting for variation in political engagement helps
identify which Whites exhibit the most change in their racial attitudes or party loyalties (cf. Carsey
and Layman, 2006).
That individual differences in engagement may condition the dynamics between partisanship
and racial attitudes follows from recent work investigating the elite information environment on
race. Information streams divide by party (Haney Lo´pez, 2014; King and Smith, 2014), but in-
dividual differences encourage selection into environments where this information is encountered
and affect how it is interpreted. It matters little if Republican elites consistently deny race’s social
reality, endorse stereotypical portrayals of racial minorities (Haney Lo´pez, 2014; Dixon, 2017), and
promote a governing vision where politics does not take race into consideration (King and Smith,
2014) if people do not encounter these cues or understand their attitudinal implications. Similarly,
liberal commentators highlighting that communities of color face persistent discrimination and
racism requires hearing this information and also understanding how it fits with existing beliefs.
Individual differences in the motivation to seek out information, and the ability to understand that
information’s attitudinal implications, likely condition any influence the elite information environ-
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ment has.
Political engagement can therefore offer insight into the dynamic relationship between parti-
sanship and racial attitudes in party-centric political contexts. I consider three related, but distinct,
dimensions of political engagement to unpack attitude change dynamics. One dimension, educa-
tion, in part captures individuals’ cognitive skills and exposes them to norms of racial egalitari-
anism which may shape responses to information on race. The second, political interest, captures
the motivation to seek out information that attitude change likely requires. The third, political
awareness, captures both the likelihood of encountering new information as well as the facility
to incorporate it into existing opinions. Results in Chapter 4 point to awareness moderating dy-
namics, but I consider it alongside other measures of political engagement here as an attempt to
identify how political engagement matters.
I demonstrate that each measure of political engagement conditions the relationship between
partisanship and racial attitudes. But only on the degree to which Whites modify their racial atti-
tudes. The extent to which they adopt new partisan ties exhibits no such variation. Using panel data
spanning Barack Obama’s administration, I find that while partisans of all stripes update their racial
attitudes, the politically engaged change the most, and particularly politically engaged Democrats.
The results support claims that attitude change follows from responses to the information envi-
ronment. Further, the consistency in effects across engagement operationalizations suggests that
neither encountering information nor the motivation to incorporate it into existing attitudes are
necessary for attitude change to occur. The relative importance of each may depend on the nature
of the information provided and its frequency.
5.1 Political Engagement and Attitude Change
I focus on multiple components related to political engagement to shed light on the dynamic
relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes in party-centric political contexts. These are
education, political interest, and political awareness. While certainly related, they vary enough
such that divergences between them in patterns of attitude change can suggest potential causal
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paths related to components of political engagement: information, motivation, and ability (Luskin,
1990; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). For instance, while some claim that education in part un-
derpins political awareness and interest (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996), other evidence supports
a view that college education’s effect on awareness is not direct but rather through it accounting for
other factors in place before people graduate from high school (Highton, 2009). Relatedly, educa-
tion, while associated with the cognitive skills political awareness includes, does not completely
capture the motivation or interest required to attend consistently to political affairs. Political inter-
est captures motivation directly and may help explain political awareness (Luskin, 1990; Highton,
2009).
5.1.1 Education, Norms, and Attitude Change
Education plays a central role in social scientific explanations for racial attitude dynamics.
Education has long been argued to encourage more tolerant attitudes (Allport, 1979; McClosky and
Zaller, 1984; Bobo and Licari, 1989; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1993; Sniderman and Piazza,
1993; Schuman et al., 1997; Pettigrew, 2000). Although why education matters appears mixed,
Delli Carpini and Keeter (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996) propose that its influence comes in part
from “providing specific instruction regarding the norms and procedures of a liberal democracy”
(221). Further, by also capturing cognitive sophistication it incorporates individuals’ ability to
connect commitment to these social and political norms with other attitudes and behaviors (Bobo
and Licari, 1989; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1993). This motivates some to claim that “a
critical determinant of whether people acknowledge that blacks are entitled to the same rights as
others is education” because “education not only combats racial prejudice but also inhibits racial
discrimination” (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1993, 13).
Despite this evidence, education may not offer a panacea. It may actually provide Whites with
new ways to express negative racial attitudes. Rather than liberalizing, education instead equips
recipients to promote dominant group interests (Jackman and Muha, 1984; Jackman, 1994). Edu-
cation allows Whites to continue expressing their prior racial attitudes but doing so in new ways.
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It may, for instance, motivate them to view their success through the lens of individualism, a view
obfuscating the impact structural factors may have in contributing to their success. Through this,
the educated become “the state-of-the-art apologists for their group’s social position” (Jackman
and Muha, 1984, 752).
This argument aligns with the necessity of norm internalization as the link between norm ex-
posure and attitude change. Critically, norms like racial egalitarianism matter only to the degree
individuals ascribe to them importance (Crandall, Eshleman and O’Brien, 2002). Education may
introduce people to social norms, but they matter most when individuals strive to follow them.
For instance, people update other attitudes or behaviors to fit with the implications from adhering
to a norm rather than simply seeing norms as social prohibitions to acknowledge when contexts
demand (e.g., offering a socially acceptable survey response). Indeed, Federico offers such an ex-
planation for evidence that the relationship between racial attitudes and policy opinions is stronger
for college-educated Whites (Federico, 2004, see also Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo, 1996). More-
over, even if Whites understand norms of racial egalitarianism and tolerance, elites like political
leaders can alter how these norms are perceived, changing the standards of normatively acceptable
attitudes and behaviors (Tankard and Paluck, 2016; Crandall, Miller and White II, 2018). Edu-
cation may militate against intolerance, but additional links appear necessary for producing this
effect. College-educated Whites may still come to hold more intolerant attitudes over time.
5.1.2 Political Interest and Information Exposure
Alongside education, I consider political interest. Interest differs from education by capturing
the motivation to pay attention to politics (Luskin, 1990). Greater levels of political interest may
thus relate to the likelihood that people seek out information. Consequently, political interest can
therefore help untangle whether exposure to information matters centrally, or if it is is also the
ability to update one’s attitudes that conditions patterns of attitude change.
Political interest may also have indirect implications for attitude change. Interest in current af-
fairs makes the politically aware likely opinion leaders in their social networks (Lazarsfeld, Berel-
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son and Gaudet, 1948; Huckfeldt, 2001). This similarly increases the likelihood that the most
aware develop new views because they discuss what they’ve learned with their peers (Levendusky,
Druckman and McLain, 2016). That Whites report talking about race less than other topics sug-
gests political interest may condition the dynamics between racial attitudes and partisanship by
making the most interested the most likely to encounter and discuss the information on race they
hear from political elites or gather from the more general information environment (Pew Research
Center, 2016). Politically interested Republicans would exhibit the greatest increase in negative
racial attitudes, while more attuned Democrats display the greatest increase in positive views.
5.1.3 Political Awareness, Information Seeking, and Attitude Updates
Political awareness (or sophistication) serves as the final manifestation of engagement and
combines the cognitive skills education in part captures, as well as the motivation to seek out new
information related to political interest. Political awareness thus captures individual differences in
the likelihood that people encounter information allowing for changes in racial attitudes and also
have the ability to understand what they encounter (Zaller, 1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).
Political awareness divides individuals according to their “intellectual or cognitive engagement
with public affairs” and the likelihood of “absorbing political communications” (Zaller, 1992, 22).
If elite rhetoric, and the information environment more generally, matter as I claim, then the most
politically aware should exhibit the greatest attitude change because they are the most likely to en-
counter information on race and also possess the other considerations necessary for incorporating
this new information into their existing attitudes. Education and interest alone may not condi-
tion effects, suggesting cognitive skills and information exposure alone are insufficient for attitude
change. If this occurs, and a moderating effect appears for political awareness, then attitude change
likely follows both being exposed to new information as well has having the capacity to integrate
this information into existing attitudes.
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5.2 Data and Methods
I rely on data from several sources to assess whether and how political sophistication condi-
tions the dynamic relationship between whites’ partisanship and racial attitudes. The 2008-2012
Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) and the 2012-2016 Democracy Fund VOTER
Survey panel data sets serve as my primary sources given included survey items.1 I supplement
these with three panel data sets from the General Social Survey spanning 2006-2014. These cover,
respectively, 2006-08-10, 2008-10-12, and 2010-12-14.
I use multiple measures of racial attitudes to capture prejudice’s many varieties (Kinder, 2013).
Racial resentment serves as my primary measure of interest (see Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Sears
and Henry, 2005; Tarman and Sears, 2005; Kam and Burge, 2018). Rather than expressing hos-
tility toward blacks in terms of biological inferiority and whether they have an innate capacity for
success, whites’ attitudes are grounded in evaluations of whether blacks will try hard enough to
succeed (Kinder and Sanders, 1996, Ch. 5). Higher levels of racial resentment correspond with
thinking (1) racial discrimination no longer provides a serious obstacle to blacks’ prospects for a
good life so (2) blacks’ continuing disadvantages largely come from their unwillingness to work
hard enough, and thus (3) their increased advantage through programs like affirmative action is
unwarranted (Tarman and Sears, 2005). This approach relies on a validated measure of racial ani-
mus (Tarman and Sears, 2005; DeSante, 2013; Banks, 2014; Kam and Burge, 2018) and provides
a consistent comparison with prior work (e.g., Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016). Even so,
some contend it conflates principled conservatism with racial animus (Sniderman and Carmines,
1997; Huddy and Feldman, 2009). To address this concern, and to shed light on potential variation
in causal dynamics by dimension of prejudice, I also consider measures of group favorability and
stereotyping.
I operationalize racial resentment with four items in the Kinder and Sanders (Kinder and
Sanders, 1996) racial resentment battery introduced in the prior chapter. I sum together the items
1Survey participants come from YouGov’s non-random respondent pool with completed surveys then weighted
back to population benchmarks. Interviews for the CCAP were conducted in March 2008 and June-July 2012. The
VOTER Survey interviews were completed in December 2011 and November-December 2016.
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Table 5.1: Correlations between Engagement Measures
College Degree Political Interest Political Awareness
College Degree — 0.16 0.27
Political Interest 0.17 — 0.54
Political Awareness 0.24 0.47 —
Note: Correlations for the 2008-2012 CCAP are contained in the lower triangle.
The upper triangle contains the correlations from the VOTER Survey.
and rescale this measure to run 0-1, with higher values indicating greater racial resentment. I oper-
ationalize partisanship using the ANES branched party identification question, present in all data
collections. Like racial resentment, I scale it to run 0-1, with 0 denoting strong Democrats and 1
indicating strong Republicans.
I measure education, political interest, and political awareness as follows. Education enters
as an indicator for whether or not someone possesses a college degree.2 I capture political inter-
est using an item where respondents reported how interested they are in politics, with responses
including “not that much,” “somewhat,” and “very much.” To measure political awareness I sum
together correct responses to factual political knowledge items (Zaller, 1992; Price and Zaller,
1993).3 Supporting the view that these are related but distinct constructs, Table 5.1 provides the
correlations between the three moderators in the CCAP (lower triangle) and VOTER survey (upper
triangle). Finally, consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler,
2016) I focus on non-Hispanic Whites.
To evaluate the dynamic relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes I use a cross-
lagged regression approach (Finkel, 1995). This framework relates lagged racial attitudes (racial attitudest−1)
to present partisanship (PIDt) and lagged partisanship (PIDt−1) to current racial attitudes (racial attitudest),
after accounting for a lagged dependent variable as well. But I modify this by interacting each
lagged predisposition by the moderator of interest (MODt−1). Equations 1 and 2 below show this
2Nearly 33% of White CCAP respondents meet this qualification. For the VOTER Survey this is 40% of partici-
pants.
3There are 11 such items in the 2008-2012 CCAP and 10 in the VOTER survey. I scale this index 0-1, with higher
values denoting greater political awareness (2008-2012 CCAP: M = 0.76,SD = 0.26,α = 0.81. 2012-2016 VOTER
Survey: M = 0.57,SD = 0.28,α = 0.85). Although items vary across surveys, all focus on current knowledge like
identifying political figures and which party controls the House.
85
mathematically.
racial attitudesi, t = β0 +β1PIDi, t−1 +β2racial attitudesi, t−1 +β3MODi, t−1
+ β4PIDi, t−1 ∗MODi, t−1 +β5racial attitudesi, t−1 ∗MODi, t−1
+ ε (5.1)
PIDi, t = α0 +α1PIDi, t−1 +α2racial attitudesi, t−1 +α3MODi, t−1
+ α4PIDi, t−1 ∗MODi, t−1 +α5racial attitudesi, t−1 ∗MODi, t−1
+ υ (5.2)
I can assess causal dynamics by relating how much change in a variable over time can be at-
tributed to the other variable in the relationship. Parameter pairs β1 and β4 and α2 and α5 reveal the
cross-lagged effects. They denote how much lagged partisanship (β1) and lagged racial attitudes
(α2) predict current values of the other construct and whether this varies by individual characteris-
tics (β4 and α5). The remaining parameters provide information on each predisposition’s temporal
stability (β2 and α1) and whether these stabilities similarly vary with individual characteristics (β5
and α4). If β4 and α5 are reliably different from zero, then this reveals for whom partisanship or
racial attitudes has a stronger causal influence. If a college education engenders tolerance, it should
promote resistance to attitude change among Republicans and encourage change for Democrats,
with evidence for this proposition coming from a negative coefficient on β4; non-college educated
partisans polarize more. The partisan gap in racial attitudes decreases as education increases. If
political interest facilitates encountering new information, then the combined effect of β1 and β4
should be positive. Similarly, if political awareness facilitates receiving and incorporating new con-
siderations into existing attitudes, then the combined effect of β1 and β4 should be also positive.
Party-driven attitude change occurs most among the most aware.
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5.3 Education Bolsters Attitude Change
I begin with an assessment of whether education conditions the relationship between racial
attitudes and partisanship. Again, education’s influence come through several mechanisms. First,
it may in part capture individuals’ cognitive skills and thus the ability to integrate new information
into existing attitudes. It may also matter by exposing Whites to norms about racial equality that
constrain adopting more negative racial attitudes. At the same time, norms require internalization
before they shape attitudes, and education may itself allow Whites to rearticulate racial attitudes in
ways that perpetuate negative views.
Table 5.2 demonstrates that a college education does condition the dynamic relationship be-
tween partisanship and racial resentment. The first column reveals that partisans of all stripes
update their racial attitudes but those with more education exhibit greater levels of polarization.
The difference between strong partisans without college degrees grows by nearly 0.11 points
(p < 0.05), nearly 2 response categories on an item. As the left panel of Figure 5.1 demonstrates,
this partisan gap increases to nearly 0.16 among college-educated partisans, although the over 0.04
point difference is imprecisely estimated (p < 0.07). This evidence does not support an argument
that education is a moderating force promoting tolerance.
Nor does racial resentment’s cross-lagged effect vary by education level. Whites are equally
likely to sort on their racial attitudes. Similarly, college-educated respondents’ partisan ties exhibit
no greater stability than non-college educated individuals’ partisan loyalties during Obama’s first
term. Education differentiates Whites in the degree to which they update their racial attitudes but
not in the extent to which they modify their partisan attachments.
These causal patterns persist during Obama’s second term in office. What changes, however,
is the size of the subsequent partisan gap in racial resentment. Non-college educated partisans
diverge by about 0.14 points (p< 0.05). But more impressively, college-educated partisans diverge
by 0.20 points (p < 0.05), over three response categories on an item, although as the right panel
in Figure 5.1 reveals, this 0.06 point increase is precisely estimate. This is equivalent to going
from strongly agreeing that Blacks simply need to try harder to get ahead in December 2011
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Table 5.2: Education’s Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites’ Partisanship and
Racial Resentment
2008-2012 CCAP 2012-2016 VOTER Survey
Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 0.109∗ 0.814∗ 0.138∗ 0.801∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
—*College Degreet−1 0.046 0.005 0.062∗ −0.025
(0.025) (0.027) (0.018) (0.020)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.711∗ 0.084∗ 0.831∗ 0.140∗
(0.018) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014)
—*College Degreet−1 0.034 0.034 −0.052∗ −0.008
(0.034) (0.037) (0.025) (0.027)
College Degreet−1 −0.087∗ −0.043∗ −0.035∗ 0.003
(0.020) (0.021) (0.014) (0.015)
Constant 0.161∗ 0.051∗ 0.019∗ 0.037∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 2,204 2,204 6,003 6,003
R2 0.648 0.770 0.617 0.682
Residual Std. Error 0.164 0.177 0.178 0.191
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use
population weights.
to disagreeing with this statement in December 2016. This reinforces the view that rather than
serving as a militating force, education appears in fact to be an accelerate for attitude polarization.
Turning to column 4, the results reflect the effects from Obama’s first term in office. Racial
resentment leads to altered party loyalties regardless of education level. Those without college
degrees scoring at racial resentment’s poles separate by 0.140 points on the partisanship measure,
nearly a full category on the 7-point item (p < 0.05), and those with college degrees look no
different (αˆ5 = −0.008, p > 0.1). Education consistently conditions one side of the relationship
between partisanship and racial attitudes.
These results show that far from guarding against external forces encouraging more negative
racial attitudes, a college education appears to help identify which Whites are most responsive to
the political environment. And this is particularly the case in the VOTER Survey data. While
attitude change occurred regardless of degree status, college-educated partisans became the most
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Figure 5.1: Partisan gap in racial resentmentt by college degree. Results based on models in
Table 5.2. Bars provide the proportion of respondents with and without a college degree in each
model.
polarized in each period.
These results also shed light on the low information racialization of partisanship account Tesler
(Tesler, 2016) offers. He demonstrates that the correlation between partisanship and racial resent-
ment increases substantially for non-college educated Whites between 2008 and 2012, lagging be-
hind changes among college-educated Whites. He argues that these patterns accord with Obama’s
presidency finally clarifying for this group that the Democratic Party champions racial and ethnic
minorities, and this encourages these previously unaware individuals to adopt new party loyalties.
The results here however suggest that this story does not seem one of low information individuals
uniquely aligning their partisan ties with their racial attitudes. Rather, the phenomenon appears to
be one of non-college educated Whites being as likely to switch parties as their college-educated
counterparts.4 Instead, what’s unique in this competitive political context is that Whites with col-
4Applying the moderated cross-lagged modeling approach to data from the 1992-1994 ANES demonstrates that
racial attitudes drive sorting in this less polarized era only among the college-educated. A decade and a half later the
political context has changed such that even less educated individuals can effectively align their partisan ties with their
racial attitudes. College-educated respondents are also the only group of the pair where evidence suggests partisanship
leads to racial attitude updates in the 1990s (βˆ1+ βˆ4 = 0.086; 95% CI [0.01, 0.16]). But the difference across education
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lege degrees exhibit larger changes in their racial attitudes.
An as-yet-untested implication from a college education, however, is that it may also constrain
how Whites change their attitudes. Education may expose Whites to structural explanations for
inequality that they had not encountered before (Wodtke, 2018). Or it could motivate Whites to
emphasize individual over structural explanations for social outcomes as a way to justify their priv-
ileged position (Jackman and Muha, 1984; Jackman, 1994). Finally, Gomez and Wilson (Gomez
and Wilson, 2006) argue that individual differences in cognitive sophistication produce different
attributional styles such that more educated individuals may be more likely to adopt a structuralist
over individualist perspective. These arguments suggest that attitude change may be isolated to
specific subcomponents of racial resentment according to one’s educational background.
To address this I divide the racial resentment measure into its structuralist and individualist
sub-components.5 Although this procedure does not allow for as precisely measuring these sub-
dimensions, it can still point to where on the construct attitude change is occurring. If attributional
styles affect where attitude change occurs, then temporal attitudinal differences by education level
should be greater on the discrimination items than the individualism items. Going further, these
analyses can offer some suggestive insight into what types of information partisans may be updat-
ing on. If one subdimension of racial resentment witnesses more change than the other, then this
suggests that the types of information partisans are updating on connect more with this component.
I present the results from this investigation in Table 5.3. The first four columns use the 2008-
2012 CCAP while the second four use the VOTER Survey. I focus first on the individualist dimen-
sion in the CCAP data. The estimates in the first column indicate that partisanship is related to
attitude change among non-College educated Whites (β1 = 0.139; p < 0.05), a difference increas-
ing by 0.10 points for the college-educated. But attitude change is not isolated. The estimates in
the third column indicate that these results also extend to the structuralist dimension. The partisan
gap in attitudes increases by 0.122 points for those without college degrees (p < 0.05), and this
level is insignificant (p > 0.1). I report these results in the appendix.
5The two individualism items are special favors and try hard. The two structural items are deserve less and past
discrimination.
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Table 5.3: College Education’s Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites’ Partisanship
and Subdimensions of Racial Resentment
2008-2012 CCAP 2012-2016 VOTER Survey
Individualist Structuralist Individualist Structuralist
RRt Partisanshipt RRt Partisanshipt RRt Partisanshipt RRt Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 0.139∗ 0.814∗ 0.122∗ 0.823∗ 0.118∗ 0.803∗ 0.214∗ 0.813∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
—*College Degreet−1 0.100∗ 0.018 0.063∗ 0.007 0.125∗ −0.013 0.009 −0.028
(0.029) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019)
RR Subdimensiont−1 0.591∗ 0.087∗ 0.650∗ 0.045∗ 0.765∗ 0.120∗ 0.677∗ 0.103∗
(0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
—*College Degreet−1 0.031 0.001 −0.029 0.051 −0.065∗ −0.026 0.027 0.015
(0.036) (0.032) (0.037) (0.033) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024)
College Degreet−1 −0.136∗ −0.029 −0.058∗ −0.059∗ −0.070∗ 0.006 −0.072∗ −0.015
(0.021) (0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015)
Constant 0.241∗ 0.051∗ 0.188∗ 0.075∗ 0.084∗ 0.050∗ 0.080∗ 0.056∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Observations 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 6,003 6,003 6,003 6,003
R2 0.559 0.771 0.545 0.769 0.560 0.681 0.486 0.680
Residual Std. Error 0.197 0.177 0.199 0.177 0.204 0.191 0.224 0.191
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.
difference increases by over 0.06 points for those with college degrees (p < 0.05). The left panel
in Figure 5.2 provides these results visually.
It could also be the case that, in addition to differences by education in where attitude change
occurs, that education also differentiates Whites in the stability of their racial attitudes. Lack-
ing the exposure to structuralist explanations for inequality that education may provide (Wodtke,
2018), this dimension should exhibit more stability among the college educated. The estimates
in Table 5.3 offer no support for this. In neither data collection does either dimension of racial
resentment exhibit differential stability by education level.
Turning to patterns of partisan change, the estimates in columns 2 and 4 offer no evidence
for a differences by education level. Both individualist (α2 = 0.087; p < 0.05) and structuralist
α2 = 0.045; p < 0.05) components motivate changes in partisan attachments among those without
college degrees. And these differences do not change appreciably for the college-educated. The
impact of structuralist explanations does increase if Whites have a college degree, but this 0.051
point difference is imprecise (p > 0.10).
Table 5.3’s remaining columns offer estimates from the same models using the VOTER survey
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Figure 5.2: Partisan gap in racial resentmentt by college degree and subdimension of racial resent-
ment. Results based on models in Table 5.3. Bars provide the proportion of respondents with and
without a college degree in each model.
data. The results reinforce those in the CCAP data. Columns 5 and 7 demonstrate that White parti-
sans without college degrees polarize in their racial attitudes on both the individualist (β1 = 0.118;
p < 0.05) and structuralist dimensions (β1 = 0.214; p < 0.05). But as Figure 5.2 demonstrates,
while the partisan attitude gap is larger among the college educated on the individualist dimension
(β4 = 0.125; p < 0.05), no difference exists by degree status on the structuralist dimension.
Turning to sorting, the estimates in columns 6 and 8 offer no evidence the effect of racial
resentment on changing party attachments difference based on degree status. For non-College
educated Whites, variation along both subdimensions of racial resentment is related to divergent
partisanship come 2016 (α2 = 0.120 and α2 = 0.103, respectively. p< 0.05). Their degree-holding
counterparts are little different.
These results offer additional evidence that education offers insight into which Whites are
most likely to update their racial attitudes. But it does not differentiate between individuals in their
likelihood of adopting different party attachments. Further, as the patterns in Figure 5.2 make clear,
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college educated White partisans diverge in their subsequent racial attitudes to the same degree on
each dimension of racial resentment, doing so across time periods. This outcome is at odds with
a view that a college education should increase the degree to which individualism features as an
explanation for social disparities among dominant group individuals (Jackman and Muha, 1984;
Jackman, 1994). This is not to say the argument offers no insight; rather, the explanation may only
hold for some Whites, a possibility I consider later.
The patterns among non-college educated Whites run counter to arguments that education nec-
essarily fosters structuralist explanations for outcomes. Partisanship does not disproportionately
affect the individualist subdimension among non-college educated Whites. Indeed, it is even more
noteworthy that the partisan divide on the structuralist dimension is greater than the differences
on the individualist one in the VOTER Survey, and compared to both gaps in the CCAP survey.
This change between Barack Obama’s first and second terms may come from changes in the type
of information available. Greater attention to structuralist explanations may be seen in attention
to police violence and discussion of legacies of discrimination among Democrats, with this infor-
mation having attitudinal implications. Some scholars argue a college education may introduce
Whites to structuralist explanations for inequality which even if not liberalizing attitudes in that
moment are present to structure information received later (Wodtke, 2018). The change in results
across periods may thus reflect in some part an equalization across education groups in the types
of information on race that Whites have available to incorporate into their attitudes.
5.4 Political Interest Also Encourages Attitude Change
I now turn to investigating self-reported political interest. While education in part captures
cognitive sophistication and exposure to norms of racial equality, political interest accounts for the
willingness to seek out information. If simple information exposure conditions the dynamics be-
tween partisanship and racial resentment, then more politically interested partisans should exhibit
the greatest degree of attitude change.
Given the discrete nature of the interest item, I enter it into the cross-lagged models as sepa-
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rate indicators for respondents reporting moderate (“somewhat interested”) and high (“very much
interested”) interest.6 I report the estimates from the cross-lagged models in Table 5.4. Focusing
first on attitude change, among the least interested partisanship does not shape racial resentment
(β1 = 0.002). But things change as reported political interest increases. As the left panel in Fig-
ure 5.3 demonstrates visually, while the partisan gap in attitudes is different from 0 among those
with moderate levels of political interest (0.069, p < 0.05), this difference is not meaningfully
greater than those reporting low levels of interest in politics. Only the most politically interested
group, over 60% of the sample, see a uniquely large difference in party-driven attitude change in
this period. This group divides by over 0.17 points, nearly 3 categories on one of the scale items.
Considering patterns of partisan change, the estimates in column 2 offer no evidence for dif-
ferences by level of political interest. While the relationship between racial resentment and sub-
sequent party attachments is imprecisely estimated among those reporting low levels of political
interest (α2 = 0.111; p < 0.08), the marginal effect of racial resentment for the moderate (0.091)
and high groups (0.106) is distinguishable from 0 but not from one another.
The estimates in columns 3 and 4 offer a slightly different account of political interest’s condi-
tioning effect during Barack Obama’s second term. Here, partisanship is related to changes in racial
resentment among the least politically interested (β1 = 0.119), and this is similar in magnitude to
moderately interested partisans. But as the right panel in Figure 5.3 demonstrates, partisanship
disproportionately changes attitudes for Whites reporting high political interest. The 0.19 point
difference between strong partisans here corresponds to a change of more than 3 categories on one
of the scale items.
When it comes to changes in partisanship in this period, however, patterns switch. Interest-
ingly, in contrast to the 2008-2012 period Whites low in political interest do not sort on their racial
attitudes. But those at moderate and high levels of interest do. Moving from the minimum to
the maximum on racial resentment yields a change in subsequent party attachments of 0.20 and
6Doing so accounts for potential non-linearities in the interaction effects as well as sharp distributional differences
between categories that may affect common support (Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu, Forthcoming).
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Table 5.4: Political Interest’s Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites’ Partisanship
and Racial Resentment
2008-2012 CCAP 2012-2016 VOTER Survey
Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 0.002 0.851∗ 0.119∗ 0.828∗
(0.039) (0.042) (0.025) (0.027)
—*Moderate Interestt−1 0.067 −0.037 −0.009 −0.024
(0.043) (0.046) (0.028) (0.030)
—*High Interestt−1 0.172∗ −0.036 0.071∗ −0.035
(0.041) (0.045) (0.028) (0.029)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.676∗ 0.111 0.723∗ 0.005
(0.058) (0.063) (0.041) (0.043)
—*Moderate Interestt−1 0.074 −0.020 0.137∗ 0.192∗
(0.064) (0.070) (0.045) (0.047)
—*High Interestt−1 0.036 −0.005 0.083 0.121∗
(0.061) (0.066) (0.043) (0.045)
Moderate Interestt−1 −0.099∗ 0.003 −0.089∗ −0.150∗
(0.050) (0.055) (0.034) (0.036)
High Interestt−1 −0.172∗ −0.018 −0.120∗ −0.110∗
(0.048) (0.052) (0.032) (0.034)
Constant 0.266∗ 0.042 0.106∗ 0.145∗
(0.047) (0.051) (0.031) (0.032)
Observations 2,204 2,204 5,970 5,970
R2 0.655 0.771 0.620 0.695
Residual Std. Error 0.163 0.177 0.178 0.186
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use
population weights. Low political interest is the omitted category.
0.13, respectively, magnitudes that are indistinguishable from one another. While White partisans
of all stripes change their racial attitudes between December 2011 and December 2016, only the
least politically interested do not update their partisanship. While these results contrast with those
considering variation by education, such a moderation effect appears rather inconsequential sub-
stantively because so few Whites in the VOTER Survey report low levels of political interest. Only
6% do, compared with 29% and 65% for moderate and high levels, respectively.
Changes between data collections in the relationship between partisanship and attitude change
among those reporting low political interest are also noteworthy. These differences imply some
change in the information environment. That the low and moderate groups display similar amounts
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Figure 5.3: Partisan gap in racial resentmentt by political interest. Results based on models in
Table 5.4. Bars provide the distribution of political interest in each model.
of attitude change between 2012 and 2016 is particularly impressive. Information streams on race
may have changed during Barack Obama’s second term in office if those largely uninterested in
politics display attitude change in similar measure as moderately interested individuals.
In conjunction with the education analyses, the results here point to information exposure as
an important component of attitude change. Education offers insight into whether and how Whites
may incorporate new information into their existing attitudes. The present results demonstrate that
those motivated to seek out new information are most likely change their attitudes.
5.5 Awareness Drives Attitude Polarization
I conclude with an assessment of political awareness’s conditioning role. It in part combines
education’s cognitive skills with political interest’s motivation to seek out new information. I
follow traditional approaches and operationalize political awareness by summing correct responses
to a series of knowledge items included in each survey. I report these results in Table 5.5.7
7Additional diagnostics recommended by Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (Forthcoming) establish that common
support exists across levels of awareness and that the linear interaction effect assumption holds.
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Table 5.5: Political Awareness’s Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites’ Partisan-
ship and Racial Resentment
2008-2012 CCAP 2012-2016 VOTER Survey
Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 0.050∗ 0.826∗ 0.087∗ 0.761∗
(0.022) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023)
—*Political Awarenesst−1 0.137∗ −0.015 0.075∗ 0.057
(0.038) (0.041) (0.029) (0.032)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.667∗ 0.071 0.564∗ 0.120∗
(0.034) (0.037) (0.031) (0.034)
—*Political Awarenesst−1 0.079 0.041 0.323∗ −0.006
(0.053) (0.057) (0.041) (0.045)
Political Awarenesst−1 −0.209∗ −0.070 −0.342∗ −0.098∗
(0.034) (0.037) (0.027) (0.030)
Constant 0.257∗ 0.077∗ 0.279∗ 0.116∗
(0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025)
Observations 2,204 2,204 5,514 5,514
R2 0.654 0.771 0.634 0.684
Residual Std. Error 0.163 0.176 0.174 0.190
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use
population weights.
The results contained in Table 5.5’s first column complement those from the preceding sec-
tions, demonstrating that political awareness does indeed modify partisanship’s influence on racial
resentment during Barack Obama’s first term in office. Partisans across awareness’s range become
more divided in their views of Black Americans. But this is also a pattern most representative
of the most politically attuned. Strong partisans incorrectly answering all 11 of the knowledge
items (some 3% of the sample) became on average 0.05 points more divided in their racial atti-
tudes (p < 0.05). But those correctly answering all of these items (13%) became on average 0.14
points more polarized in their evaluations of Black Americans (p < 0.05). These differences re-
late to between 1 and 3 categories on one of the racial resentment items. Figure 5.4’s left panel
presents these results visually, demonstrating that partisanship is more influential among the most
politically aware.
Awareness also only moderates one direction of the relationship between racial attitudes and
partisanship. The results presented in column 2 offer no evidence that individuals at different levels
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of political awareness were more or less likely to sort on their racial attitudes during Obama’s first
term. Nor is there much evidence to suggest political awareness increases partisanship’s stability.
Individuals during Obama’s first term adopt new partisan loyalties, but this is a pattern consistent
for most everyone.8 This suggests that during Obama’s first term Whites could more easily map
racial attitudes to partisanship than they can incorporate cues on race in light of their partisan
loyalties, that more aware individuals are more likely to encounter the information required to
motivate attitude change, or both.
Turning to Obama’s second term, the third and fourth columns in Table 5.5 offer little evidence
for a change in dynamics. Attitude change again occurs across all levels of awareness, but much
more among the more aware. Moreover, the partisan attitude gap between the least and most aware
individuals is similar to the 2008-2012 results, patterns reinforced by the right panel in Figure 5.4.
Among the least aware (1% of the sample), partisans diverge by about 0.09 points in racial resent-
ment (p < 0.05), a slight 0.04 point increase over the first term. The partisan divide increases to
0.16 points for the most politically aware (33% of the sample, p < 0.05). This period also sees
awareness produce more stable racial attitudes. For the most aware individuals, partisanship is a
stronger causal force even as racial resentment exhibits much greater stability. Finally, the results
in column 4 demonstrate that racial resentment similarly motivates sorting, but this occurs to the
same degree by level of awareness. The results also suggest that partisanship is somewhat more
stable among the most aware (p = 0.071). Awareness appears to make partisanship a more durable
attachment.
These results support the argument that political awareness conditions the dynamic relationship
between partisanship and racial attitudes. The politically aware exhibit the greatest amount of at-
titude change, and this holds for both Barack Obama’s first and second terms in office. The rise of
the Black Lives Matter movement and increased attention to racial discrimination during Obama’s
second term appear to have not changed the dynamics. A general context of party-centered polit-
8Only the effect for the racial attitudes of the least aware individuals does not differ from 0 at conventional levels
(p = 0.051)
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Figure 5.4: Partisan gap in racial resentmentt by political awareness. Results based on models in
Table 5.5. Bars provide the distribution of political awareness in each model.
ical conflict that sees ongoing racial discourse appears an apt characterization of the period. The
results also provide additional support for my argument that attitude change comes from patterns
in the elite information environment. The greatest attitude polarization occurs among those most
likely to experience, and incorporate new information on race. Awareness also conditions parti-
sanship’s effect on racial attitudes, but does not differentially affect racial resentment’s effect on
partisanship. This suggests that the ingredients needed to map racial beliefs to partisanship are
shared equally across awareness levels. What varies by political awareness is the willingness and
ability to incorporate new information on race into existing attitudes.
But an alternative explanation for these differences is that the greater facility for change among
politically aware partisans comes from differences in how they respond to the racial resentment
items. As noted in the education analyses, some argue that differences in cognitive sophistication
, which political awareness in part captures, introduce different attributions for social phenomena
(Gomez and Wilson, 2006).
To address this I again divide racial resentment into its individualist and structuralist compo-
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Table 5.6: Political Awareness’s Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites’ Partisan-
ship and Subdimensions of Racial Resentment
2008-2012 CCAP 2012-2016 VOTER Survey
Individualist Structuralist Individualist Structuralist
RRt Partisanshipt RRt Partisanshipt RRt Partisanshipt RRt Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 0.069∗ 0.817∗ 0.049 0.835∗ 0.032 0.767∗ 0.112∗ 0.755∗
(0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023)
—*Political Awarenesst−1 0.173∗ 0.008 0.170∗ −0.019 0.165∗ 0.053 0.111∗ 0.082∗
(0.043) (0.039) (0.045) (0.040) (0.033) (0.031) (0.036) (0.031)
RR Subdimensiont−1 0.465∗ 0.097∗ 0.629∗ 0.005 0.474∗ 0.045 0.480∗ 0.116∗
(0.035) (0.032) (0.037) (0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.029)
—*Political Awarenesst−1 0.230∗ −0.018 0.006 0.100 0.328∗ 0.065 0.305∗ −0.035
(0.055) (0.050) (0.059) (0.053) (0.042) (0.040) (0.045) (0.039)
Political Awarenesst−1 −0.349∗ −0.043 −0.181∗ −0.115∗ −0.422∗ −0.142∗ −0.342∗ −0.098∗
(0.037) (0.033) (0.039) (0.035) (0.029) (0.028) (0.032) (0.027)
Constant 0.404∗ 0.065∗ 0.277∗ 0.120∗ 0.396∗ 0.165∗ 0.309∗ 0.126∗
(0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026) (0.022)
Observations 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 5,514 5,514 5,514 5,514
R2 0.568 0.772 0.551 0.770 0.576 0.683 0.505 0.683
Residual Std. Error 0.195 0.176 0.198 0.177 0.200 0.190 0.220 0.190
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.
nents, presenting the results from this exercise Table 5.6. I focus first on the attitude change results
using the individualist subdimension in the CCAP data. The first column offers evidence that even
among the least aware, partisans divide in individualist explanations (p < 0.05). This 0.07 point
gap increase by 0.17 points among the most politically attentive. Further, similar patterns manifest
on the structuralist dimension. Partisanship still changes racial attitudes among the least politically
aware, although this difference is imprecisely estimated (p = 0.064). But as with the individu-
alist dimension, the gap between the least and most attentive partisans increases by 0.17 points.
Figure 5.5 provides this comparison visually. The left panel shows that the partisan gap in racial
resentment does not vary between subdimensions across levels of political awareness.
Turning to the relationship between racial resentment’s subdimensions and changes in partisan-
ship, the results presented in columns 2 and 4 offer no evidence that political awareness condition’s
racial resentment’s effect. Among the least politically aware, the individualist dimension is related
to a divide in subsequent party attachments of nearly 0.10 points (p < .05). And this gap only
modestly declines across political awareness’s range (αˆ5 = −0.018; p > .10). At the same time,
individualist attributions appear to do more to explain party switching than structuralist. Among
the least politically aware, variation in structuralist explanations are unrelated to subsequent party
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Figure 5.5: Partisan gap in racial resentmentt by political awareness and subdimension of racial
resentment. Results based on models in Table 5.6 and include 95% confidence intervals. Bars
provide the distribution of political awareness in each model.
attachments (αˆ2 = 0.005; p > .10). The gap increases, however, as political awareness increases,
although this difference is imprecisely estimate (αˆ5 = 0.100; p = 0.057).
The remaining columns in Table 5.6 offer results largely consistent with the CCAP. Considering
first changes in racial resentment, columns 5 and 7 reveal that party-driven attitude change occurs
on both subdimensions, and for most Whites. As Figure 5.5 shows, increases in political awareness
are related to larger party divides on both the individualist and structuralist dimensions. But in
contrast to the CCAP data, the difference between the least and most politically aware is greater
on the individualist rather than structuralist dimensions, evidence inconsistent with attributional
differences differentially shaping attitude change. Perhaps most impressively from this perspective,
the least politically aware exhibit more change on the structuralist dimension (βˆ1 = 0.032; p >
0.10) instead of the individualist dimension (βˆ1 = 0.112; p < 0.05).
Columns 6 and 8 reinforce the uniqueness of the structuralist dimension in this period while
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also offering no evidence for variation in sorting by political awareness. For the least aware,
individualist explanations lead to a 0.045 point change in party attachments between 2012 and
2016 among the least aware, but this difference is imprecisely estimate (p > 0.10). Nor is does
this difference vary between them and the most aware (αˆ5 = 0.065; p > 0.10). This changes for
the structuralist dimension. Here, a min-max change on this dimension relates to over an 0.11
point difference in partisanship (p < 0.05). While this effect declines across the range of political
awareness, the difference is slight and insignificant (αˆ5 =−0.035; p > 0.10).
Taken together, the results offer no evidence that attitude change comes more from shifts in
individualist or structuralist explanations. If attributional differences shape responses to the racial
resentment items, then these same differences in cognitive style would suggest divergent attitude
change patterns between more and less politically attentive Whites. That partisanship’s effect does
not clearly vary across dimensions is evidence at odds with this claim. If anything, that partisanship
does more to change attitudes on the structuralist dimension among the less politically aware in
the VOTER data is further evidence against the claim that attributional differences introduced by
cognitive style should shape responses to the racial resentment items.
The one difference in effects between the CCAP and VOTER Survey suggests a potential
change in the information partisans are updating on. While each period sees partisanship change
racial resentment’s subdimensions to the same degree for high awareness individuals, among the
least aware partisanship has a greater affect on structuralist rather individualist attributions in the
VOTER Survey. This is informative if low awareness individuals are thought to lack the mo-
tivation to update arguably more complex attributions (Gomez and Wilson, 2006). Further, the
shift between periods suggests that 2012-2016 may have included more information related to
the structuralist dimension, providing the least aware with considerations they otherwise had not
encountered.
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5.6 Political Engagement’s Conditioning Effect Varies by Party
Politically engaged partisans, no matter the operationalization, exhibit the greatest amount of
racial attitude change in the party-centric context of Barack Obama’s administration. But the
analyses assume that engagement conditions the relationship between party affiliation and racial
attitudes similarly for Democrats and Republicans. Indeed the estimates from the cross-lagged
models simply look at how variation in partisanship ranging from strong Democrats to strong Re-
publicans relates to subsequent racial attitudes. It could be the case that engagement has differential
effects by party. Further, this possibility can help unpack what work engagement is doing given
the consistency in results between measures.
I focus here only on patterns of racial attitude change rather than partisan switching. I modify
slightly the preceding estimation strategy. Instead of entering partisanship as a single measure, I in-
corporate indicators for Republicans and pure Independents, coding independent leaners with their
respective parties. I then interact these indicators with the prior political engagement measures.
The comparisons then allow for considering variation in the effect of each engagement dimension
on changes in racial resentment, with the estimates using White Democrats as the benchmark.
I present the results visually, reserving the model estimates for the Appendix. I use the model
estimates to predict levels of racial resentment by party while varying political engagement. This
takes a sample average individual in racial resentment at t− 1 and predicts their attitudes at t. I
focus here on partisan identifiers, ignoring pure Independents. The panels in Figure 5.6 show how
political engagement does comparatively little to condition Republicans’ racial attitudes (dashed
lines), but substantially influences Democrats’ (solid lines). In one instance political engagement
appears to meaningfully differentiate Republicans’ in their later levels of racial resentment. The
predicted values in the bottom right panel suggest that variation in political awareness is related
to changes in Republicans’ levels of racial resentment between 2012 and 2016, such that more
aware partisans are actually less resentful than their least aware peers. It is also noteworthy that
college educated Republicans resemble their non-college educated co-partisans, suggesting that
any liberalizing effects a college education may provide are contingent and potentially overridden
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Figure 5.6: Predicted level of racial resentmentt . Results based on models in Table A.20.
by partisan concerns.9
But throughout, the most engaged Democrats demonstrate the greatest amount of change. The
relative similarity among Republicans, but variation among Democrats, further supports the view
that partisans are responding to the information environment. For instance, the stability in Re-
publicans’ attitudes suggests that the information stream they encounter is consistent with their
existing attitudes (Zaller, 1992). Modest increases come from this information reinforcing existing
attitudes. Republicans’ realities on race between 20008 and 2016 appear largely consistent with
what they experienced before this period.
Differences by party suggest that Democrats have encountered information on race that goes
against their existing attitudes, and they have the motivation update their attitudes. This informa-
tion, moreover, is likely different from prior information. The patterns of change are consistent
9The model estimates in Table A.20 do not suggest that these results are driven by more engaged Republicans’
attitudes changing more and bringing them in line with their less engaged co-partisans, or vice versa. In some instances
engaged Republicans exhibit less change than the less engaged while in other cases they exhibit more change or look
no different. These patterns are inconsistent by engagement measure and between time period.
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with Zaller’s (1992) argument that one-side information flows on unfamiliar issues are more likely
to see more engaged individuals change their attitudes (165). Applied to the present context, this
could be modified slightly to consist of unfamiliar or unexpected information on a known issue
delivered by co-partisans.
Finally, separating racial resentment into its structuralist and individualist components does
not offer any evidence for degree of change varying consistently across dimension for Democrats
or Republicans. Additional results reported in the Appendix offer evidence that engagement does
more to differentiate attitude change among Democrats, but the degree of change is similar on
each subdimension. Further, as with the results in Figure 5.6 engaged Republicans resemble their
less engaged co-partisans with little variation by subdimension. These results suggest that even
within party there’s little difference in how Whites are updating their attitudes. Changes in racial
resentment appear global in nature.
5.7 Political Engagement and the Dynamics of Group Affect and Stereotyping
The preceding analyses consistently show that political engagement in its various guises mod-
erates the relationship between partisanship and racial resentment. But prejudice takes myriad
forms, with distinct origins and political connections (Kinder, 2013). To address this I extend the
preceding analyses to consider stereotyping and affect. Together these dimensions capture category
evaluations, specific and broad. By containing category information that exaggerates group differ-
ences and homogenizes outgroups in an unflattering light, stereotypes capture cognitive aspects
of prejudice. Affect, in contrast, consists of summary judgments of categories that can influence
evaluations oftentimes quickly and outside of conscious awareness. While racial resentment cer-
tainly contains an affective component (e.g., Sears and Henry, 2003; Banks, 2014; Kam and Burge,
2018), affective responses develop separately and may respond to political dynamics differently.
Given these characteristics, measures of political engagement may do less to differentiate which
partisans update their attitudes most on affect, but reveal more variation on stereotype change.
To understand affect, I use data from the VOTER Survey. Respondents rated Blacks and Whites
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separately on 101-point feeling thermometers. I take evaluations of Whites and subtract from them
evaluations of Blacks, creating a relative affect measure which addresses how people respond
to such rating items (Brady, 1985). I scale this measure from 0-1, where higher values denote
holding more positive feelings about Whites than Blacks (or, by construction, how much more
negatively people feel about Blacks than Whites). Because I consistently found moderation effects
on changes in racial attitudes rather than changes in partisanship, I present results for changes in
affect and reserve analyses on changes in partisanship for the Appendix.
The estimates presented in Table 5.7’s 3 columns correspond to moderation by education, po-
litical interest, and political awareness, respectively.
The results echo those found using rational resentment. Each dimension of political engage-
ment has a similar conditioning effect on changes in affect as on changes in racial resentment,
patterns also evident visually in Figure 5.7. While the degree of change varies across measures
of racial animus–consider the more limited y-axis range for Figure 5.7 than for Figure 5.4 for
instance–the most politically engaged partisans polarize the most.
I next turn to racial stereotypes. The GSS panels include items where respondents were in-
vited to rate separately the degree to which Blacks and Whites were intelligent or unintelligent
and lazy or hardworking. I recode each item such that higher scores denote endorsing the negative
stereotype. Similar to the affect rating, I then subtract respondents’ ratings of Whites from their
ratings of Blacks to create a relative negative stereotyping measure for each trait. I then average
these relative ratings together into a measure ranging from 0-1, where higher values indicate hold-
ing more negative stereotypes of Blacks than Whites. These analyses are unfortunately limited
compared to the preceding, however, because the GSS does not contain measures approximating
political awareness or political interest. Even so, the degree to which these dimensions similarly
conditioned effects on racial resentment and affect suggest that patterns found using education may
generalize.
The results from these analyses are in Table 5.8. They point to little conditioning effect for
education on changes in stereotype endorsement. What education does capture, although inconsis-
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Table 5.7: Moderating Effect of Political Engagement Dimensions on the relationship between
Whites’ Partisanship and Group Affect
Education Political Interest Political Awareness
Partisanshipt−1 0.059∗ 0.048∗ 0.023
(0.005) (0.016) (0.013)
—*College Educationt−1 0.035∗
(0.010)
—*Moderate Interestt−1 −0.006
(0.017)
—*High Interestt−1 0.036∗
(0.016)
—*Political Awarenesst−1 0.064∗
(0.017)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.544∗ 0.412∗ 0.352∗
(0.014) (0.034) (0.032)
—*College Educationt−1 0.034
(0.030)
—*Moderate Interestt−1 0.242∗
(0.040)
—*High Interestt−1 0.156∗
(0.038)
—*Political Awarenesst−1 0.292∗
(0.044)
College Educationt−1 −0.058∗
(0.017)
Moderate Interestt−1 −0.130∗
(0.026)
High Interestt−1 −0.121∗
(0.024)
Political Awarenesst−1 −0.247∗
(0.027)
Constant 0.206∗ 0.287∗ 0.364∗
(0.008) (0.022) (0.020)
Observations 5,712 5,691 5,262
R2 0.324 0.342 0.330
Residual Std. Error 0.105 0.104 0.106
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled
0-1. Analyses use population weights. Low political interest is the omitted category in
column 2.
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Figure 5.7: Partisan gap in group affectt by political engagement dimension. Results based on
models in Table 5.7. Bars provide the distribution of the moderator in each model.
tently so across data collections, is variation in the stability of stereotype endorsement. Columns
1 and 2 suggest more stability for Whites with college degrees, although in only the first period is
this difference by education level reliable (p < 0.05).
Figure 5.8 clarifies the effect of partisanship on stereotyping by whether or not Whites hold a
college degree. The panels reinforce the insight that variation in education level does not shape the
extent to which partisanship affects stereotype endorsement. What the plots do point to, however,
is whether partisanship’s influence is reliably different from 0. In only two of six instances is
this the case, and inconsistently so. Partisanship contributes to changes in stereotype endorsement
among non-college educated partisans between 2006 and 2010 and for degree-holding partisans
between 2010 and 2014.
The investigation into stereotypes offers some evidence on the limits of party-driven attitude
change. Partisanship does shape stereotyping, but its influence is inconsistent both across time
periods and by education level. Even so, the results are at odds with the possibility that stereo-
types, as a more cognitive realization of prejudice, should only change among the more engaged.
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Table 5.8: Education’s Moderating Effect on the Relationship between Partisanship and Changes
in Stereotype Endorsement
2006-2010 2008-2012 2010-2014
Partisanshipt−1 0.024∗ 0.001 0.013
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
—*College Degreet−1 −0.020 0.014 0.022
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Negative Stereotypest−1 0.229∗ 0.420∗ 0.306∗
(0.045) (0.046) (0.043)
—*College Degreet−1 0.338∗ 0.166 −0.037
(0.103) (0.131) (0.107)
College Degreet−1 −0.181∗ −0.099 0.002
(0.055) (0.070) (0.055)
Constant 0.404∗ 0.315∗ 0.371∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024)
Observations 505 540 530
R2 0.139 0.172 0.125
Residual Std. Error 0.069 0.073 0.067
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses.
Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.
The present case is particularly informative because education accounts in part for differences in
cognitive skills. The limited impact, and inconsistent moderating effect, suggests that the ability
to update one’s attitudes is not the key force underpinning party-driven attitude change.
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Figure 5.8: Partisan gap in racial stereotypest by education. Results based on models in Table 5.8.
Bars provide the proportion of respondents with and without a college degree in each model.
5.8 Conclusion
The results from these analyses enrich our understanding of the dynamic relationship between
Whites’ partisanship and their racial attitudes. That the most politically engaged partisans exhibit
the greatest amount of attitude change supports the argument that the information environment
plays an important role in encouraging attitude change. While all Whites display racial attitude
change over time, the politically engaged display the greatest polarization in this party centric
political context. And this is especially the case for engaged Democrats. This fits with evidence
on the relationship between partisanship and other attitudes where those more attuned to politics
are those for whom attitude change is most likely (Carsey and Layman, 2006). But it also furthers
these understandings by revealing similar patterns for even presumptively fundamental beliefs like
racial attitudes. Further, that even the least politically engaged partisans exhibit changes in racial
attitudes is an important result given arguments that only the politically engaged are likely to
change their attitudes to align with their favored political party (Carsey and Layman, 2006). All
the more impressive is that the patterns of change I find occur on attitudes that are thought to
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be much more stable than issue positions. Mass opinion on issues is often quite susceptible to
the information environment (Zaller, 1992), with racial prejudice actually thought to guide the
reception and incorporation of new considerations because these orientations are early-learned and
persistent (Sears and Brown, 2013).
It is also noteworthy that across levels of engagement the most engaged exhibit the greatest
amount of attitude change. This evidence is at odds with models of attitude change where the
moderately engaged should exhibit the greatest amount of change (Zaller, 1992). The least aware
are less likely to encounter new information and have the facility to incorporate it into their existing
beliefs. The most aware, in contrast, are most likely to encounter new information and have the
capacity to update existing attitudes, but they also have a much greater store of existing considera-
tions to draw from to bolster existing attitudes. While the approach differs, that degree of change is
monotonic best fits with a one-sided information flow (e.g., liberals receive liberal messages) on an
unfamiliar issue in Zaller’s (1992) attitude change typology. Differences in information streams are
reinforced by the divergence in engagement’s effects by party. That politically engaged Democrats
appear to be the most responsive, and politically engaged Republicans more consistently change
their attitudes to a degree similar to their least engaged peers, suggests such a pattern.
That education has effects similar to political awareness and interest offers important quali-
fications to claims that education promotes tolerant beliefs (Allport, 1979; McClosky and Zaller,
1984; Bobo and Licari, 1989; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1993; Sniderman and Piazza, 1993;
Schuman et al., 1997; Pettigrew, 2000). Key here, it seems, are arguments that norm internaliza-
tion matters for education to promote tolerance (Crandall, Eshleman and O’Brien, 2002; Federico,
2004). College-educated Republicans, while less racially resentful than their non-college educated
copartisans, still change their views of Black Americans in ways consistent with their party loy-
alties. Similarly, college-educated Democrats display more attitude change at least between 2012
and 2016 than their non-college educated copartisans. Both are presumably aware of norms re-
garding racial tolerance, but these patterns suggest Democrats are more motivated to change their
attitudes to be consistent with norms of racial tolerance than Republicans. Such an outcome sug-
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gests that a beliefs about what norms of racial equality are and how they relate to appropriate
attitudes may themselves divide by party. It could even be the case that understandings of what
behaviors and beliefs constitute prejudice also divide by party (see generally Crandall, Miller and
White II, 2018). Comparing Democrats’ and Republicans’ beliefs about what racial intolerance is,
and also their personal commitment to upholding norms of racial tolerance, appears an important
point for future research to consider.
My results have implications beyond simply clarifying the dynamics between racial attitudes
and partisanship. They also suggest the types of views that politicians hear. Data from the 2016
ANES show that this is indeed an important outcome. While average levels of racial resentment
for White Democrats and Republicans completing face-to-face interviews are 0.41 and 0.70, re-
spectively, this 0.29 point gap increases to 0.38 points when comparing partisans completing one
or more political activities that year.10 This gap grows largely due to politically active White
Democrats, with an average racial resentment score of 0.34. Active Republicans, in contrast, place
at a 0.72. Further, focusing only donations as the costliest political act, this gap in attitudes widens
further. While the Republican average remains at 0.72, Democrats now score at a 0.23. Although
this comparison concerns only 92 respondents (57 Democrats and 35 Republicans), this a particu-
larly consequential difference given the potential relationship between contributions and legislator
access (Kalla and Broockman, 2015).
Seventy-five years ago Gunnar Myrdal 1962 contended that the intransigence of Whites’ racial
attitudes stemmed in part from ignorance, willful or involuntary. According to Myrdal, north-
ern Whites, epitomizing those largely unintentionally ignorant about the status of Black Ameri-
cans, would be “shocked and shaken in their conscience when they learn the facts” (48). He thus
proposed an educational, consciousness raising effort to improve Whites’ attitudes and allow for
improvements to Blacks’ station. While not the “nationwide educational offensive against racial
intolerance” Myrdal (1962) envisioned (49), my results, particularly among Democrats, suggest
10This includes persuading someone else to vote for or against a candidate, attending a rally or some other political
event, wearing a campaign button or posting a sign/bumper sticker, donating to a political party or candidate, or doing
any other work for a candidate.
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information may indeed matter. Myrdal identified schools and churches as potential prejudice-
reducing institutions because they connect with people’s ideas about how the world ought to be
which can overcome attitudes structuring everyday life (80). Political parties, given the correct
political context, may function in much the same way. Not all Whites are necessarily open to this
information, but that Democrats of all stripes changed their attitudes suggests parties, by providing
a vision of how society should be organized, can serve as a vehicle promoting a racially egalitarian
vision that mass partisans even from an advantaged group will adopt. It is up to elites to offer this
vision.
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Chapter 6
Partisanship and Racial Attitudes into the Future
Partisanship and race are driving forces in American politics (Campbell et al., 1960; Hutch-
ings and Valentino, 2004). In the preceding chapters I have shown that not only is the connection
between the two tightening as other scholars note (Tesler, 2016), but among White Americans par-
tisanship is shaping beliefs about race in America. Changes in the political context have provided
partisan elites and related actors with the ability to shape how Whites understand the role race
plays in structuring social and political affairs. I show that partisan elites provide ingredients that
can make up mass attitudes, and public opinion tracks this information.
In this conclusion I address an immediate question as well as future possibilities. The immedi-
ate concern is that the dynamics I address are driven exclusively by President Obama. All of the
analyses pointing toward partisanship mattering occur when Obama is president. It could be the
case that the patterns I find halt given the transition to the Trump administration. At the same time,
partisan polarization has not diminished. Nor has race receded from its status as a salient social
and political concern. While it is possible that the end of the Obama administration coincided with
a new equilibrium in the relationship between partisanship and attitudes about race, I show below
that descriptive trends suggest the attitude change patterns I identify are likely continuing under
Trump.
I then entertain open questions. I offer avenues for future research that engage with expla-
nations for why partisanship is changing attitudes, including the possibility that these trends are
simply expressive responding rather than true attitude change. I then offer preliminary results ex-
tending the analyses from chapter 4 in two ways that reveal a more general story about the influence
partisanship has on attitudes about other groups in society.
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6.1 Patterns Continue
An important open question from the preceding chapters is whether patterns of attitude change
will persist. The argument and evidence I present suggests that patterns of attitude change can
continue so long as the political context motivates partisans to adopt party-consistent views. After
nearly a full term for President Donald Trump, party’s influence does not seem to be abating. Nor
does race seem to be transitioning to a peripheral concern politically. Early candidates seeking
the Democratic Party’s 2020 presidential nomination have signaled a readiness to campaign on
race conscious platforms (Herndon, 2019). President Trump, in contrast, appears to be positioning
himself for a repeat performance of 2016 by stoking fears of criminal immigrants (Brownstein,
2019).
While no publicly available panel data exist to carry the analyses forward, two sets of cross-
sectional data strongly suggest the causal dynamics I identified continue. The first series comes
from the Pew Research Center. Since 2005, Pew has asked respondents to select one of two options
for Black Americans’ social and economic status. The pair strongly reflects racial resentment with
one option stating “racial discrimination is the main reason why many black people can’t get ahead
these days” and the other “Blacks who can’t get ahead in this country are mostly responsible for
their own condition.”1
Figure 6.1 plots the percentage of non-Hispanic White partisans selecting discrimination (left
panel) or personal responsibility (right panel). The trends highlight a consistent thread through the
analyses in the preceding chapters: Democrats are unique in this period (black line). Between 2005
and 2012, the percentage of Democrats selecting the discrimination option fluctuated between 25
and 41%. But after 2012 the proportion of partisans selecting this response consistently increases.
From 46% in March 2014, this rises to 52% in October 2015 and reaches 70% in June 2017.
While most Democrats selected the responsibility option during President Obama’s first term, the
gap between choices dropped to less than 5 points by 2012. But starting in October 2015 the
proportion of Democrats selecting the discrimination response outweighs the proportion choosing
1The question preamble is: “Which statement comes closer to your views, even if neither is exactly right?”
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Figure 6.1: White explanations for Blacks’ social and economic status by party. Pew Research
Center Surveys.
the responsibility option in every survey.
These patterns help unpack the descriptive picture presented in chapter 4’s appendix by sug-
gesting most of the change in racial resentment among Democrats occurred toward the end of the
2012-2016 period. They also suggest a likely continuation of attitude change. While it is unclear
where between 2015 and 2017 most of the change in attitudes occurred, these patterns support my
argument that this is a general story about attitude change rather than one isolated to a context
featuring a Black man as president.
It is noteworthy that these substantial changes manifest on a binary item. In contrast to the items
comprising the racial resentment measure which allow for strength of agreement with different
statements that to varying degrees capture structural or individual attributions, these trends come
from White Democrats deciding that racial discrimination rather than personal responsibility best
explain Black Americans’ position in the United States.
The item’s structure is likely behind the greater consistency is White Republicans’ attitudes in
this period. Although increases in the proportion of partisans selecting the personal responsibility
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Figure 6.2: Racial resentment’s distribution among Whites by party. Bars indicate proportion of
party identifiers with given level of racial resentment. Four-item index scaled 0-1, with higher val-
ues denoting more racial resentment. Web surveys from the American National Election Studies.
option do occur, for instance between January 2012 and March 2017, the series start and end points
each rest at 75% choosing this option.
Additional data complement these insights. These data come from the 2018 American National
Election Study pilot Study.2 Conducted online by the YouGov survey firm, the survey included the
four standard racial resentment items. Given the online setting, I compare them to the web portion
of the 2016 ANES.
Figure 6.2 sheds light on changes in the distribution of racial resentment by party between 2016
and 2018. Democrats exhibit a substantial shift to the left where the modal respondent places at
the scale minimum in 2018.3 While over 9% of Democrats placed here in 2016, this increases to
2The interview period was December 6-19, 2018. The ANES describes the study as follows: “The survey was
conducted using non-probability sampling. This method produces a sample that looks similar to a probability sample
on the matched characteristics, but may still differ in unknown ways on unmatched characteristics.”
3As noted in chapter 4’s appendix, this change, where the modal respondent locates at the minimum, occurred
between 2012 and 2016 in the face-to-face interviews. The discrepancy between survey mode does not have a ready
explanation.
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over 16% two years later. Complementing this change among Democrats, Republicans exhibit a
sharp rightward shift. While the modal respondent scored at the scale’s maximum, the proportion
of the party scoring here increases over 6 percentage points, from 14% to 20%.
These distributional changes are reflected in consequential shifts in group means as well. White
Democrats in 2016 on average scored at a 0.43. This decreases by 0.09 points to 0.34 in 2018.
Republicans, in contrast, moved from a 0.71 in 2016 to a 0.76.4 To tie everything together, the
correlation between the 7-point party identification measure and racial resentment increased from
0.51 to 0.64.5 The joint movement of means and distributions reinforces the trends I identify in
this dissertation and continue to implicate racial attitude change more than partisan sorting as best
explaining the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes in the present political context.
6.1.1 Implications
These trends have important implications for political practioners and social scientists. For
practioners, that White Democrats appear unique in this period has potential consequences for the
party’s primary. Candidates campaigning on race-conscious policies may have greater freedom
to do so than in prior years. The party coalition used to be more divided on race, but changes
in Whites’ attitudes appear to have reduced the degree to which they are divide them from their
co-partisans of color in beliefs about race (Horowitz, Brown and Cox, 2019). Race may do less to
divide Democrats, and may even serve to unite them, especially when juxtaposed with positions
the Republican Party takes.
For social scientists, polarizing racial attitudes have consequences for how we understand the
role racial attitudes play in structuring political opinion. As I note elsewhere (Engelhardt, Forth-
4These shifts in racial resentment are also reflected on feeling thermometers. In 2016, White Republicans and
Democrats both felt more positively about Whites than Blacks, but this difference was much larger for Republicans.
The favorability gap for Republicans was 10 points (74 vs. 64) while for Democrats it was just 1 point (72 vs. 71).
In 2018, Republicans still rated Whites 12 points more favorably than Blacks (81 vs. 69). Democrats, however, rated
Blacks more positively than Whites by 8 points (69 vs. 77).
5In comparison, the correlation between partisanship and the 7-point ANES ideological self-identification or place-
ment measure is 0.76 in 2016 and 0.78 in 2018. To item wording varies somewhat between surveys and does not
include a “haven’t thought much about this” option in 2018. Consequently I exclude such responses from the 2016
coding.
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coming), claims that Whites’ racial attitudes were uniquely important in shaping their vote pref-
erences in the 2016 presidential election, and that this came from Donald Trump’s campaign ac-
tivating these attitudes, are assertions without clear evidentiary support. The increased alignment
between racial attitudes and party creates observational equivalence issues in regression models,
inferential problems well-known to scholars of issue voting (Lenz, 2012). While proper research
designs can help overcome this problem, the increased correlation between racial attitudes and
partisanship means that Whites’ racial attitudes may be chronically related to vote preference, no
campaign activation required. Democrats’ racially liberal attitudes motivate them to support the
Democratic candidate and reject the Republican candidate, and vice versa for Republicans’ racially
conservative beliefs (see also Tesler and Sears, 2010).
6.2 Future Work
The current investigation offers several potentially interesting avenues for future work. First,
while I find evidence for Whites’ views about race aligning with their partisan ties, this says noth-
ing about whether this related to changes in attitudes themselves or partisan cheerleading (Bullock
et al., 2015). From this perspective, attitudes themselves have not changed; rather, social desirabil-
ity concerns or similar pressures are conditioning how partisans respond to survey items. While
possible, the analyses using structural equation models to estimate relationships in chapter 4 fix
racial resentment’s meaning across waves, removing the possibility that changes in the nature of
survey responses explain the relationships I find. Future work could test this more systematically,
perhaps using the racial resentment battery and assessing item performance over time and between
theoretically relevant groups to test whether social desirability or other expressive responding con-
cerns play any role in the changes I identify.
Relatedly, the encouraging outcome that White Democrats’ attitudes about Blacks are improv-
ing becomes especially important if these beliefs translate into behaviors. If Democrats also take
action to promote policies, movements, or candidates seeking to improve Blacks’ station then this
trend in liberalizing attitudes carries even more import. Future work could investigate whether
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White Democrats are increasingly likely to support and donate to candidates advocating address-
ing racial inequality, with the 2020 Democratic primary providing a particularly advantageous time
to evaluate this. Analyses could also consider whether increased racial liberalism relates to greater
participation in Black Lives Matter marches and less discrimination in lab experiments like the
ultimatum game.
Given these insights, it is also important to understand further why partisanship is related to
attitude change. That political engagement moderates dynamics suggests that information matters,
but this likely does so alongside the motivation to updates existing beliefs. Future work can in-
vestigate the kinds of information that matters, how this interacts with source characteristics, and
whether and how individual differences condition the interpretation and incorporation of this in-
formation. While these questions may be best answered through experimental designs, additional
observational analyses could consider whether age, social context, or strength of partisan commit-
ment condition responses. By considering multiple possibilities, evidence can triangulate types
of interventions and targets that may work to foster more positive attitudes about marginalized
groups.
Finally, additional investigations can extend the dynamic partisanship-racial attitude relation-
ship. The first considers Whites’ attitudes about non-Black minorities while the second looks at
whether partisanship shapes non-Whites’ attitudes about Black Americans. Given available survey
data, I offer initial investigations below.
6.2.1 Whites’ Attitudes About Non-Black Minorities
While the Black-White divide motivated most of my analyses, I note in several spots that the
color line in the United States has shifted. Influxes of immigrants from Asia and Latin Amer-
ica, and the potency of outgroup attitudes in structuring White opinion (Kinder and Kam, 2009),
necessitate considering whether attitude change generalizes to other racialized minority groups.
One way to consider the breadth of possible effects is to consider whether partisan variation in
Whites’ attitudes about Blacks manifests in orientations toward minorities generally. Specifically,
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I consider variation by party in levels of group empathy. Group empathy theory proposes that
socialization experiences, related in part to demographics (e.g., discrimination, intergroup contact),
instill in people a concern for the struggles of outgroups (Sirin, Valentino and Villalobos, 2016a,
429-30). Group empathy is “a process where members of one group begin to internalize and
vicariously experience the perspectives and emotions of members of another group even when
they do not share intimate family or friendship bonds” (Sirin, Valentino and Villalobos, 2016b,
895). As such, items measuring it include “How often would you say you try to better understand
people of other racial or ethnic groups by imagining how things look from their perspective” and
“Before criticizing somebody from another racial or ethnic group, how often do you try to imagine
how you would feel if you were in their place.” Fortunately, the 2018 ANES pilot study included
these two items as well as two other from the group empathy measure introduced by Sirin and
colleagues (Sirin, Valentino and Villalobos, 2016a,b).6 Responses are recorded on 5-point scales,
from “extremely often” to “not often at all.” I score each item such that higher values denote
the more empathetic response and average them together into a 0-1 scale.7 Although I do not
have panel data to assess patterns of change driven by party, that group empathy theory forms
through socialization and learning processes (Sirin, Valentino and Villalobos, 2016a,b) suggests
any partisan variation may come in part from attitude change.
This measure offers evidence that partisanship may shape global orientations toward minority
6Two items were randomly assigned to respondents in what appears to be a question wording test. One item
shows significant response variation between question format (p < 0.01) while the other does not. To preserve cases I
combine question wording formats into single items but note how responses differ on the item with wording variation.
All received: “How often would you say you try to better understand people of other racial or ethnic groups by
imagining how things look from their perspective?”
“Before criticizing somebody from another racial or ethnic group, how often do you try to imagine how you would
feel if you were in their place?”
Half received: “How often would you say that you have tender, concerned feelings for people from another racial or
ethnic group who are less fortunate than you?”
“When you see someone being taken advantage of due to their race or ethnicity, how often do you feel protective
towards them?”
Half received: “How often would you say that you feel concerned about people from another racial or ethnic group
who are less fortunate than you?”
“When you see someone being treated poorly due to their race or ethnicity, how often do you feel protective towards
them?”
7The items demonstrate high internal reliability (α = 0.89), and this does not vary much by party (Democrats:
α = 0.89, Republicans: α = 0.84).
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groups. While White Republicans score at a 0.51, Democrats report more group empathy, scoring
on average 17 points higher on the measure at 0.68.8 To put this in context, Blacks average a
0.58 and Latinos place at a 0.54. Interestingly, group empathy theory’s proponents contend non-
Whites should score higher on group empathy because of different group-based experiences with
marginalization (Sirin, Valentino and Villalobos, 2016a,b), but this is not the case in these data
(Whites as a whole average 0.58).9 That White Democrats express greater levels of group empathy
suggests that indirect experiences may contribute to these attitudes as well.10
To offer additional evidence for a generalized account of party-driven attitude change toward
other social groups, I return to the 2012-2016 VOTER Survey and 2016 CCAP. These panels con-
tain favorability items for various groups. I consider 3: Latinos, Asians, and Muslims. Latinos
and Asians allow me to generalize the findings to two other racial groups. Muslims extend these
patterns to a marginalized group that has been racialized over the last two decades (Lajevardi and
Oskooii, 2018; Lajevardi and Abrajano, 2019). As with the analyses in chapters 4 and 5 I create
a differenced affect measure for the Latino and Asian favorability items, subtracting these evalua-
tions from Whites’ evaluations of Whites. For Muslims, I take the difference between evaluations
of Christians and evaluations of Muslims. I score this measure such that higher values denote
relatively more positive attitudes about Christians than Muslims.11
Table 6.1 provides the estimates from cross-lagged regression models looking at group evalua-
tions measured in the VOTER Survey. The estimates reveal a dynamic relationship between group
evaluations and partisanship on all counts. Between December 2011 and November/December
2016, Republicans’ and Democrats’ preferences for Latinos and Asians, relative to Whites, po-
8Partisanship and group empathy correlate at -0.34.
9It is also not the case that Whites’ attitudes are more variable. The standard deviations of White Democrats’ and
Republicans’ scores are 0.22 and 0.23, respectively. Blacks and Latinos display greater heterogeneity, with standard
deviations of 0.25 and 0.26, respectively. Two-sample KS tests offer evidence that distributions vary both between
partisan groups and also between Whites and non-Whites.
10Interestingly, racial resentment and group empathy correlate at -0.48, with a heartier correlation among Democrats
(-0.49) than Republicans (-0.26). This suggests that different orientations toward race and marginalized groups are
increasingly unified among Democrats, while Republicans’ attitudes are more readily distinguished from each other.
11The results are consistent using just the Latino and Asian favorability items rather than the difference measure.
Interestingly, disaggregating the composite measure for Muslims offers suggestive evidence that partisanship does
more to shape attitudes about Muslims than Christians in both data collections. Further, attitudes about Christians are
more influential on changes in party loyalties in the VOTER Survey but are equal in influence in the CCAP data.
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Table 6.1: Relationship between Whites’ Partisanship and Other Group Evaluations, VOTER Sur-
vey
Whites - Latinos Whites - Asians Christians - Muslims
Group Negativityt Partisanshipt Group Negativityt Partisanshipt Group Negativityt Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 0.066∗ 0.830∗ 0.072∗ 0.832∗ 0.141∗ 0.778∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Group Negativityt−1 0.600∗ 0.110∗ 0.527∗ 0.219∗ 0.737∗ 0.252∗
(0.012) (0.021) (0.013) (0.023) (0.012) (0.016)
Constant 0.162∗ 0.044∗ 0.194∗ −0.013 0.074∗ −0.030∗
(0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations 5,522 5,522 5,522 5,522 5,338 5,338
R2 0.349 0.682 0.271 0.685 0.567 0.706
Residual Std. Error 0.105 0.188 0.102 0.187 0.139 0.180
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.
larizes. So, too, do their feelings about Muslims. Out-group evaluations appear relatively more
influential than partisanship in the relationship.
These results, moreover, are not unique to this data collection. The estimates in Table 6.2 reveal
similar dynamics during 2016. The relationship between racial group evaluations and partisanship
is dynamic, with each about as influential. But here partisanship does more to shape relative
feelings about Muslims than the reverse.
Partisanship not only shapes how Whites view Black Americans, it also influences their at-
titudes about Asians, Latinos, and Muslims. Further, differences across groups in partisanship’s
relative influence shed some light on what facilitates the dynamic relationship. That attitudes about
Latinos and Asians are likely to motivate party switching to at least the same degree as partisanship
is to change these attitudes suggests the parties’ positions vis-a`-vis these groups are being clarified
for White Americans. This appears to also be the case for Muslims, although primarily in the
VOTER Survey data. A change in relative influence suggests that partisans are incorporating new
information into attitudes about the group rather than using this information to identify the party
best aligned with their group attitudes. These results reinforce the view that information from party
elites and others may be particularly influential because of comparatively low levels of interaction
between Whites and various outgroups.
123
Table 6.2: Relationship between Whites’ Partisanship and Other Group Evaluations, 2016 CCAP
Whites - Latinos Whites - Asians Christians - Muslims
Group Negativityt Partisanshipt Group Negativityt Partisanshipt Group Negativityt Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 0.066∗ 0.927∗ 0.057∗ 0.928∗ 0.102∗ 0.907∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Group Negativityt−1 0.558∗ 0.042∗ 0.442∗ 0.056∗ 0.673∗ 0.067∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
Constant 0.195∗ 0.018∗ 0.248∗ 0.012∗ 0.130∗ 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 8,119 8,119 8,119 8,119 8,120 8,120
R2 0.355 0.851 0.237 0.851 0.599 0.852
Residual Std. Error 0.129 0.118 0.120 0.118 0.142 0.117
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.
6.2.2 Non-Whites’ Attitudes About Blacks
Extending the test of partisanship shaping outgroup evaluations to non-Whites provides an in-
teresting extension of the argument. Partisanship for non-Whites is often not as potent an influence
due to different socialization processes and motivations for party loyalty (Hajnal and Lee, 2011). It
is possible, therefore, that party does not affect other groups’ attitudes. Alternatively, the nature of
the present political context may be such that regardless of why someone identifies as a Democrat
of a Republican, the very presence of this attachment allows for partisanship to matter.
To test whether partisanship’s influence travels, I use data from the 2012-2016 VOTER Sur-
vey and the 2016 CCAP. These collections are large enough to provide reasonable inferences about
attitude dynamics among minority groups.12 I use racial resentment as the attitudinal outcome. Al-
though conceptualized as an attitude for White Americans, the measure captures the same attitude
among Black Americans (Kam and Burge, 2018). Consequently, I assume that its characterization
as structural versus individual attributions for Black Americans’ social and economic status travels
to Latinos and Asians as well. I use the same analysis strategy as in chapter 4 and I pool together
Latino and Asian respondents.
Table 6.3 presents the results from these analyses. The estimates reveal a relationship between
partisanship on changes in racial resentment in both data collections. The estimated relationships,
12The VOTER Survey contains responses from 120 Asians and 404 Latinos. These totals for the 2016 CCAP are
211 and 796, respectively. In both data collections the provided information on race includes Latino alongside other
group categories rather than as a separate items asked after group identification.
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Table 6.3: Relationship between Partisanship and Racial Resentment, Latinos and Asians
2012-2016 VOTER Survey 2016 CCAP
Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 0.148∗ 0.843∗ 0.085∗ 0.762∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.021) (0.025)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.807∗ 0.145∗ 0.723∗ 0.053
(0.034) (0.034) (0.025) (0.030)
Constant −0.002 −0.024 0.110∗ 0.037∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.017)
Observations 495 495 735 735
R2 0.626 0.729 0.592 0.608
Residual Std. Error 0.262 0.264 0.249 0.295
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1.
Analyses use population weights.
moreover, are indistinguishable from the estimates for White partisans in chapter 4. Partisanship’s
influence therefore appears to travel, and quite well.
The results also point to a relationship between racial resentment and partisan change for Lati-
nos and Asians. This relationship is clearest in the VOTER Survey, and less reliable in the 2016
CCAP (p < 0.10). Further, like the estimated relationship for partisanship, the results here are
quite similar to the results found among Whites.
These result indicate that partisanship’s influence on attitudes about Black Americans is not
isolated to Whites. These dynamics extend to Asian and Latino respondents as well. A potentially
consequential limitation, though, is that these results likely overestimate relationships for these
groups because group members participating in these surveys are likely much more socialized into
the political process in the United States than their coethnics. Even so, these results are important
given the variation in the nature of partisan attachments for racial and ethnic minorities (Hajnal
and Lee, 2011).
As a final test, I extend these analyses to consider Black attitudes about Blacks. Because the
target is their ingroup, Blacks’ partisan loyalties may have no relationship with their subsequent
racial attitudes. Party is not required to update explanations for their ingroup’s social and economic
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Table 6.4: Relationship between Partisanship and Racial Resentment, Blacks
2012-2016 VOTER Survey 2016 CCAP
Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 0.104∗ 0.655∗ 0.065∗ 0.842∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.022) (0.019)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.841∗ −0.066∗ 0.784∗ 0.020
(0.032) (0.033) (0.023) (0.019)
Constant −0.009 0.061∗ 0.062∗ 0.030∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008)
Observations 627 627 868 868
R2 0.542 0.448 0.593 0.703
Residual Std. Error 0.191 0.200 0.188 0.158
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1.
Analyses use population weights.
status. Even so, partisanship may still matter for this group.
The results reported in Table 6.4 offer evidence that partisanship is influential even among
Black Americans. In both the VOTER Survey and 2016 CCAP partisanship is related to changes
in racial attitudes (p < 0.05). Not only that, partisanship’s estimated effects do not reliably differ
between Blacks and Whites. While the estimated effect in the VOTER survey is about 0.04 points
smaller than the estimate for Whites reported in Table 4.3, this difference is imprecise (p < 0.06,
one-tailed). In the 2016 CCAP, partisanship’s effect among Blacks is 0.02 points smaller but this
is again imprecisely estimated (p > 0.10, one-tailed).
The estimates also suggest some role for racial attitudes for Blacks. In the VOTER survey,
Blacks placing more emphasis on individual over structural explanations for their group’s social
and economic status were actually more likely to identify as Democrats (αˆ2 =−0.066, p < 0.05).
It could be the case that racial resentment as a construct maps differently to the party system for
Blacks than it does for Whites (see generally Pe´rez and Hetherington, 2014; Hetherington and
Weiler, 2018). This is an interesting empirical question encouraged by evidence demonstrating the
construct’s cross-racial comparability (Kam and Burge, 2018).
All told, partisanship not only appears to affect how Whites view other groups. It also provides
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a potent force shaping how non-Whites view Black Americans. And impressively, it also relates
to Blacks’ views of their own group. In the present political context, party provides a general, and
influential, organizing force for people’s attitudes about other social groups.
6.3 The Race-Party Link and the Nature of Democracy
These results present a normatively mixed picture about the relationship between democracy
and intergroup relations. On the one hand, political processes appear capable of encouraging peo-
ple to adopt more positive views about marginalized groups in society. Such an outcome can pro-
vide important benefits by producing more positive intergroup interactions. It can also potentially
offer a foundation of support for policies targeted at addressing any group-based inequalities these
marginalized groups experience. This is plausible because group-centric thinking helps people
navigate politics without requiring sophisticated belief systems (Converse, 1964; Brady and Sni-
derman, 1985; Achen and Bartels, 2016), where people’s views of policy beneficiaries underpin
policy preferences (Nelson and Kinder, 1996; Gilens, 1999).
On the other hand, the results point to how political processes can perpetuate disadvantage.
Typically, social scientists focus on the effects that institutions and public policies have on creating
and perpetuating structural divides between groups (Katznelson, 2006; Rothstein, 2017). But the
evidence I offer suggests an alternative path through which politics may maintain inequality: its
contribution to intergroup attitudes. In the same way that changes in intergroup attitudes may open
the door for more favorable attitudes towards policies potentially benefitting that group, so too
does information reinforcing negative attitudes. A lack of concern for marginalized groups can
perpetuate low support for policies intended to address their station.
Knowing that many Americans’ partisanship is not only built upon attitudes about race but can
also mold these views helps us understand how the political system will respond to, and shape,
an increasingly diverse country. And these results can shed light both on past periods in US his-
tory and in other political contexts. Against the backdrop of American history the party-centric
nature of today’s politics seems more normal than abnormal (Azari and Hetherington, 2016), pat-
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terns reinforced by the deep connections between individuals’ social and political selves (Mason,
2018). An electorate diversifying in an era of renewed party centrism suggests that partisan-driven
racial attitude change could continue into the future as race remains socially and political salient.
The current party system appears much more likely to reinforce, and possibly heighten, social
antagonisms than foster any sort of reconciliation or incorporation motives.
Political parties are not simply neutral preference aggregators within democratic polities. Peo-
ple’s willingness to categorize the world into into “us” and “them” allows the fight for political
power to result in political conflict stoking, or quelling, social animosities (cf. Posner, 2005). De-
bates about which groups constitute the polis in a democracy, and therefore merit representation
and potential state assistance, seem likely to be at the forefront of concern in an era of increased
attention to international migration. Refugees from conflicts in the Middle East traveling to Eu-
rope or migrants fleeing violence in Central America and journeying to the United States make the
politics of difference central to understanding political conflict cross-nationally for the foreseeable
future. A core tension in many countries, then, will be between elites interested in leveraging these
shifts for political gain by appealing to concerns about demographic change and whether their
opponents push back on such campaigning. Knowing that elites have the capacity to alter mass
attitudes about other social groups makes these political dynamics all the more consequential.
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Appendix
Appendix to Chapter 2
Text Analysis Procedure
I used a multi-step procedure to classify the documents according to whether or not they men-
tioned race. First, and as mentioned in the text, I took a random sample of 200 documents per
month and coded each by hand according to whether or not they discussed race. Again, this in-
cluded mentions of race in any context that explicitly refer to a racial group, racialized policy or
experience, or prominent racial figure (Gillion, 2016). I then partitioned this over 21,000 document
set into a training set and test set by randomly dividing it in half. I preprocessed the documents
by removing stopwords, numbers, and punctuation. I did not stem words because eliminating
contextually-relevant information in the unstemmed words reduced classifier accuracy. After test-
ing a series of classifiers on the training set, including Naive Bayes and maximum entropy, I settled
on a support vector machine to classify these documents because it was the most accurate in terms
of recall and precision on the test set (Hsu, Chang and Lin, 2003).
I then did two things to improve classification accuracy. First, following prior work (Gillion,
2016) I used a keyword search for words that are undoubtedly race-related (e.g., African American,
Latino, racism, racial) to add additional information into the training data to improve classifier
accuracy. Second, I weighted words based on mutual information (MI). MI captures how much
information a word’s presence or absence contributes to making a classification decision (Manning,
Raghavan and Schu¨tze, 2009). I selected the specific MI cutoff by iterating over different MI levels
and selecting the MI cutoff by evaluating each model’s F-score, a weighted average of model recall
and precision, or the frequency of type II and type I errors (Manning, Raghavan and Schu¨tze,
2009). I used an MI cutoff of 0.0033, with the model in the test set providing an overall F-score
of 0.91 out of 1, and a race-specific one of 0.88. Finally, I addressed overfitting the SVM through
cross-validation with total accuracy of 92.8%.
After training the classifier I applied it to the uncoded documents. After collecting the coded
147
documents I then read through each document classified as discussing race to correct any Type I
errors. Following this, 2.6% of documents were coded as implicating race in some way.This is
similar to the 4% of the hand coded set that related to race.
Using these coded documents I then applied the structural topic modeling discussed in the text.
I preprocessed the documents the same way, again not stemming words. I then specified different
numbers of topics ranging from 20 to 50 in units of 5 and ran 10 different models for each topic
specification. Each model allowed topic prevalence to vary by show and over time. For each topic
specification I evaluated the 10 models based on exclusivity and semantic coherence as statistical
criteria for each model’s ability to identify unique topics that cohere well together (Roberts et al.,
2014), and then inspected them to assess substance. After selecting a candidate model for each
topic specification, I then compared these models across topic specifications, finally settling on the
35 topic model discussed in the text. While I make no claims that this is the definitive number
of topics, the results appear meaningful based on the statistical and substantive comparisons, and
from reading the documents while correcting Type I errors.13
Additional Examples of Topic Text
13The model’s semantic coherence is -146.90, and exclusivity is 9.93.
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O'Reilly
REV. JESSE JACKSON, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVIST: This is
a civil war struggle, are you with the union? Are
you with the states rightists? They had a debate in
Iowa two weeks ago. And all of them are for the 10th
Amendment. That's the slave amendment. They want to
undermine the 13, 14, 15th Amendment. This is very
serious.
And you made an interesting point about Rosa Parks.
Rosa Parks and other good people back in the Civil
Rights days boycotted, boycotted because human rights
were being violated. Human rights, it wasn't an
opinion. People were being forced physically to be in
the back of the bus or not to go into a hotel. There is
a big difference. We are talking speech here. Now, how
would you reply to the counselor?
O'REILLY: Reverend Burns. Reverend Coates and other
clerics, black clerics see it as a civil rights issue.
You obviously do not. And you know you were in the
forefront of the Civil Rights Movement. But you don't
see gay marriage as a civil rights issue, do you.
Maddow
MADDOW: That was this weekend in Selma, Alabama, during
the 50th commemoration of the march across the Edmund
Pettus Bridge and the police violence against those
marchers that led to the Voting Rights Act in 1965.
And the reality is that here in Alabama, in Selma,
Alabama, the 1990s, Section 5 was required to block
five discriminatory voting measures in the 1990s
alone. Alabama is the epitome of a state that should
be covered by Section 5. And Shelby County, Alabama,
in particular, which is the place where which the
challenge originates, as Justice Sotomayor at oral
argument suggested is the personification of a
jurisdiction that is rightfully covered by the Voting
Rights Act.
RAND PAUL (R), KENTUCKY SENATORIAL CANDIDATE: I
like the Civil Rights Act in the sense that it ended
discrimination in all public domains, and I‘m all in
favor of that.
Civil and Voting Rights
Figure A.1: Example topic documents: Civil and Voting Rights
O'Reilly
O'REILLY: "Impact" segment tonight, while the Justice
Department is suing the state of Arizona over its
new anti−illegal alien law, it has for years ignored
sanctuary cities like San Francisco and Houston that
have refused to enforce federal immigration law.
That is, if local authorities there in those cities
apprehend illegal aliens, they do not tell homeland
security, as they are required to do. So why aren't
those cities being sued?
INGRAHAM: One of my favorite parts of this ruling is
when she discusses what the government argued about
this burdensome, the process of having to cross check
an individual's ID with the federal alien register.
And they argue that it would tax the system, it would
tax federal resources, and divert focus of the federal
government. My question to you, John, is what about
the taxing of the system of illegal aliens, by illegal
aliens? How about that focus on the resources that are
being drained from the American public?
On the home front the San Francisco Chronicle reporting
that the feds are investigating the city of San
Francisco for violating U.S. immigration law, finally.
The allegations are that San Francisco authorities
protected illegal alien drug dealers from Honduras.
Maddow
MADDOW: Romney there praising Arizona as a model,
praising two things in Arizona: the E−verify system
where employers have to check on the legal status of
their employees and papers please, which is what the
Obama Justice Department has sued Arizona to stop, in
which Romney said he would not sue to stop it. I think
Arizona is a model for the nation.
MADDOW: And, of course, as Arizona Governor Jan Brewer
explaining her decision to sign into law the "Papers,
please" bill which compels law enforcement officers
in Arizona to stop anyone who looks like they might be
an illegal immigrant to demand that that person show
proof that they are not, in fact, here illegally. In
Arizona, you are presumed illegal unless you can prove
otherwise −− papers, please. Arizona needs this law,
in Governor Brewer‘s estimation, because the federal
government is not doing a good enough job dealing with
immigration. The Arizona governor is not alone in that
assessment. There‘s actually a fairly wide consensus on
both sides of the political aisle that what happened in
Arizona only happened because the feds haven‘t acted to
fix the immigration system and the problem of illegal
immigration. (BEGIN VIDEO CLIPS)
Meet Sheriff Clarence Dupnik of Pima County, Arizona.
Sheriff Dupnik says Arizona may have passed this new
law telling police officers to stop people for just
looking like illegal immigrants. They may have passed
that law, but he says it‘s not enforceable.
Illegal Immigration
Figure A.2: Example topic documents: Illegal Immigration
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O'Reilly
But second of all, I think the problem is, you know,
Ms. O'Donnell would recoil at the idea that she is
playing upon stereotypes here. But that's in fact what
she's doing. She's putting the words in someone else's
mouth, but she's the one who went there. And I would
suggest to liberal journalists that when they hear a
Republican talk about the president and his love for
basketball, which is well−documented, and it's not some
sort of thing that Newt made up, that the first thing
their mind goes to is a common stereotype about black
people, then they might be the ones with the racial
hang ups. Now−−
Is it fair? Look, it's reprehensible that any of these
(inaudible), anybody uses the N−Word would've heard −−
Oprah Winfrey would've heard Bill Cosby and others say
"These robbers (ph) are just as bad as these racist who
use the N−Word." There's no place for the N−Word. But
from a PR standpoint, for Paula Deen, the bigger thing,
it's very much in politics. It's always said that
it's not the crime, it's the cover−up that gets you in
trouble.
Now, that's dumb. Because, look, Rather didn't do
anything wrong here. He just tried to be folksy. He
wasn't trying to be racist. Anybody who says he was
is an idiot. All Rather had to do was say that: "I'm
trying to be folksy. It really doesn't work. I'm
sorry. I'm trying to be folksy." But then he gets into
journalism and news and all of this.
Maddow
PAUL: You had to ask me the "but." I don‘t like the
idea of telling private business owners. I abhor
racism. I think it‘s a bad business decision to ever
exclude anybody from your restaurant. But at the
same time, I do believe in private ownership. But I
think there should be absolutely no discrimination
in anything that gets any public funding, and that‘s
mostly what the Civil Rights Act was about, to my mind.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
PAUL: There‘s a hilarious episode on "Seinfeld", any
"Seinfeld" fans? Where Jerry −− Jerry admits he loves
Asian women, but he frets and he worries. He says, is
it racist to like a certain race?
GOV. PAUL LEPAGE (R), MAINE: Mr. Gattine, this is
Governor Paul Richard LePage. I would like to talk to
you about your comments about my being a racist, you
(EXPLETIVE DELETED) sucker. I want to talk to you −− I
want you to prove that I‘m racist. I‘ve spent my life
helping black people and you little son of a bitch
socialist (EXPLETIVE DELETED) sucker. You −− I need you
to −− just friggin. I want you to record this and make
it public because I‘m after you. Thank you.
Discrimination
Figure A.3: Example topic documents: Discrimination
O'Reilly
You practically had your tongue down his throat. And
how about those black columnists who play the race card
and generalize about Tea Party people being racist?
Why don't you go after them by name and do it with the
same passion and gusto that you use when you are going
after fox people. How about Bill Maher? Bill Maher
generalizes about people who go to church being a bunch
of dopes. Is there some rule that says a comic can't
go after another comic? Here is my final word, Jon,
you can do whatever you want. But if you don't do that,
guess what? You are not nearly as edgy as you think you
are. You are just a safe, Jay Leno with a much smaller
audience, but you get to say the f bomb, which gives
your incredibly unsophisticated audience.
Folks, this is insane. So it's a cultural badge of
honor to demean and degrade based on skin color if
you are a person of color? Or are those who are going
out of their way to excuse Ms. Jeantel's comments
just suffering from an overdose of white guilt? In
other words, we have to excuse her poor manners, her
disrespectful language and cocky ignorance because
she is black? It's all part of the culture William
Raspberry called it once the ghettocracy. Left−wing
elites fall over themselves to avoid criticizing
behavior among black use that they would never tolerate
from most upper crust white kids like the use of the
"n" word or the "f" word or the "c" word. Oh when that
happens just chill out.
GOLDBERG: I mean, I think everybody realizes that
calling people racist is a waste of time, nobody buys
it anymore. If you are a racist because you are against
Obamacare and the stimulus and the worldwide apology
tour, if that makes you a racist, what do you call the
skin heads who are really racist? Well, it just −− it's
passe. Nobody is accepting it.
Maddow
The use of stereotypical war whoop chants and
tomahawk chops are offensive and downright racist. The
individuals involved in this unfortunate incident are
high−ranking staffers in both the Senate office and the
Brown campaign. A campaign that would allow and condone
such offensive and racist behavior must be called to
task for their actions.
Here is that tattoo, the specific one reference there.
And this is that specific guy. See, it‘s a Celtic
cross inside a circle. And if you look in the white
foreground, there‘s a big 14 on it −− 14 stands for the
racist skinhead kind of pledge of allegiance, I guess,
because it has 14 words. The 14 words are: "We must
secure the existence of our people and a future for
white children." Fourteen words supposedly written in
prison by the leader of a group called The Order, which
was the conspiratorial violent Nazi group that murdered
the liberal radio host Allen Bird (ph) in Denver in
1984.
HILLARY CLINTON (D), PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE: This is
not conservatism as we have known it. This is not
Republicanism as we have known it. These are racist
ideas, race−baiting ideas, anti−Muslim, anti−immigrant,
anti−women − − all key tenets making up the emerging
racist ideology known as the alt− right.
Racism
Figure A.4: Example topic documents: Racism
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The autopsy shows that the young man was shot six
times, had marijuana in his bloodstream. The tape shows
that shortly before the confrontation with the police
officer, the young man stole stuff from a convenient
store and not assaulted but pushed a clerk who is half
his size. Mr. Brown was close to 300 pounds and 6'4".
Finally two updates. The police officer in Tulsa,
Betty Shelby who shot dead an unarmed black man,
Terrence Crutcher has now been indicted on manslaughter
charges. And in Charlotte, police have arrested 21−
year−old Rayquan Borum, a protester for killing another
protester 26−year−old Justin Carr. The accused killer
has spent time prison and has two pending weapons
charges against him.
O'REILLY: Bitterness rising over the shooting death
of 17−year−old Trayvon Martin. Are the authorities
handling the case properly? And what about all the
craziness that has descended on Florida?
Maddow
Unlike Michael Brown, police say that the man who was
killed today, that he −− police say he was armed. They
say he was armed with a knife. He allegedly brandished
that knife at officers and that‘s why these two police
officers say they shot him.
Another man, Eric Garner of Staten Island, New York,
he died after police put him in a chokehold while
arresting him for selling loose cigarettes on the
sidewalk in Staten Island. Eric Garner actually died
a few weeks before Michael Brown was shot in Ferguson.
But the protests in Ferguson seemed to amplify the
response to Eric Garner‘s death and thousands of people
marched on Staten Island last summer to protest what
happened to Garner.
The current national outrage over police use of force
began in earnest late last summer with the shooting
of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. Michael Brown,
18 years old and unarmed when he died on the street
in Ferguson in August 2014, last August. After Michael
Brown‘s death, Ferguson saw weeks of protests, some of
them very intense.
Deaths of Black Americans
Figure A.5: Example topic documents: Deaths of Black Americans
O'Reilly
MACDONALD: This is something that is driven by violent
crime. And I love Mr. Rangel's complaint that the
government is ignoring inner city problems. They are
going nuts about New York City policing because it has
managed to bring homicide down in black neighborhoods
by 80 percent by stop and frisk. And this is the
government finally responding to black crime and saving
lives.
As Harlem here in New York City proves, his
opportunity comes to people and places that respect the
marketplace. Burning things down is anarchy. Investors
and entrepreneurs avoid anarchy. And it's not African−
American leadership that must act. It's black Americans
themselves through peer pressure.
The two guys charged with killing your daughter were
gangsters who were looking to kill other gangsters.
And this has been going on for years in Chicago in
certain neighborhoods. Not on the Gulf Coast all
right. Not in the suburbs of Chicago. It's going on
in your neighborhood, it's going on in poor black
neighborhoods. So I say that you flood the zone with
police just as they have here in New York City. And
then the police use the Stop−and−Frisk tactic to
discourage criminals, to discourage them from bringing
guns on to the street. Now you've seen the tremendous
drop in murder here in New York City not very different
from Chicago, by the way.
Maddow
What I notice now is they‘re condemning the youth for
what has happened but they were the ones on the front
line, they were the ones upset, they were ones that
brung all this attention to all the problems that
plague Baltimore youth, Baltimore citizens. And the
majority of them are black. That‘s truth of the matter.
MADDOW: When I looked at that report today from the
New Orleans chapter of the Urban League , I felt like
the main thrust that I didn‘t fully understand I think
before seeing it put in those terms, the main thesis
was that a lot of what explains some of the racial
−− a lot of what explains the racial disparity in the
recovery, particularly some things about like political
representation and whether or not people are governing
themselves and people are being governed according
to a sort of fair demographic sense, a lot of that
is because the poorest neighborhoods and the blackest
neighborhoods are neighborhoods that people were less
able to come back to, less able to move back into New
Orleans back into than other neighborhoods that tended
to be whiter.
What‘s being discussed online today and what‘s starting
seemingly be a source of anger is that the curfew only
really applies to mostly black neighborhoods and that
in wealthier parts of the city, parts of the city that
haven‘t seen big protest activity, that the curfew
isn‘t being enforced in those places and they can live
as usual.
City/Community Problems
Figure A.6: Example topic documents: City/Community Problems
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An Additional Case Study: A Beer Summit Follows “Police Acting Stupidly”
As an additional case study I offer the arrest of Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates on July
16, 2009, the outcome of which led to the White House Beer Summit featuring Gates, President
Obama, and arresting officer James Crowley.
The White House Beer Summit followed comments President Obama made during a White
House press conference on healthcare reform that drew attention to how Officer Crowley handled
his interaction with Professor Gates. “I don’t know – not having been there and not seeing all the
facts – what role race played in that, but I think it’s fair to say, number one, any of us would be
pretty angry; number two that the Cambridge police acted stupidly in arresting somebody when
there was already proof that they were in their own home”
The O’Reilly Factor picked up the story following these remarks. Guest host Monica Crowley
wondered whether President Obama should “have given say a more value-neutral statement” and if
he “sees things through the prism of race or perhaps his liberal ideology.” Instead of sticking with
his promise to “try and bring to America a post-racial era,” Crowley proposed that “[Obama] waited
[sic] unnecessarily and irresponsibly knee deep into racial politics.” Her comments, reflecting a
racially conservative view, suggest that President Obama was making too much about race. He
did not put forward a reasoned reaction to racial profiling by the police, as argued by one of The
Factor’s guests, but rather drew too heavily on his being a black man. Moreover, his comments did
not befit the office of the President of the United States.
Across four episodes, The Factor paired guests who justified the arrest with those viewing the
arrest as irresponsible, even reflecting racial bias. Factor hosts and guests justifying the arrest
argued that Gates should not have acted “belligerently.” As one guest advised, “You need to shut
up when you’re addressing a guy with a gun and a badge. And you need to be respectful, like
we all are, or should be when we deal with somebody who’s an officer of the law.” This, despite
his counterpart pointing out that “many African Americans have known the situation where police
officers feel like they have to win,” with officers feeling compelled to arrest blacks for even small
infractions.
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Most discussion, however, emphasized the racially conservative point that race was not a salient
factor in the arrest itself. It was Professor Gates’s behavior that mattered. He “had a chip on his
shoulder” and “at a heartbeat turned this into a racial incident” according to O’Reilly, disagreeing
with guest Geraldo Rivera’s proposition that race is a constantly important factor in interactions
between non-whites and the police. The view The Factor offered was that Gates’s being a black
man was irrelevant to how the event unfolded. President Obama, moreover, made a serious mistake
by calling attention to possible racial dynamics present in the event and needed a mea culpa.
Rachel Maddow and her guests provided a markedly different perspective reflecting racially
liberal themes. On two separate episodes, Maddow and guest Melissa Harris-Lacewell used the in-
cident to talk about race’s role in contemporary American politics. The first related to how the Re-
publican National Committee was using President Obama’s comments to fundraise. Both Maddow
and Harris-Lacewell speculated that the GOP was more interested in stoking “racial indignation
among [its] base” than in discussing “ideas and policy.” On a separate occasion, Harris-Lacewell
noted that “we had a little bit of a cheering section going on among progressive African American
scholars when we heard Barack Obama speak so forthrightly about what sounded like his clear
understanding of the anxious relationship between African Americans and the police.” From this
perspective the incident had clear racial implications. Professor Gates’s arrest opened up a path to
talk about criminal justice issues and offered a teachable moment for police forces to understand
how African Americans are taught to interact with the police.
Even when covering the same story, Maddow and O’Reilly incorporate race in different ways.
Although The Factor did more to present competing depictions of the arrest than did Maddow,
an unmistakable takeaway from watching the former is that race was not an important event fea-
ture. In line with a racially conservative perspective, claims to racial profiling or proposals that
blacks have meaningfully different interactions with police officers take a back seat to exhorta-
tions that simply being respectful and following orders will solve any issues citizens may have
with law enforcement. In contrast, Maddow’s viewers were shown yet another obstacle facing the
black community, reinforcing racially liberal themes. Moreover, not only were President Obama’s
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comments on the incident warranted, in contrast to reactions presented on O’Reilly comments on
Maddow suggested they did not go far enough. Obama had missed an opportunity to speak directly
to the black community’s concerns about issues in the criminal justice system.
Appendix to Chapter 3
Most Important Problem Results and Alternative Specifications
Table A.1: Relationship between Media Racial Discussion and Race as Most Important Problem
Race Only Race Plus
Maddow Coverage 8.150∗ 2.827∗
(2.771) (1.337)
O’Reilly Coverage −4.257 −1.848
(3.063) (1.777)
Independent −0.217∗ 0.114∗
(0.053) (0.027)
Republican −0.348∗ 0.230∗
(0.031) (0.016)
Age −0.006∗ 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.0004)
Female 0.132∗ 0.022
(0.029) (0.015)
College 0.064∗ −0.125∗
(0.030) (0.016)
Southerner 0.008 0.001
(0.032) (0.016)
Constant −2.730∗ −1.648∗
(0.408) (0.093)
Observations 79,317 79,317
Log Likelihood -3,874.608 -17,402.300
Akaike Inf. Crit. 7,961.216 35,016.600
Note: ∗p<0.05. Probit regression results with
standard errors in parentheses. Gallup data for
non-Hispanic Whites. Models include survey
fixed effects.
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Table A.2: Relationship between Media Racial Discussion and Placebo Most Important Problem
Evaluations
Environment Unemployment Abortion
Maddow Coverage −2.125 0.325 −2.598
(2.500) (1.036) (3.370)
O’Reilly Coverage −1.616 0.269 −3.988
(3.674) (1.574) (5.409)
Independent −0.517∗ −0.095∗ −0.111
(0.055) (0.021) (0.088)
Republican −0.888∗ −0.125∗ 0.245∗
(0.036) (0.012) (0.041)
Age −0.005∗ 0.006∗ −0.004∗
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.001)
Female −0.0002 0.053∗ 0.254∗
(0.027) (0.012) (0.039)
College 0.367∗ −0.238∗ 0.025
(0.027) (0.013) (0.039)
Southerner −0.154∗ −0.029∗ −0.124∗
(0.033) (0.013) (0.043)
Constant −1.500∗ −1.947∗ −2.070∗
(0.138) (0.108) (0.156)
Observations 79,317 79,317 79,317
Log Likelihood -4,578.968 -30,243.070 -2,215.246
Akaike Inf. Crit. 9,369.936 60,698.140 4,642.492
Note: ∗p<0.05. Probit regression results with standard errors in
parentheses. Gallup data for non-Hispanic Whites. Models include
survey fixed effects.
155
Table A.3: Relationship between Media Racial Discussion and Race as Most Important Problem,
Racial Differences
Race Only Race Plus Race Only Race Plus
Maddow Coverage 0.969 −5.169∗ 0.969 −5.169∗
(2.418) (1.740) (2.418) (1.740)
O’Reilly Coverage −3.980 −0.005 −3.980 −0.005
(3.228) (2.309) (3.228) (2.309)
Independent 0.013 0.108∗ 0.013 0.108∗
(0.041) (0.029) (0.041) (0.029)
Republican −0.476∗ −0.019 −0.476∗ −0.019
(0.043) (0.023) (0.043) (0.023)
Age −0.002∗ −0.002∗ −0.002∗ −0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.006 0.126∗ 0.006 0.126∗
(0.029) (0.019) (0.029) (0.019)
College 0.043 −0.210∗ 0.043 −0.210∗
(0.033) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024)
Southerner 0.067∗ 0.020 0.067∗ 0.020
(0.029) (0.020) (0.029) (0.020)
White −0.101 −0.040
(0.621) (0.191)
White*Maddow Coverage 7.181 7.996∗
(3.677) (2.195)
White*O’Reilly Coverage −0.277 −1.844
(4.450) (2.914)
White*Independent −0.230∗ 0.006
(0.067) (0.040)
White*Republican 0.128∗ 0.249∗
(0.053) (0.028)
White*Age −0.004∗ 0.004∗
(0.001) (0.001)
White*Female 0.126∗ −0.105∗
(0.041) (0.024)
White*College 0.021 0.085∗
(0.045) (0.029)
White*Southerner −0.059 −0.019
(0.043) (0.025)
Constant −2.629∗ −1.608∗ −2.629∗ −1.608∗
(0.468) (0.167) (0.468) (0.167)
Observations 21,780 21,780 101,097 101,097
Log Likelihood -4,494.416 -10,957.800 -8,369.024 -28,360.100
Akaike Inf. Crit. 9,200.832 22,127.610 17,162.050 57,144.210
Note: ∗p<0.05. Probit regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Gallup
data for non-Hispanic Whites. Models include survey fixed effects.
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Figure A.7: Probability of endorsing race as the most important problem by show attention to
race. Predicted probabilities generated from probit models for a white Republican with remaining
covariates held at sample means or modes The hashmarks provide the distribution of levels of
racial discussion, shaded by show.
Experimental Treatments
All participants first read a non-political story about interest rates, presented below. They were
then randomly assigned to the control, race-important, or race-denial treatments.
USA Today: Mortgage rates drop to lowest since election, but borrowers barely budge
The lowest mortgage interest rates since last November did little to encourage people to refinance
their home loans or take out a new loan to buy a home.
Total mortgage application volume rose just 0.1%, seasonally adjusted, last week from the
previous week, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA). Volume was nearly 22%
lower than a year ago.
A sharp drop in rates usually prompts homeowners to refinance, but those applications rose just
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2% for the week and are still down 40% from the same week one year ago, when rates were lower.
So many people have already refinanced at rock-bottom rates that the pool of potential applicants
is shrinking.
The average contract interest rate for 30-year fixed-rate mortgages with conforming loan bal-
ances of $424,100 or less decreased to 4.12 percent, from 4.14 percent, with points remaining
unchanged at 0.38, including the origination fee, for 80 percent loan-to-value ratio loans.
“Last week, mortgage rates dropped to their lowest level since the week of the November 2016
election,” said Mike Fratantoni, chief economist for the MBA.
Lower rates did nothing to spur home buyers because the drop was not nearly enough to offset
fast-rising home prices and a short supply of homes for sale. Mortgage applications to purchase a
home fell 2 percent for the week but remain nearly 10% higher than a year ago.
One sign that buyers are struggling increasingly with high home prices is the jump in adjustable
rate mortgage applications, which offer a lower interest rate. ARM volume now stands 13% higher
than a year ago. In addition, FHA loan applications to purchase a home are only up 4% from a
year ago. FHA loans are a favorite among young, first-time buyers with less money to put down
on a home.
Control Condition
USA Today: Bill Aims to Reform Policing Practices
Civil asset forfeiture law faces radical reform if a bill in the state legislature passes.
These private property seizures gained traction in the 1980s when law enforcement agencies
used them to go after the fruits and tools of organized drug traffickers. Laws allowed agencies to
seize all kinds of property, from commercial real estate to boats and jewelry, that they believed was
used in crimes or obtained with crime proceeds.
But well-publicized abuses of the process led to a long-running reform movement among ac-
tivists on both the federal and state levels.
Asset forfeiture turns the common concept of due process on its head: Police can seize property
even when its owner is not even charged, much less convicted of, a crime police suspect is related
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to the property. Then the burden falls on the owner to prove their belongings are not criminally
tainted.
The bill would alter some fundamental aspects of current property seizure practice. For one,
forfeitures would have to be tied to a criminal conviction, and even then, the forfeiture would have
to be proportional to the offense, meaning, for example, a semi-truck couldn’t be taken because
the driver had sold a personal amount of marijuana to another driver inside the cab.
Race-important Condition
USA Today: Bill Aims to Reform Racially Discriminatory Policing Practices
Civil asset forfeiture law, an effective crime-fighting tool to some, an instance of racial discrimi-
nation for others, faces radical reform if a bill in the state legislature passes.
These private property seizures gained traction in the 1980s when law enforcement agencies
used them to go after the fruits and tools of organized drug traffickers. Laws allowed agencies to
seize all kinds of property, from commercial real estate to boats and jewelry, that they believed was
used in crimes or obtained with crime proceeds.
But well-publicized abuses of the process led to a long-running reform movement among ac-
tivists on both the federal and state levels.
Asset forfeiture turns the common concept of due process on its head: Police can seize property
even when its owner is not even charged, much less convicted of, a crime police suspect is related
to the property. Then the burden falls on the owner to prove their belongings are not criminally
tainted.
Many point to racial disparities in the policy’s application. Although information is limited, in
400 federal court cases where people who challenged seizures and received some money back, the
majority were black, Hispanic or another minority.
“Civil asset forfeiture perpetuates racial discrimination in the criminal justice system. Re-
forming this practice makes sure skin color does not shape one’s access to the due process rights
the Constitution provides,” said Jake Miller, the head of the state ACLU chapter, an organization
supporting the reform effort.
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“This policy is just one example of how the criminal justice system is stacked against minori-
ties. This bill is the first step toward addressing these pervasive racial biases.”
The bill would alter some fundamental aspects of current property seizure practice. For one,
forfeitures would have to be tied to a criminal conviction, and even then, the forfeiture would have
to be proportional to the offense, meaning, for example, a semi-truck couldn’t be taken because
the driver had sold a personal amount of marijuana to another driver inside the cab.
Race-denial Condition
USA Today: Bill Aims to Reform “Racially Discriminatory” Policing Practices
Civil asset forfeiture law, an effective crime-fighting tool to some, an instance of racial discrimi-
nation for others, faces radical reform if a bill in the state legislature passes.
These private property seizures gained traction in the 1980s when law enforcement agencies
used them to go after the fruits and tools of organized drug traffickers. Laws allowed agencies to
seize all kinds of property, from commercial real estate to boats and jewelry, that they believed was
used in crimes or obtained with crime proceeds.
But well-publicized abuses of the process led to a long-running reform movement among ac-
tivists on both the federal and state levels.
Asset forfeiture turns the common concept of due process on its head: Police can seize property
even when its owner is not even charged, much less convicted of, a crime police suspect is related
to the property. Then the burden falls on the owner to prove their belongings are not criminally
tainted.
Many point to racial disparities in the policy’s application. Although information is limited, in
400 federal court cases where people who challenged seizures and received some money back, the
majority were black, Hispanic or another minority.
“Civil asset forfeiture does not involve racial discrimination. Skin color does not shape one’s
access to the due process rights the Constitution provides, and reforming this practice does not
change that,” said Jake Miller, the head of the state Association of Chiefs of Police, an organization
opposing the reform effort.
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“Opponents of this policy are trying to make this about race when it’s not. They’re using race
as a distraction to get support for a bill that removes an effective policing practice.”
The bill would alter some fundamental aspects of current property seizure practice. For one,
forfeitures would have to be tied to a criminal conviction, and even then, the forfeiture would have
to be proportional to the offense, meaning, for example, a semi-truck couldn’t be taken because
the driver had sold a personal amount of marijuana to another driver inside the cab.
Appendix to Chapter 4
Question Wording and Descriptive Statistics
Past discrimination: “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make
it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.”
Deserve less: “Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.”
Try hard: “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try
harder they could be just as well off as whites.” (Reverse Coded)
Special favors (Not asked in 2016 CCAP): “Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities over-
came prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.”
(Reverse Coded)
Special favors (2008 CCAP version): “Many other minority groups have overcome prejudice and
worked their way up. African Americans should do the same without any special favors.” (Reverse
Coded)
Responses in 4 of the 5 surveys are recorded on 5-point Likert-type scales anchored by strongly
agree and strongly disagree. The VOTER Survey differed, with responses recorded on 4-point
agree-disagree scales that also included a “don’t know” response. “Don’t knows” were recoded as
midpoints on the scale to approximate the 5 category scale. Descriptive statistics for each scale in
each data collection used in the main text analyses, grouped by party, are presented in Table A.4.
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Table A.4: Descriptives for Racial Resentment Measures
ANES 1992-1994 CCAP 2008 CCAP 2012 VOTER Survey 2012-2016 CCAP 2016
1992 1994 March October December 2011 March August 2012 2016 June Nov-Dec
Mean Democrats 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.52 0.49 0.40 0.38 0.36
Republicans 0.65 0.68 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.74 0.73
SD Democrats 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.29
Republicans 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.21
Cronbach’s α Democrats 0.75 0.74 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.86 0.85
Republicans 0.65 0.56 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.70 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.69
Note: Statistics come from non-Hispanic white respondents completing both waves.
Descriptive Analyses: A Polarizing Political Context Coincides with Polarizing Racial Attitudes
Here I show descriptively that the connection between whites’ racial attitudes and partisanship
has strengthened considerably over the past three decades. Importantly, however, the pattern of
changes in these variables indicates that partisanship should be considered as a potential causal
force. First, using data from the face-to-face interviews in the 1986-2016 ANES surveys I present
means for racial resentment broken down by party in Figure A.8. Between 1986 and 1990, little
difference existed between Democrats and Republicans.14 But starting in 1992 the partisan gap
grows in almost every passing year. It increases to 0.07 points in 1992, hits 0.15 points in 2004,
and reaches a current peak of 0.28 points in 2016. Before 2016 most of this change came from
Republicans becoming increasingly racially resentful. Republicans averaged a 0.61 on the scale
in 1986, and 0.70 come 2016. Between 1986 and 2012, Democrats averaged between a 0.54 and
0.57, but dropped an astonishing 0.14 points between 2012 and 2016 to 0.41.15 Between 1986
and 2016, the correlation between the ANES’s 7-point partisanship measure and racial resentment
strengthened from a paltry 0.06 to a robust 0.49.16
Not only are the means moving apart, but the distributions are changing as well. This is a
critically important point. It is not that racially resentful erstwhile Democrats and racially sympa-
thetic erstwhile Republicans have sorted themselves out of the “wrong” party, therefore increasing
14I include leaners with strong and weak partisans.
15Since 2008, similar partisan gaps have grown on affect and interracial dating measures (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck,
2018).
16This relationship implicates both Southern and non-Southern whites. For Southerners the correlation changes
from -0.05 to 0.38. For non-Southerners it increases from 0.11 to 0.51.
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Figure A.8: Whites’ average racial resentment levels by party affiliation and the correlation be-
tween the two. Four-item index scaled 0-1, with higher values denoting more racial resentment.
Face-to-face interviews from the American National Election Studies.
the correlation between partisanship and racial attitudes. Instead, partisans are moving toward the
scale’s extremes over time. Figure A.9 breaks down the distribution of Democrats’ and Republi-
cans’ racial resentment scores, comparing when the items first appear in the American National
Election Study with more recent readings. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, little substantive
difference existed between partisans.17
Things change in the 2000s as Republicans increasingly move rightward. In 2004, the most
resentful three categories contain 25% of Republicans, up from 16% in 1988. This increases to
28% in 2016 with 14% scoring at the measure’s maximum, making it the modal category.
White Democrats’ attitudes were much more stable until Barack Obama’s second term in of-
fice. The substantial drop in the group’s average level of racial resentment coincided with a large
distributional shift. The least resentful three categories contained 8% of Democrats in 2012, but
24% come 2016. Moreover, the modal white Democrat now places at the scale’s minimum (12%),
17Racial resentment’s distribution does not, for instance, clearly differ by party in 1988 (χ216 = 25.499, p = 0.06).
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Figure A.9: Racial resentment’s distribution among whites by party in select years. Bars indicate
proportion of party identifiers with given level of racial resentment. Four-item index scaled 0-1,
with higher values denoting more racial resentment. Face-to-face interviews from the American
National Election Studies.
while only 2% did in 2012. Not only are partisans’ evaluations of blacks increasingly distinct, but
their racial attitudes are becoming more extreme.
These changes do not accord with a story where racial attitudes are consistently more central,
and thus a more likely causal force, than partisanship. In this same time period, partisanship’s
distribution changes little. Between 1988 and 2016, the number of whites identifying as any type
of Democrat decreases by 1.5 percentage points and the percentage of white Republican identifiers
increased by 5 points. Similarly, partisans are not becoming markedly more extreme. Neither party
sees more than a 4 percentage point increase in strong partisans in this 28-year window. It makes
little sense to consider a less stable construct (racial resentment) as consistently causally prior to a
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more stable one (partisanship).
Comparing Relative Magnitudes over Time
The main text references an omnibus model stacking the data sets together to assess whether
the impact of partisanship on racial attitudes is significantly greater in the Obama era than the
Clinton Era. These results are reported in Table A.5. The substantive picture is the same as the
results reported in the text. What this analysis offers is insight into whether changes in the effects
of partisanship and racial resentment change across data collections. As one indication, the second
row compares the effect of partisanship measured in the 2008 CCAP relative to partisanship in the
1992-1994 ANES. The 6 point increase in magnitude is statistically significant (p < 0.05). Simi-
larly, moving to the eighth row and second column, the near 8 point decrease in racial resentment’s
influence between data collections is not significant (p > 0.05).
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Table A.5: Relationship between Partisanship and Racial Attitudes
Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 0.041 0.853∗
(0.021) (0.025)
Partisanshipt−1*CCAP 2008 0.061∗ 0.064∗
(0.022) (0.025)
Partisanshipt−1*CCAP 2012: March 0.034 0.069∗
(0.036) (0.033)
Partisanshipt−1*CCAP 2012: August 0.088∗ 0.082∗
(0.036) (0.031)
Partisanshipt−1*VOTER Survey 2012-2016 0.106∗ −0.061
(0.027) (0.032)
Partisanshipt−1*CCAP 2016 0.045∗ 0.067∗
(0.023) (0.026)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.600∗ 0.127∗
(0.031) (0.041)
Racial Resentmentt−1*CCAP 2008 0.139∗ −0.079
(0.033) (0.041)
Racial Resentmentt−1*CCAP 2012: March 0.211∗ −0.061
(0.042) (0.049)
Racial Resentmentt−1*CCAP 2012: August 0.192∗ −0.095∗
(0.056) (0.048)
Racial Resentmentt−1*VOTER Survey 2012-2016 0.237∗ 0.014
(0.040) (0.049)
Racial Resentmentt−1*CCAP 2016 0.194∗ −0.090∗
(0.033) (0.041)
CCAP 2008 −0.123∗ 0.001
(0.022) (0.026)
CCAP 2012: March −0.147∗ −0.014
(0.028) (0.029)
CCAP 2012: August −0.162∗ 0.001
(0.033) (0.032)
VOTER Survey 2012-2016 −0.242∗ 0.025
(0.026) (0.031)
CCAP 2016 −0.175∗ 0.012
(0.022) (0.026)
Constant 0.243∗ 0.011
(0.022) (0.025)
Observations 25,065 25,065
R2 0.672 0.815
Residual Std. Error 0.153 0.146
Note: ∗p<0.05
OLS regression results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models use population weights.
Variables scaled 0-1. The 1992-1994 ANES is the baseline data set.
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Standardizing Variables to Address Relative Influence
The main text analyses offer two perspectives on the relative influence for each predisposition.
The first focuses on estimating the difference in theoretical maximum influence indicated by a min-
max change in a predisposition by using a seemingly unrelated regression strategy. But evidence
from such comparisons is limited in part due to differences in the variance of the related constructs.
The second addresses the sizes of the sample these differences relate as to whether these effects
are understated. Even so, some may argue these comparisons do not effectively shed light on
each predisposition’s relative importance. A third way to address relative influence comes from
using standardized coefficients. While methodologists disagree about their utility (cf. King, 1986;
Luskin, 1991), standardizing variables to account for each’s distribution can shed light on how
much variation in the outcome variable is related to variation in the explanatory variable (Luskin,
1991; Gelman and Hill, 2007).
Table A.6 reports the results for the main text models that operationalize racial attitudes with
racial resentment after standardizing all variables and estimating the models using OLS. This pro-
cedure de-means each variable and then divides it by its standard deviation. In support of my hy-
pothesis that partisanship should be more substantively meaningful in its relationship with racial
attitudes in political contexts privileging it over other concerns, the results from all models ex-
cept those from 1992-1994 ANES reveal a larger relative influence for partisanship than racial
attitudes.18 This is additional evidence that attitude change rather than sorting best explains the
dynamics between racial attitudes and partisanship in party-centric political contexts.
Table A.7 extends these analyses to the differential affect measure. Again, this takes the differ-
ence between whites’ feelings about blacks and their feelings about whites such that higher values
denote more negative evaluations of blacks than whites. The results here again point to attitude
change rather than sorting as best characterizing the more party-centric political context covered by
the VOTER Survey and 2016 CCAP. Partisanship is about 5 times as influential as racial attitudes
18In all cases but the 1992-1994 ANES and the March wave of the 2012 CCAP, partisanship’s effect is reliably
different than racial resentment’s (p < .05).
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Table A.7: Relationship between Partisanship and Affect Differential, Standardized Variables
ANES 1992-1994 VOTER Survey 2012-2016 CCAP 2016
Affect Differencet Partisanshipt Affect Differencet Partisanshipt Affect Differencet Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 −0.004 0.822∗ 0.189∗ 0.821∗ 0.156∗ 0.919∗
(0.042) (0.023) (0.026) (0.018) (0.017) (0.008)
Affect Differencet−1 0.559∗ 0.016 0.494∗ 0.034∗ 0.554∗ 0.030∗
(0.062) (0.023) (0.032) (0.015) (0.021) (0.008)
Constant 0.017 0.001 0.022 0.063∗ 0.025 0.004
(0.041) (0.027) (0.025) (0.017) (0.015) (0.007)
Observations 577 577 5,720 5,720 8,120 8,120
R2 0.294 0.648 0.317 0.687 0.378 0.851
Residual Std. Error 0.874 0.599 0.821 0.443 0.708 0.316
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.
as measured by differential group affect.
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Addressing Measurement Error with Structural Equation Models
In the main text I note that measurement error may potentially affect my conclusions in part by
influencing measure stabilities. Here, I replicate the main text analyses using structural equation
models as a way to tame measurement error. To facilitate interpretation, I separately report the
measurement model results, attitude stabilities, and cross-lagged effects. Finally, to make the
comparison as direct as possible I focus only on the respondents included in the main text analysis.
Rather than using full information maximum likelihood or some other estimation technique that
allows for missingness in my model, I restrict the data to the same respondent set. I then estimate
all models via maximum likelihood using the lavaan R package (version 0.5) (Rosseel, 2012).
I estimate the same model for all panels. For the measurement component, I freely estimate
the factor loadings for each racial resentment item, but constrain the loadings for each item to be
equal at t−1 and t. This fixes the meaning of racial resentment over time. To identify these latent
variables I therefore set each’s metric to unit variance. I also correlate the item error variances
over time (e.g., past discrimination at t−1 and past discrimination at t) and between items sharing
the same response formate (e.g., try hard and special favors are reverse coded). Because it is
a single item, partisanship’s metric is identified by fixing the single item loading to 1. Finally,
the covariances between partisanship and racial resentment are also fixed over time. Table A.8
presents the measurement model components of the SEM results for each data set used in the main
text analyses, including the factor loadings and fit indices. The fit results are adequate, although
not ideal (Brown, 2015).
Tables A.9 and A.10 contain the results from the structural relationships in the cross lagged
SEMs. The stability estimates in Table A.9 affirm that each predisposition is highly stable, and
also indicate that partisanship is more persistent. But this is not to say they do not change. The
results in Table A.10 again support my argument that the relationship between partisanship and
racial attitudes is dynamic, and that partisanship becomes more influential in contexts privileging
it above other predispositions. In only one case (December-March in the 2012 CCAP) do the
substantive conclusions differ from the main text results. Here there is no evidence supporting the
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Table A.8: SEM Measurement Model Results
ANES 1992-1994 CCAP 2008 CCAP 2012: March CCAP 2012: August 2012-2016 VOTER Survey CCAP 2016
Special Favors 0.763 0.695 0.707 0.698 0.810 —
(0.037) (0.008) (0.029) (0.025) (0.009) —
Deserve Less 0.386 0.673 0.597 0.618 0.719 0.724
(0.036) (0.008) (0.027) (0.024) (0.008) (0.010)
Try Hard 0.728 0.716 0.722 0.703 0.801 0.933
(0.039) (0.009) (0.031) (0.027) (0.009) (0.010)
Past Discrimination 0.416 0.764 0.749 0.711 0.817 0.844
(0.042) (0.009) (0.032) (0.028) (0.010) (0.009)
Partisanship 1 1 1 1 1 1
(—) (—) (—) (—) (—) (—)
χ2 172.628 4193.889 460.871 412.831 1932.661 5887.985
DF 30 28 28 28 28 15
CFI 0.932 0.933 0.923 0.933 0.960 0.900
TLI 0.898 0.893 0.877 0.893 0.936 0.812
SRMR 0.106 0.183 0.200 0.189 0.158 0.235
RMSEA [90% CI] 0.09 [0.077, 0.103] 0.13 [0.126, 0.133] 0.146 [0.134, 0.158] 0.135 [0.124, 0.147] 0.106 [0.102, 0.11] 0.22 [0.215, 0.224]
N 592 8866 726 751 6014 8116
Entries denote parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Estimated via maximum likelihood. Factor variances for racial resentment and partisanship item loading
fixed to 1 to identify the model. Loadings constrained to equality over time.
racial attitude influence hypothesis, with the effect imprecisely estimated (p = .104).
Table A.9: Stability Coefficients for Partisanship and Racial Resentment
ANES 1992-1994 CCAP 2008 CCAP 2012: March CCAP 2012: August 2012-2016 VOTER Survey CCAP 2016
Partisanship 0.845 0.794 0.928 0.908 0.941 0.923 0.947 0.914 0.852 0.808 0.941 0.915
(0.026) (0.016) (0.005) (0.002) (0.015) (0.007) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Racial Resentment 0.790 0.619 0.879 0.639 0.977 0.684 0.997 0.684 0.986 0.671 0.906 0.656
(0.053) (0.026) (0.014) (0.007) (0.051) (0.021) (0.047) (0.020) (0.017) (0.008) (0.014) (0.006)
Note: ∗p<0.05
Entries are estimates from cross-lagged structural equation models estimated via maximum likelihood with standard errors in parentheses. Estimates
from completely standardized solution included in italics. Measurement results reported in Table A.8.
Table A.10: Cross-Lagged Effects of Partisanship and Racial Resentment
ANES 1992-1994 CCAP 2008 CCAP 2012: March CCAP 2012: August 2012-2016 VOTER Survey CCAP 2016
Partisanshipt−1 0.068 0.017 0.617∗ 0.158∗ 0.582∗ 0.135∗ 0.674∗ 0.152∗ 0.672∗ 0.152∗ 0.470∗ 0.117∗
−→ Racial Resentmentt (0.143) (0.037) (0.040) (0.010) (0.154) (0.036) (0.148) (0.034) (0.051) (0.012) (0.041) (0.010)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.023∗ 0.068∗ 0.004∗ 0.010∗ 0.008 0.025 0.005 0.014 0.023∗ 0.065∗ 0.005∗ 0.015∗
−→ Partisanshipt (0.009) (0.027) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.005) (0.016) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005)
Note: ∗p<0.05
Entries are estimates from cross-lagged structural equation models estimated via maximum likelihood with standard errors in parentheses. Estimates
from completely standardized solution included in italics. Measurement models reported in Table A.8.
Furthermore, I can address relative magnitudes through a completely standardized solution.
These results, italicized entries in Tables A.9 and A.10, demonstrate that partisanship’s temporal
influence consistently surpasses racial attitudes’ in this later period. Interpreted as the standard
deviation change in the outcome produced by a standard deviation change in the predictor, parti-
sanship is 2.5 to 15 times as influential as racial attitudes in the relationship. The conclusions drawn
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from the main text models receive additional support even after addressing potential differences in
measure reliability introduced by measurement error.
Analyses Incorporating Additional Core Attitudes
To address the possibility that attitudes correlated with partisanship but omitted from my model
explain my findings, I include other core predispositions into the main text models. These include
culture war (Goren and Chapp, 2017) and economic orientations, as well as immigration attitudes
(Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015). Unfortunately not all data sets contain measures for these orienta-
tions captured in the same wave as partisanship and racial resentment, which would cloud tem-
poral comparisons if entered into the models. Nor are operationalizations consistent across data
sets, but as best as possible my coding follows existing work (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Goren
and Chapp, 2017).19 Despite these limits my results speak to whether it’s partisanship and racial
19The operationalizations for each measure are as follows. In the 1992-1994 ANES I operationalization culture war
attitudes using the same four items as (Goren and Chapp, 2017). One item relates to abortion: “There has been some
discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view?
You can just tell me the number of the opinion you choose.” With responses: (1) By law, abortion should never be
permitted. (2) The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the woman’s life is in danger. (3)
The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only after the
need for the abortion has been clearly established. (4) By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion
as a matter of personal choice. Two items asking whether they “favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against
job discrimination” and “think homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the United States Armed Forces or don’t
you think so”, with responses recorded on four-point (strongly) agree/disagree scales. Finally, I included a feeling
thermometer for “Gay men and lesbians; that is, homosexuals.” I code each to capture conservative positions and
combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.46, sd = 0.28, α = 0.75). For immigration opinion, I combine 5 items. The
first asks “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United
States to live should be increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is
now?” The next three record responses on four point scales from extremely to not at all likely. These ask how likely is
it that “the growing number of Hispanics will improve our culture with new ideas and customs,” “cause higher taxes
due to more demands for public services,” and “take jobs away from people already here”. Finally, I include a feeling
thermometer for illegal immigrants. I key each to capture conservative positions and combine them into a 0-1 scale
(mean = 0.62, sd = 0.18, α = 0.65).
In the 2008 CCAP, I measure anti-immigration attitude with an item asking respondents if “Illegal immigrants
should be arrested and deported as quickly as possible, regardless of their circumstances” or “Illegal immigrants now
living in the U.S. should be allowed to become citizens if they pay a fine and meet other requirements.” I key this
to indicate anti-immigrant opinion. I capture culture war attitudes with two items, one concerning abortion’s legality
(responses: Abortion should always be legal = 0; abortion should be legal with some restrictions; abortion should only
be legal in special circumstances.; abortion should be illegal. It should never be allowed = 1) and the other asking
whether one supports civil unions for gay couples (responses strongly favor = 0, strongly oppose = 1). I code each to
capture opposition and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.46, sd = 0.34, α = 0.71).
In the 2012 CCAP, I measure anti-immigration attitude with 3 items asking respondents if “illegal immigrants make
a contribution to American society or are a drain,” if “it should be easier or harder for foreigners to immigrate to the
172
attitudes themselves, or related factors, that explain my results.
The conclusions drawn from the main text models persist even after accounting for these other
presumptively fundamental predispositions. Table A.11 demonstrates that partisanship still has
a substantively and statistically significant impact on racial attitudes in a party-centric era. In no
case does partisanship no longer explain attitude change in the Obama era or 2016 election models.
When conclusions do change they come from the effect racial attitudes have on party switching.
The March reinterviews for the 2012 CCAP and the 2016 CCAP analyses each suggested that
racial attitudes motivated sorting. Incorporating additional core attitudes introduces additional
imprecision into the estimates, dropping the results from conventional levels of statistical signif-
icance. That all the explanatory variables are highly correlated suggests multicollinearity could
explain the imprecision, but even then the substantive impact appears negligible for at least the
2016 election patterns.
US legally than it is currently” and if they “favor or oppose providing a legal way for illegal immigrants already in the
United States to become U.S. citizens?” I key each to capture opposition and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean =
0.47, sd = 0.31, α = 0.73). Culture war attitudes are operationalized with 3 items, one on abortion’s legality (responses
legal in all cases, legal/illegal in some cases, illegal in all cases), one asking whether someone favors or opposes gay
marriage (responses favor or oppose), and a feeling thermometer asking about ones feelings towards gays. I code each
to capture negative attitudes or opposition and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.44, sd = 0.31, α = 0.75).
Finally, I measure economic orientations with an item asking if “there is too much or too little regulation of business
by the government?” with responses recorded as too much (coded = 1), about right (0.5), or too little (0).
I use the same operationalization scheme as the 2012 CCAP for the VOTER survey, each again scaled 0-1 denoting
more conservative attitudes (anti-immigration attitude: mean = 0.58, sd = 0.32, α = 0.72; culture war attitudes: mean
= 0.53, sd = 0.31, α = 0.76).
Finally, for the 2016 CCAP I operationalize culture war attitudes with 3 item. One for whether people “have a
favorable or an unfavorable opinion of” gays and lesbians (responses: very favorable = 0, very unfavorable = 1), and
two asking whether they favor or oppose “repealing a woman’s right to have an abortion” (responses: strongly favor
= 0, strongly oppose = 1), and “allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally” (responses: strongly favor = 0, strongly
oppose = 1). I then combine these items into a 0-1 scale where higher scores correspond with conservative positions
(mean = 0.37, sd = 0.34, α = 0.81). I use a similar set for anti-immigration attitudes. One item includes favorability
evaluations of illegal immigrants (responses: very favorable = 0, very unfavorable = 1), and two asking whether they
favor or oppose “building a wall along the Mexican border” (responses: strongly oppose = 0, strongly favor = 1)
and “providing a legal way for illegal immigrants already in the United States to become U.S. citizens” (responses:
strongly favor = 0, strongly oppose = 1). Likewise, I combine these items into a 0-1 scale with higher scores denoting
anti-immigrant attitudes (mean = 0.56, sd = 0.35, α = 0.83).
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What’s interesting, too, is the relationships between these additional attitudes and racial re-
sentment. In all cases one or more of these orientations explains racial attitude change, but to
my knowledge no extant work suggests why these relationships should exist. Most likely, as with
partisanship, these attitudes motivate selection into certain information environments where, upon
encountering information on race, individuals then update their attitudes to maintain belief system
coherence. The interrelationships between these attitudes are interesting and other work should
consider investigating them in greater detail in future work. But the point remains: my account
that the relationship between racial attitudes and partisanship is dynamic, with partisanship shaping
racial attitudes, holds.
Analyses with Additional Party-Centric Era Panels
I also conducted additional analyses relating racial resentment and partisanship in other data
collections to demonstrate that the effect I find for partisanship on racial attitudes does not come
from the data collections used in the main text analyses or the specific time periods employed.
Here, I focus on the 2006 and 2010 waves of the 2006-2008-2010 General Social Survey (GSS)
panel, the 2008-2012 CCAP panel, and the 2010 and 2014 waves of the 2010-2012-2014 Cooper-
ative Congressional Election Study panel.20 These data shed light on different parts of President
Obama’s tenure in office, including reactions to his seeking the Democratic Party’s nomination
(GSS) and reactions to his first term (CCAP). Similarly, the GSS and CCES shed light on whether
presidential election years uniquely privilege partisanship in the relationship, or if lower salience
midterm elections still see similar patterns.
Importantly, these panels vary in their operationalization of racial resentment. Only the CCAP
contains the full four-item set. The CCES contains just two items (special favors and past discrim-
ination) and the GSS contains a single item (special favors) to which I add other items based on
prior work (cf. Kinder and Chudy, 2016; Tesler, 2016).21 All analyses again focus on non-Hispanic
20I also considered other panels including the 2000-2004, 2004-2006, and 2008-2009-2010 ANES and the 2006-
2012 Portraits of American Life Study. They unfortunately do not contain sufficient sample sizes, suitable items, or
measured racial attitudes at different times temporally than partisanship which affects any analyses.
21These additional items are: “On the average, African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than White
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Table A.12: Relationship between Whites’ Partisanship and Racial Resentment in additional data
collections
GSS 2006-2010 CCAP 2008-2012 CCES 2010-2014
Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 0.130∗ 0.761∗ 0.119∗ 0.815∗ 0.107∗ 0.858∗
(0.035) (0.039) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.521∗ 0.057 0.748∗ 0.105∗ 0.820∗ 0.100∗
(0.049) (0.051) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016)
Constant 0.235∗ 0.084∗ 0.118∗ 0.031∗ 0.050∗ −0.005
(0.033) (0.035) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
Observations 331 331 2,204 2,204 7,815 7,815
R2 0.410 0.597 0.642 0.770 0.665 0.826
Residual Std. Error 0.176 0.208 0.165 0.177 0.169 0.139
Note:∗p<0.05. OLS regression results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.
whites. Further, because the GSS conducted face-to-face interviews, the analyses using these focus
only on those respondents interviewed by a consistently white or non-white interviewer in 2006
and 2010.22
Table A.12 shows that the results from these analyses reflect the results presented in the main
text. In each model lagged partisanship has a substantive and statistically significant impact on
racial attitudes (p < 0.05). Lagged racial resentment similarly shapes subsequent partisanship in
two of three analyses.23 Moreover, while these lagged effects not statistically distinguishable, par-
people. Do you think these differences are mainly due to discrimination?” and “On the average, African Americans
have worse jobs, income, and housing than White people. Do you think these differences are because most African
Americans just don’t have the motivation or will power to pull themselves out of poverty?” Responses to each were
recorded as Yes/No, with disagreeing to the first and agreeing with the second coded as racially resentful responses.
The last item takes the difference between respondents’ ratings of whites and blacks on a 7-point scale asking them to
rate each group as hardworking or lazy. This operationalization makes an adequate scale: α 2006 = 0.62 and 2010 =
0.63.
22The CCAP and CCES again relied on YouGov’s online panel.
23Interestingly, I fail to find a significant bivariate relationship between racial resentment and partisanship between
2006 and 2010 in the GSS. Tesler (Tesler, 2016) reports results finding a significant influence, including a larger coef-
ficient estimate, in a model incorporating additional covariates. The most likely reason I find different results comes
from my attempt to hold constant variation in the interview context to address potential variation in racial attitude
responses from interviewer effects (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). This, combined with focusing solely on respondents
without missing partisanship and racial resentment in both waves, drops my effective sample to 331 compared with
Tesler’s (Tesler, 2016) reported 581 observations. The results disparity appears to come from missingness related to
the racial background of respondents’ third wave interviewers. Eliminating the restriction that respondents be inter-
viewed by a consistently white or non-white interviewer does nothing to affect the reported results among those for
whom these data are recorded. Ignoring interviewer race and only looking at complete cases for 2006 and 2010 parti-
sanship and racial resentment again supports my argument that party matters, but also recovers a sorting effect similar
to (Tesler, 2016).
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tisanship appears the most substantively meaningful. These estimates reflect variation along the
range of the measure so if cases are unevenly distributed then the estimates may overestimate the
measure’s influence. That similar amounts of whites place at the ends of the partisanship measure
makes these differences more substantively consequential in light of racial resentment’s skewed
distribution. Few people place at racial resentment’s minimum in any data collection making the
coefficient estimates speak to an unlikely comparison given the data (for a similar argument on
relative effect sizes, see Goren and Chapp, 2017). For example, the CCAP and CCES results
indicate that 46-47% of white respondents, those identifying as strong partisans, separate by an
average of 11-12 percentage points in racial resentment. In sharp contrast, while a similar dif-
ference manifests between those scoring at racial resentment’s poles, this group makes up 22%
of CCAP respondents and 35% in the CCES. With between a third to over twice again as many
people potentially implicated in aligning their racial attitudes with their partisanship, the relation-
ship between partisanship and racial attitudes appears to be better characterized by people attitude
change than party switching. These conclusions are further supported by results from models using
standardized variables. Similarly, including immigration, and culture war attitude does not affect
the conclusions suggested by the results in Table A.12’s third through sixth columns.24
Investigating Obama’s Role
Some existing work suggests President Obama was central to the connection between racial
attitudes and partisan change. Specifically, those with more negative (positive) racial attitudes
are more likely to evaluate Obama negatively (positively) and change their partisanship or racial
attitudes accordingly (e.g., Tesler, 2013, 2016). It could therefore be the case that the effects I
find in the main text and supplemental analyses are solely attributable to Obama and by missing
this connection my argument about partisanship’s influence is incomplete. Even the 2016 CCAP
analyses may feature the imprint of a two-term black president.
24Unfortunately the GSS’s ballot assignment halves my effective sample size when including culture war attitudes,
with the case loss substantially decreasing the estimates’ precision. But the results are still in the expected direction in
each.
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However, while Obama may be potentially influential as a signal of racial progress that sug-
gests racial discrimination is over and thus motivates respondents to double down on denying
discrimination, or as a positive exemplar who highlights the obstacles black Americans face, it
seems unlikely that he alone explains the patterns observed. First, from a theoretical perspective
these arguments suggest that his election and administration created a shock to which people re-
acted. This implies that attitude change or sorting should occur largely in the early Obama years
as people become used to these new political realities. But if Obama alone mattered, the patterns
I find during his second term or the 2016 election make less sense. That partisanship’s estimated
effect remains fairly consistent across models spanning different periods of Obama’s time in office
suggests a more general pattern. It seems a richer theoretical account emphasizes the broader infor-
mation environment, and how partisanship influences interpretations of it, rather than privileging
distinct stimuli. This is certainly not to say that Obama did not matter for shaping individuals’
political thinking; that evidence is substantial (Tesler, 2016). Rather, I modify this slightly to note
that he was one piece of a larger, party-centric context that featured many potentially race-related
stimuli to which people could respond, a feature particularly characteristic of his second term.
Acknowledging this provides for a richer picture of the connection between politics and race.25
Second, identifying exhaustive causal mediators requires considering other factors correlated
with evaluations of Obama that could explain their connection to the relationship between par-
tisanship and racial attitudes that encourages changing one or the other. This is not to say that
considering possible attitudinal mechanisms connecting partisanship and racial attitudes is not im-
portant. It is by providing insight into why these relationships exist. Rather, analyses can suggest
possible paths for influence and then incorporate how sensitive these paths are to unaccounted for
factors that violate assumptions required to claim the proposed mediator exhausts possible mecha-
nisms (see Imai et al., 2011; Acharya, Blackwell and Sen, 2016). Obama evaluations may matter,
25Indeed, the descriptive patterns presented in the main text indicate that the largest polarization in racial attitudes
came during President Obama’s second term. If Obama alone mattered for this shift it seems like this change should
have happened during his first term in office. But this latter period saw the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement
and increased attention to police brutality and the persistence of racial discrimination, as well as Donald Trump’s pres-
idential campaign. These movements, and the media attention they generated, offered information to which partisans
could, and seemingly did, respond.
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but they matter alongside other potentially unmeasured factors.
To demonstrate, the panels in Figure A.10 provide the estimates and confidence intervals for
a mediation analysis following the Baron-Kenny regression procedure (Baron and Kenny, 1986)
using the 2008-2012 CCAP and the 2012-2016 VOTER Survey.26 The total effect result corre-
sponds with the regression results reported above and in the main text (e.g., partisanshipt−1 on
racial attitudest). The average direct effect (ADE) results denote the estimated cross-lagged effect
for partisanship or racial attitudes after incorporating evaluations of Barack Obama.27 Finally, the
average causal mediation effect (ACME) signifies the portion of the relationship between partisan-
ship or racial attitudes and the other outcome mediated by Obama evaluations.
Comparing the total effects with the ACME offers evidence for the mediating influence of
Obama evaluations. Figure A.10 shows that whites’ feelings about Obama help explain the rela-
tionship between partisanship and racial attitudes. But they are not the whole story. Lagged parti-
sanship and racial attitudes still have statistically and substantively significant direct influences on
the respective outcome, evidence indicating that other mechanisms are at work.
These results, however, are only part of the account. The panels in Figure A.11 contain results
from sensitivity analyses for the preceding outcomes. They speak to how much the ACME changes
given levels of confounding by unobservables. The approach relates the proportion of variation in
the mediator (Obama evaluations) and the outcome (racial attitudes or partisanship) explained by
the confounder to the estimated ACME (Imai et al., 2011). Specifically, I hypothesize unobserved
confounding to affect the mediator and outcome in opposite ways (e.g., more positive Obama
evaluations produce less resentful attitudes).
At first glance these results suggest robustly estimated mediation effects for Obama evalua-
tions. The bounds for unexplained variance (e.g., variation suggesting possible confounding as
26Mediation and sensitivity analysis results calculated using the mediation R package (version 4.4.5) (Tingley
et al., 2014) which follows Imai et al. (2011). Other approaches yield similar outcomes (Acharya, Blackwell and Sen,
2016).
27This item asks how favorable one feels toward Barack Obama, with responses recorded on 4-point scales ranging
from very favorable to very unfavorable. I scale this to run 0-1 with higher values denoting more positive evaluations.
Each are asked at t−1.
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Figure A.10: Point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the average total ef-
fect, average causal mediation effect (ACME), and average direct effect (ADE).
indicated by the limits of the contour lines) are relatively low, a trait Imai and colleagues (Imai
et al., 2011) note “indicates a more robust estimate of the ACME because there is less room for an
unobserved confounder to bias the result” (777). Yet closer inspection reveals greater sensitivity.
Relatively low levels of confounding actually switch the sign for the ACME. The top two panels,
for example, indicate that if one or more unobserved variables explain over 10% of Obama evalu-
ations and over 5% of racial attitudes or partisanship, then the ACMEs reported in Figure A.10 are
incorrect. More generally, even small amounts of original variance explained by confounders re-
sults in ACME estimates of 0 (from 0.2% to 0.5% depending on the model). How people evaluate
Barack Obama may facilitate the relationship between racial attitudes and partisanship, but theo-
retical expectations and these results suggest there’s much more to the story. Exploring possible
mechanisms is certainly worth other work considering.
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Figure A.11: Sensitivity analyses for mediation results presented in Figure A.10.
Alternative Operationalizations of Racial Attitudes
I report here additional analyses using alternative measures for racial attitudes in other data
collections covering similar time windows.28 The first addresses racial group stereotypes. The
28Unfortunately the NAES lacks any measure approximating racial resentment to which I can compare effects across
racial attitude measures using the same respondents.
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2006-08-10 General Social Survey (GSS) panel survey includes four items asking respondents if
they thought whites and blacks “tend to be hard-working or if they tend to be lazy” and “tend to
be unintelligent or tend to be intelligent,” with responses recorded on 7-point scales. Similarly,
the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES)’s online panel asked respondents if whites
and blacks “in general” are hardworking or lazy, trustworthy or untrustworthy, and intelligent or
unintelligent, with responses recorded on 0-100 scales.29 As with the group favorability items
I take the difference between whites’ ratings of blacks and their ratings of whites to create 0-1
measures of endorsing anti-black stereotypes. I focus on the 2006-2010 waves for the GSS and
waves 3 and 5 for the NAES (summer and winter 2008 respectively).30 Again, all observations
come from non-Hispanic whites and given the GSS’s face-to-face interviews I focus only on those
interviewed by a white or non-white interviewer in both 2006 and 2010.31
The first four columns in Table A.13 contain the results using stereotypes. They provide in-
consistent evidence for a dynamic relationship between partisanship and group characterizations.
Rather, the results offer more consistent evidence for the partisanship influence hypothesis. First,
the GSS analyses demonstrate that partisanship does have a meaningful cross-lagged effect. Be-
tween 2006 and 2010 whites’ partisan ties motivate them to modify how much they negatively
stereotype black Americans relative to white Americans (β1 = 0.025, p < 0.05). At the same time,
there’s no evidence that stereotypes motivated sorting in this period. Second, the NAES results
similarly support partisanship as a causal force (β1 = 0.034, p < 0.05). But here, evidence also
supports those holding negative stereotypes of black Americans in summer 2008 diverging in their
partisanship (α2 = 0.406p < 0.05). While racial attitudes appear more influential here, this dif-
ference is quite overstated because it applies to the full range of the stereotype measure, a range
anchored by under 1% of respondents. Racial attitudes implicates many fewer respondents than
the 34% of whites identifying as strong partisans. Furthermore, results from models using stan-
29The NAES sample came from Knowledge Networks’s Knowledge Panel with participants recruited by random-
digit telephone dialing. If households lacked internet access they were provided it to participate in the panel.
30GSS06: mean = 0.55, sd= 0.08. GSS10: mean = 0.54, sd= 0.08. NAESwave3: mean = 0.53, sd = 0.09. NAESwave5:
mean = 0.53, sd = 0.08.
31After model diagnostics suggested misspecification (King and Roberts, 2017), I transformed the NAES stereotype
measure using a Box-Cox transformation to normalize each variable.
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Table A.13: Relationship between Whites’ Partisanship and Racial Attitudes
GSS 2006-2010 2008 NAES (July-December) GSS 2006-2010
Anti-Black Anti-Black Same-Race
Stereotypest Partisanshipt Stereotypest Partisanshipt Marriage Preferencet Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 0.025∗ 0.776∗ 0.006∗ 0.898∗ 0.026 0.762∗
(0.012) (0.034) (0.001) (0.009) (0.022) (0.034)
Anti-Black Stereotypest−1 0.309∗ 0.078 0.284∗ 0.406∗
(0.050) (0.141) (0.013) (0.082)
Same-Race Marriage Preferencet−1 0.584∗ 0.143∗
(0.038) (0.059)
Constant 0.357∗ 0.067 0.648∗ −0.288∗ 0.232∗ 0.026
(0.027) (0.077) (0.011) (0.069) (0.027) (0.042)
Observations 364 364 2,938 2,938 378 378
R2 0.113 0.598 0.164 0.787 0.395 0.591
Residual Std. Error 0.073 0.206 0.022 0.146 0.137 0.208
Note:∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.
dardized variables suggest that partisanship is twice as influential.
Finally, the fifth and sixth columns in Table A.13 address beliefs about interracial marriage.
This item is frequently used to capture old fashion racism, a preference for social distance based
on race (Tesler, 2013).32 The results indicate that no dynamic relationship appears to exist be-
tween partisanship and in-marriage preference. Opposing interracial marriage is related to party
switching (p < 0.05), but partisanship has no relationship to in-marriage preferences.
Considered alongside the analyses from the main text, these results suggest that partisanship’s
influence on racial attitudes is not isolated to racial resentment or general group evaluations. It
also shapes stereotypes. It does not, however, affect same-race marriage preferences. This mix
of relationships appears to reflect patterns in the elite information environment where messages
frequently relate to the themes of racial resentment (Haney Lo´pez, 2014), occasionally implicate
racial stereotypes (Dixon, 2017), and do not appear to speak to old fashioned racist beliefs. That
partisanship shapes multiple dimensions of racial animus (Kinder, 2013) speaks to its influence in
a party-centric political context.
32Specifically, this takes two items asking “How about having a close relative or family member marry a black/white
person? Would you be very in favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it happening,
somewhat opposed, or very opposed to it happening?” It’s coded such that 1 = strongly opposing someone marrying a
black person and strongly favoring marrying a white person, and 0 = no in-marriage preference.
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Table A.14: Relationship between Whites’ Partisanship and Racial Resentment. Alternative Parti-
sanship Operationalization.
ANES 1992-1994 CCAP 2016
Racial Resentmentt Relative Republican Favorabilityt Racial Resentmentt Relative Republican Favorabilityt
Relative Republican Favorabilityt−1 0.112∗ 0.713∗ 0.110∗ 0.810∗
(0.037) (0.030) (0.006) (0.007)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.596∗ 0.108∗ 0.777∗ 0.107∗
(0.030) (0.024) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant 0.210∗ 0.116∗ 0.065∗ 0.052∗
(0.024) (0.020) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 574 574 8,116 8,116
R2 0.436 0.534 0.727 0.732
Residual Std. Error 0.158 0.127 0.138 0.148
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses employ population weights.
Alternative Operationalization of Partisanship
In two data sets I generate substitute measures of partisanship employing differenced feeling
thermometers. This new measure offers additional variation, potentially overcoming limitations
from using the traditional 7-point branched ANES measure. Higher values on the outcome denote
greater relative favorability for Republicans over Democrats, mirroring in part an attachment to the
Republican Party. The results in Table A.14 below demonstrates that this alternative measure of
partisanship still shapes racial attitudes.
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Table A.15: Political Awareness’s Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites’ Parti-
sanship and Affect Differential
1992-1994 ANES 2012-2016 VOTER Survey
Low Awareness High Awareness Low Awareness High Awareness
Affect Differencet Partisanshipt Affect Differencet Partisanshipt Affect Differencet Partisanshipt Affect Differencet Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 −0.017 0.774∗ 0.018 0.909∗ 0.056∗ 0.800∗ 0.085∗ 0.878∗
(0.022) (0.051) (0.012) (0.031) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.009)
Affect Differencet−1 0.739∗ 0.035 0.469∗ 0.060 0.515∗ 0.159∗ 0.618∗ −0.032
(0.070) (0.158) (0.043) (0.108) (0.018) (0.034) (0.019) (0.030)
Constant 0.176∗ 0.087 0.270∗ 0.039 0.230∗ 0.045∗ 0.132∗ 0.078∗
(0.041) (0.094) (0.024) (0.060) (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.016)
Observations 194 194 383 383 2,573 2,573 2,689 2,689
R2 0.377 0.551 0.249 0.693 0.266 0.625 0.368 0.775
Residual Std. Error 0.100 0.226 0.079 0.199 0.115 0.219 0.096 0.148
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.
Examining Political Awareness’s Moderating Effect Using Group Affect
The results in Table A.15 replicate the main text analysis exploring political awareness’s con-
ditioning role but using the affect operationalization for racial attitudes. The results offer similar
insights. As with the main results using this operationalization, little dynamic relationship exists
between partisanship and racial attitudes in the 1990s, and this holds for both the most and least
aware (again defined here as those scoring at or above, or below, the median of political awareness
in each data set).
The remaining columns reinforce the main text conclusions that changes in the political con-
text can make partisanship a causal force and that this appears to come from people responding to
the information environment. The results again show that partisanship motivates attitude change,
but the politically aware change the most. The main text results extend to an additional dimension
of racial animus. Where things do change is in racial attitudes’ effect on party switching. Here,
the least politically aware were the most likely to adopt new party loyalties to fit with their racial
attitudes. The more negatively they felt about blacks relative to whites, the more they identified
as Republicans (αˆ2 = 0.159, p < 0.05). The results do not offer any evidence that the most aware
switched parties between 2012 and 2016 (αˆ2 = −0.032, p > 0.1). This divergence across dimen-
sions suggests that group affect may be more readily mapped on to the political system for the less
politically aware.
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Replicating the Main Analyses with an Alternative Analytic Strategy
An additional procedure for evaluating causal patterns comes from (Miller, 1999). This method
classifies individuals based on whether they are located consistently on predisposition measures
across survey waves, or whether one or both predispositions of interest change over time. From
there, causal patterns can be identified by looking at the percentage of individuals who change one
predisposition to align with its partner in a proposed relationship. The distribution of cases among
these categories helps shed light on plausible patterns of causation, and suggests the dominant
causal direction in a given time period. Here, I look at the percentage of individuals who remain at
the same level of partisanship and change their racial attitudes in a congruent direction (e.g., more
racially sympathetic for Democrats) and the percentage of individuals at the same level of racial
resentment (reduced here to a 6-category scale to address potential measurement error issues) who
change their party attachments in a congruent direction (e.g., more Republican for racially resent-
ful individuals).33 When added together these cases provide the total percentage of respondents
available for identifying a causal relationship, and they can be used to explore the more influential
part of a predisposition (e.g., more Republicans change their racial attitudes than Democrats).
The results from this exercise, reported in Table A.16, reinforce the conclusions from the cross-
lagged analyses that partisanship exerts a causal force on racial attitudes, and that this influence is
relatively greater in recent years when compared to the 1990s. First, in the 1992-1994 ANES data,
some 28% of cases allow for determining whether partisanship or racial resentment is a causal
force. Within this set, half of these causal cases support partisanship, while the other half support
racial attitudes. Further, Republicans become more racially resentful at a rate slightly greater than
Democrats become more racially sympathetic (rate = 1.19:1). Racially resentful individuals, those
scoring above the scale’s midpoint, are also twice as likely to become more attached to the Repub-
lican Party than racially sympathetic individuals decrease their attachments to the same (1.96:1).34
33Changing the number of categories does shape the picture presented, but do not change the substantive results.
Analyses using fewer categories make racial attitudes seem more stable, but still present a substantively similar picture
as those presented here. More categories do much more to privilege partisanship in the relationship. By focusing on
fewer categories I present a more stringent test of my hypotheses, and still observe the proposed relationship.
34Changes in party attachments can include reducing one’s attachment to the same party (e.g., strong to weak
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Table A.16: Distribution of Cases featuring Partisanship or Racial Attitudes as a Plausible Cause
Causal Forces 1992-1994 ANES 2008 CCAP 2012 CCAP: March 2012 CCAP: August 2012-2016 VOTER Survey 2016 CCAP
Partisanship Updating Democrats 6% 10% 9% 10% 10% 7%
Racial Attitudes Republicans 8% 8% 9% 10% 10% 10%
Total 14% 19% 19% 20% 20% 17%
Racial Attitudes Racially Resentful 9% 4% 3% 3% 6% 3%
Updating Partisanship Racially Sympathetic 5% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2%
Total 14% 5% 4% 5% 8% 5%
Causal total 28% 24% 23% 25% 28% 22%
This procedure therefore helps shed light on where most of the causal action is occurring in the
1990s by revealing that more change occurs among Republicans and the racially resentful.
Turning to the 2008 election and the CCAP data, much the same pattern holds. Between March
and October, some 24% of cases can identify causal patterns. In contrast to the 1990s, though, party
loyalties matter much more than racial attitudes. Over three times as many whites bring their racial
attitudes into alignment with their partisan ties than vice versa (3.5:1). Of these cases where causal
leverage can be attributed to partisanship, Democrats are moderately more likely than Republicans
to change their racial attitudes (1.2:1). Racially resentful whites are also twice as likely to express
greater identification with the Republican Party than their racially sympathetic counterparts do with
the Democratic Party (2.18:1). Like the 1992-1994 ANES results, those with more negative racial
attitudes provide more of the causal force. But in contrast to these results, partisanship causes a
greater share of predisposition change than do racial attitudes, and among these cases Democrats
appear more influential.
These patterns are remarkably similar when moving to the 2012 CCAP. For the March rein-
terviews, 23% of cases allow for plausibly identifying racial attitudes or partisanship as a cause
and partisanship matters much more. This increases to 25% for the August group. For both sets
of respondents, about four times as many whites update their racial attitudes as alter their parti-
san allegiances. Moreover, Republicans and Democrats are equally likely to change their attitudes.
When considering those updating their partisan ties, the racially resentful are more likely to weaken
their attachments to, or abandon, the Democratic Party than the racially sympathetic are to change
Republican) or switching to another category entirely (e.g., pure independent to lean Republican).
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their loyalties to the Republican Party. But this is more common among the March reinterview
group than the August pool.
These trends persist when looking at changes between 2012 and 2016. Some 28% of cases can
be used to identify causal patterns, and 72% of these speak to partisanship’s influence. Some 20%
of respondents align their racial attitudes with their party loyalties, and these patterns do not differ
by party. Only 8% of cases support racial attitudes having any influence. But of these, the racially
resentful over twice as likely as the racially sympathetic to modify their party loyalties to fit with
their racial attitudes.
Finally, the 2016 CCAP data extend these patterns. Some 22% of cases allow for identifying
causal patterns, and over three-fourths of these implicate partisanship. Within this group, some-
what more white Republicans change their racial attitudes than Democrats (1.55:1). Similarly, the
racially resentful are slightly more likely to change their party loyalties than are the racially sym-
pathetic (1.30:1). These results again fit with the prior evidence suggesting Republicans and the
racially resentful provide most of the causal force.
Using a different analytical strategy I again demonstrate that partisanship can change racial
attitudes, and that this is more likely in a party-centric political context. What’s more, this proce-
dure also sheds light on who is most likely to update their racial attitudes or their partisanship. No
partisan group seems especially prone to updating their attitudes. But racially resentful individu-
als are somewhat more likely to align their party loyalties appropriately than racially sympathetic
individuals are to update theirs.
Appendix to Chapter 5
Education’s Moderating Effect in a Less Party Centric Era
The results in Table A.17 consider education’s conditioning effect in a period less polarized by
party. As noted in the main text, there are no conditioned relationship effects from partisanship
on racial attitudes. Indeed there’s weak support for partisanship even having an average effect
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on attitude change. But as the results in the second column indicate, this period saw changes
in partisan ties produced by racial attitudes. Moreover, these differences are driven by racially
resentful individuals with college degrees.
Table A.17: Conditioned Relationship between Whites’ Partisanship and Racial Resentment be-
tween 1992 and 1994
Racial Resentmentt Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 0.036 0.837∗
(0.025) (0.033)
—*College Degreet−1 0.051 0.022
(0.045) (0.060)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.520∗ 0.020
(0.040) (0.053)
—*College Degreet−1 0.105 0.243∗
(0.063) (0.083)
College Degreet−1 −0.141∗ −0.151∗
(0.041) (0.054)
Constant 0.310∗ 0.084∗
(0.028) (0.037)
Observations 571 571
R2 0.442 0.663
Residual Std. Error 0.156 0.205
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from
the 1992-1994 ANES panel study with population weights.
Testing Education’s Moderating Effect with an Alternative Approach
Table A.18 provides results using an alternative analytical strategy described in (Miller, 1999).
This method classifies individuals based on whether they are located consistently on predisposition
measures across survey waves, or whether one or both predispositions of interest change over
time. From there, causal patterns can be identified by looking at the percentage of individuals who
change one predisposition to align with its partner in a proposed relationship. The distribution of
cases among these categories helps shed light on plausible patterns of causation, and suggests the
dominant causal direction in a given time period. Here, I look at the percentage of individuals who
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remain at the same level of partisanship and change their racial attitudes in a congruent direction
(e.g., more racially sympathetic for Democrats) and the percentage of individuals at the same level
of racial resentment (reduced here to a 6-category scale to address potential measurement error
issues) who change their party attachments in a congruent direction (e.g., more Republican for
racially resentful individuals). When added together these cases provide the total percentage of
respondents available for identifying a causal relationship, and they can be used to explore the
more influential part of a predisposition (e.g., more Republicans change their racial attitudes than
Democrats).
Table A.18: Distribution of Cases featuring Partisanship or Racial Attitudes as a Plausible Cause
2008-2012 CCAP 2012-2016 VOTER Survey
Causal Forces No College College No College College
Partisanship Updating Democrats 7% 7 10 13
Racial Attitudes Republicans 11 9 12 9
Total 18 17 21 22
Racial Attitudes Racially Resentful 8 4 6 3
Updating Partisanship Racially Sympathetic 2 2 1 2
Total 9 6 6 5
Causal total 27 23 28 28
Racial Resentment Subdimension Analysis by Political Interest
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Table A.19: Political Interest’s Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites’ Partisanship
and Racial Resentment
2008-2012 CCAP 2012-2016 VOTER Survey
Individualist Structuralist Individualist Structuralist
RRt Partisanshipt RRt Partisanshipt RRt Partisanshipt RRt Partisanshipt
Partisanshipt−1 −0.009 0.852∗ 0.016 0.854∗ 0.071∗ 0.826∗ 0.172∗ 0.829∗
(0.046) (0.042) (0.047) (0.042) (0.029) (0.027) (0.032) (0.027)
—*Moderate Interestt−1 0.098 −0.039 0.077 −0.031 0.042 −0.012 −0.023 −0.021
(0.051) (0.046) (0.052) (0.046) (0.032) (0.030) (0.036) (0.030)
—*High Interestt−1 0.238∗ −0.028 0.173∗ −0.031 0.122∗ −0.030 0.085∗ −0.020
(0.049) (0.044) (0.050) (0.045) (0.031) (0.029) (0.034) (0.029)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.442∗ 0.152∗ 0.692∗ −0.002 0.677∗ 0.044 0.605∗ −0.034
(0.057) (0.052) (0.062) (0.055) (0.040) (0.037) (0.042) (0.035)
—*Moderate Interestt−1 0.170∗ −0.057 −0.040 0.049 0.113∗ 0.090∗ 0.063 0.211∗
(0.064) (0.058) (0.068) (0.061) (0.044) (0.041) (0.047) (0.040)
—*High Interestt−1 0.182∗ −0.067 −0.062 0.087 0.061 0.067 0.099∗ 0.131∗
(0.061) (0.055) (0.065) (0.058) (0.042) (0.039) (0.045) (0.038)
Moderate Interestt−1 −0.179∗ 0.031 −0.032 −0.052 −0.104∗ −0.085∗ −0.025 −0.165∗
(0.052) (0.047) (0.056) (0.050) (0.034) (0.032) (0.037) (0.031)
High Interestt−1 −0.313∗ 0.021 −0.108∗ −0.090 −0.138∗ −0.073∗ −0.139∗ −0.128∗
(0.050) (0.045) (0.053) (0.048) (0.032) (0.030) (0.035) (0.029)
Constant 0.442∗ 0.013 0.243∗ 0.122∗ 0.174∗ 0.119∗ 0.148∗ 0.171∗
(0.048) (0.044) (0.052) (0.046) (0.031) (0.029) (0.033) (0.028)
Observations 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 5,970 5,970 5,970 5,970
R2 0.567 0.771 0.551 0.769 0.565 0.693 0.492 0.694
Residual Std. Error 0.195 0.177 0.198 0.177 0.203 0.187 0.222 0.186
Note: ∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights. Low political interest is the
omitted category.
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Figure A.12: Partisan gap in racial resentmentt by political interest and subdimension of racial
resentment. Results based on models in Table A.19. Bars provide the distribution of political
interest in each model.
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Engagement Moderation Analysis by Party
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Table A.20: Moderating Effect of Political Engagement Dimensions on the Relationship between
Whites’ Partisanship and Racial Resentment
CCAP VOTER Survey CCAP VOTER Survey CCAP VOTER Survey
2008-2012 2012-2016 2008-2012 2012-2016 2008-2012 2012-2016
Republicant−1 0.094∗ 0.114∗ 0.012 0.088∗ 0.020 0.061∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.028) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016)
—*College Educationt−1 0.038 0.052∗
(0.021) (0.014)
—*Moderate Interestt−1 0.045 0.015
(0.031) (0.021)
—*High Interestt−1 0.148∗ 0.070∗
(0.030) (0.020)
—*Political Awarenesst−1 0.163∗ 0.082∗
(0.031) (0.023)
Pure Independentt−1 0.076∗ 0.067∗ −0.010 0.061∗ −0.002 0.023
(0.015) (0.008) (0.031) (0.018) (0.025) (0.017)
—*College Educationt−1 0.042 0.066∗
(0.030) (0.018)
—*Moderate Interestt−1 0.047 −0.007
(0.038) (0.021)
—*High Interestt−1 0.153∗ 0.050∗
(0.037) (0.022)
—*Political Awarenesst−1 0.166∗ 0.055∗
(0.044) (0.026)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.703∗ 0.821∗ 0.679∗ 0.726∗ 0.682∗ 0.573∗
(0.019) (0.013) (0.058) (0.041) (0.034) (0.031)
—*College Educationt−1 0.028 −0.058∗
(0.035) (0.025)
—*Moderate Interestt−1 0.066 0.118∗
(0.065) (0.045)
—*High Interestt−1 0.014 0.063
(0.062) (0.043)
—*Political Awarenesst−1 0.029 0.291∗
(0.053) (0.041)
College Educationt−1 −0.082∗ −0.032∗
(0.020) (0.014)
Moderate Interestt−1 −0.087 −0.082∗
(0.048) (0.034)
High Interestt−1 −0.153∗ −0.106∗
(0.046) (0.032)
Political Awarenesst−1 −0.192∗ −0.330∗
(0.034) (0.027)
Constant 0.172∗ 0.035∗ 0.262∗ 0.113∗ 0.262∗ 0.287∗
(0.013) (0.009) (0.044) (0.031) (0.024) (0.022)
Observations 2,204 6,095 2,204 6,062 2,204 5,597
R2 0.652 0.622 0.662 0.625 0.660 0.639
Residual Std. Error 0.163 0.177 0.161 0.176 0.161 0.172
Note:∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights. Democrats are the
omitted category.
193
Individualist Structuralist
No
College
Degree
College
Degree
No
College
Degree
College
Degree
.50
.60
.70
.50
.60
.70
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 R
ac
ia
l R
es
en
tm
en
t t
Education
Individualist Structuralist
CCAP
2008−2012
VO
TER
 Survey
2012−2016
0 .25 .50 .75 1.00 0 .25 .50 .75 1.00
Political Awareness
Democrats Republicans
Figure A.13: Predicted level of racial resentmentt by subdimension. Results based on models in
Tables A.21 and Tables A.22.
Variation by Racial Resentment Subdimension
To further unpack party differences by engagement, I consider variation by subdimension of
racial resentment and the conditioning effects of education and political awareness. The panels
in Figure A.13 again demonstrate asymmetric conditioning effects by party. But the degree of
variation varies somewhat by dimension. No matter the time period or dimension, more engaged
Democrats exhibit greater degrees of attitude change. Even so, variation is somewhat more muted
on the structuralist dimension in the VOTER Survey data than in the CCAP data, again suggesting
a change in the nature of information to which partisans are responding.
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Table A.21: Moderating Effect of Political Engagement Dimensions on the Relationship between
Whites’ Partisanship and Racial Resentment’s Structuralist Dimension
CCAP VOTER Survey CCAP VOTER Survey CCAP VOTER Survey
2008-2012 2012-2016 2008-2012 2012-2016 2008-2012 2012-2016
Republicant−1 0.106∗ 0.174∗ 0.037 0.130∗ 0.020 0.075∗
(0.011) (0.008) (0.034) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
—*College Educationt−1 0.054∗ 0.019
(0.024) (0.017)
—*Moderate Interestt−1 0.041 0.009
(0.038) (0.026)
—*High Interestt−1 0.132∗ 0.085∗
(0.037) (0.025)
—*Political Awarenesst−1 0.190∗ 0.122∗
(0.036) (0.028)
Pure Independentt−1 0.079∗ 0.099∗ 0.017 0.128∗ −0.011 0.029
(0.018) (0.010) (0.039) (0.023) (0.030) (0.022)
—*College Educationt−1 0.040 0.059∗
(0.037) (0.022)
—*Moderate Interestt−1 0.015 −0.083∗
(0.047) (0.027)
—*High Interestt−1 0.118∗ 0.026
(0.045) (0.027)
—*Political Awarenesst−1 0.187∗ 0.085∗
(0.053) (0.033)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.642∗ 0.667∗ 0.686∗ 0.627∗ 0.642∗ 0.494∗
(0.020) (0.014) (0.063) (0.042) (0.037) (0.033)
—*College Educationt−1 −0.035 0.015
(0.037) (0.028)
—*Moderate Interestt−1 −0.040 0.030
(0.069) (0.047)
—*High Interestt−1 −0.070 0.053
(0.066) (0.045)
—*Political Awarenesst−1 −0.039 0.260∗
(0.059) (0.046)
College Educationt−1 −0.050∗ −0.074∗
(0.023) (0.017)
Moderate Interestt−1 −0.015 0.008
(0.053) (0.037)
High Interestt−1 −0.086 −0.097∗
(0.051) (0.035)
Political Awarenesst−1 −0.165∗ −0.324∗
(0.039) (0.031)
Constant 0.200∗ 0.103∗ 0.238∗ 0.134∗ 0.284∗ 0.320∗
(0.015) (0.010) (0.049) (0.033) (0.027) (0.025)
Observations 2,204 6,003 2,204 5,970 2,204 5,514
R2 0.549 0.493 0.556 0.500 0.558 0.511
Residual Std. Error 0.198 0.223 0.197 0.220 0.196
Note:∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights. Democrats are the
omitted category.
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Table A.22: Moderating Effect of Political Engagement Dimensions on the Relationship between
Whites’ Partisanship and Racial Resentment’s Individualist Dimension
CCAP VOTER Survey CCAP VOTER Survey CCAP VOTER Survey
2008-2012 2012-2016 2008-2012 2012-2016 2008-2012 2012-2016
Republicant−1 0.119∗ 0.101∗ −0.007 0.054∗ 0.038 0.028
(0.011) (0.008) (0.033) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019)
—*College Educationt−1 0.080∗ 0.089∗
(0.024) (0.016)
—*Moderate Interestt−1 0.079∗ 0.047∗
(0.037) (0.024)
—*High Interestt−1 0.215∗ 0.107∗
(0.036) (0.023)
—*Political Awarenesst−1 0.186∗ 0.139∗
(0.036) (0.026)
Pure Independentt−1 0.090∗ 0.063∗ −0.021 −0.009 0.024 0.001
(0.018) (0.009) (0.037) (0.021) (0.029) (0.020)
—*College Educationt−1 0.092∗ 0.077∗
(0.036) (0.020)
—*Moderate Interestt−1 0.083 0.097∗
(0.045) (0.024)
—*High Interestt−1 0.201∗ 0.120∗
(0.044) (0.025)
—*Political Awarenesst−1 0.162∗ 0.092∗
(0.052) (0.030)
Racial Resentmentt−1 0.583∗ 0.756∗ 0.446∗ 0.683∗ 0.475∗ 0.482∗
(0.019) (0.013) (0.057) (0.039) (0.035) (0.032)
—*College Educationt−1 0.024 −0.067∗
(0.036) (0.026)
—*Moderate Interestt−1 0.161∗ 0.092∗
(0.064) (0.044)
—*High Interestt−1 0.158∗ 0.041
(0.061) (0.042)
—*Political Awarenesst−1 0.192∗ 0.301∗
(0.056) (0.042)
College Educationt−1 −0.126∗ −0.055∗
(0.021) (0.015)
Moderate Interestt−1 −0.169∗ −0.112∗
(0.049) (0.034)
High Interestt−1 −0.295∗ −0.135∗
(0.047) (0.032)
Political Awarenesst−1 −0.332∗ −0.401∗
(0.036) (0.029)
Constant 0.254∗ 0.095∗ 0.443∗ 0.190∗ 0.411∗ 0.398∗
(0.014) (0.009) (0.045) (0.031) (0.025) (0.024)
Observations 2,204 6,003 2,204 5,970 2,204 5,514
R2 0.564 0.562 0.576 0.570 0.574 0.579
Residual Std. Error 0.195 0.204 0.193 0.202 0.193 0.199
Note:∗p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights. Democrats are the
omitted category.
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